Government and Student Tension in China: A Study of the Student Movements in the 1980's by Zou, Linda
GOVERNMENT AND STUDENT TENSION IN CHINA: 
A STUDY OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENTS 
IN THE 1980'S 
BY 
LINDA ~OU 
Bachelor of Arts 
North-Western Teachers College 
Gansu, China 
1982 
Master of Arts 
Oral Roberts University 
Tulsa, Oklahoma 
1987 
Submitted to the Faculty of the 
Graduate College of the 
Oklahoma state University 
in partial fulfillment of 
the requirement for 
the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION 
May, 1991 
Oklahoma State Univ. Library 
GOVERNMENT AND STUDENT TENSION IN CHINA: 
A STUDY OF THE STUDENT MOVEMENTS 
IN THE 1980'S 
Thesis Advisor 
~T:!'~ ""--- . 




The 1989 student movement in China has written a very 
unique page in the Chinese history. During the course of 
this movement, I was in the process of selecting a topic for 
my dissertation. Deeply effected by what transpired in 
Tiananmen Square and concerned about the future of China, I 
decided to devote my dissertation topic to the study of the 
relationship between the Chinese government and the students 
and their movements. 
In the course of choosing the topic and conducting the 
research, I have received a lot of help and guidance from 
several individuals. Here I wish to express my sincere 
thanks and appreciation to Dr. Thomas A, Karman, the 
chairman and advisor on my dissertation committee, and Dr. 
Richard Rohrs, department head of history, for encouraging 
and guiding me from the initiation of the thesis topic to 
the development of the contents. My special thanks goes to 
Dr Karman who not only gave me a lot of valuable suggestions 
in writing this paper but also encouraged me since the first 
class of my doctoral studies. My special thanks and 
gratitude go to Dr. Rohrs who had gone an extra step in 
helping me with this research, whose guidance, help and 
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humor made difficult situations manageable. I am also 
indebted to Dr.David Webster and Dr. John Gardiner. 
Dr. Gardiner and Webster have always trusted and encouraged 
me during my doctoral study here in OSU, and their 
confidence in me and support have meant a lot in my journey 
finishing up this research project. 
I also want to thank Polly McLachlan who has helped me 
with many editings of this dissertation and Jill Holmes with 
her library assistance. My special thanks also goes to my 
friend Chen Zhanghoun who began writing his dissertation 
almost the same time as I did. we encouraged each other and 
shared many valuable resources. My sincere appreciation 
goes to Robert Imark, whose computer assistance has made the 
typing a lot easier and quicker. 
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Without progress 
There will be retrogression 
Chinese Proverb 
As if on the track of. an aged mill. history grinds on. 
slowly and heavily; in the riverbed wbich has accumulated 
silt and sand of the ages. the Yellow.River flows on. as 
slowly and as heavily. 
Is another flood coming? 
or is turmoil gone forever? 
We are asking the Yellow River. we are asking history. 
From River Elegy-television series 
"Chaos often breeds life 




Throughout the history of modern China, there has been 
constant tension between the Chinese government and 
intellectuals, particularly students. This tension has 
contributed to many student movements and political changes. 
This research attempts to investigate the tension between 
the government and the students and its impact on higher 
education and the student movements in the 1980's. 
For many people, Chinese and foreigners alike, who have 
been exposed only to the isolated events of the student 
movement of 1989, understanding the Chinese government, 
students and their demonstrations is difficult. This 
research, by investigating the connection between the 
political situation and the student movements of this 
decade, should offer a framework within which the 
relationship between the government and the students can be 
reflected upon and the student movements in the 1980's 
understood better. 
Having grown up in China, having been educated by the 
higher education system after Mao, having witnessed and 
experienced and occasionally participated in the student 
movements in China since 1978, I feel that I have 
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an advantage in discussing, analyzing, and presenting the 
topic. so far, to my knowledge, there have been several 
books written on the student movement of 1989, but no 
systematic research has been done which examines the longer-
standing tension between the government and the students 
and how this tension impacted the student movements in the 
1980's. Thus, this research will make a body of knowledge 
available in regard to a critical period and serious topic 
in Chinese history. 
The major sources were from periodicals, magazines and 
newspapers, documents and books published both here and in 
China. Many materials have been obtained through the osu 
library and other channels, such as Microfiche, interlibrary 
loan, and personal collections. Data dealing with issues 
like politics, economy, and education were drawn from 
primary sources such as government documents, from secondary 
sources such as books written by Chinese as well as foreign 
writers. The criteria for determining exclusion and 
inclusion of primary as well as secondary sources were the 
relevance to the purpose of this study. In addition, I am a 
native Chinese. The language skill has helped to translate 
some primary sources into English. 
As the topic of this dissertation encompassed a large 
domain of politics, education, and student movements from 
1978 and 1989, it was impossible for me to dwell in detail 
on each one. Consequently, this study was intended only to 
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illustrate the relationship between the Chinese government's 
educational policy and the students, and its impact on the 
student movements. Chinese political movements since Mao's 
death have not been confined to the student demonstrations, 
but the non-students movements have not been treated here, 
noticeably the 1978 Tiananmen Democracy Wall by workers. 
This study used historical research method. Attention 
was first given to the historical background of the Chinese 
politics, higher education development and the students, 
then to the chronology and examination of the development of 
the tension between the government and the students in the 
1980's. 
There is no consensus among scholars as to how Chinese 
names should be romanized. In general, with exception of 
those which have long been standardized (such as confucius 
and Chiang Kai-Shek), all names of persons and places before 
the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, have 
been romanized according to the Wade-Giles system. All 
names of persons and places after 1949 have been romanized 
according to the Hanyupinyin system. 
The research started right after the demonstrations of 
1989. Being a Chinese student from Mainland China, the 
student demonstrations had an emotional impact on me. 
However, in the course of the research, I tried to avoid 
personal feelings as much as possible so that the reader can 
get an unbiased view of the research topic. 
CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Chinese Higher Education and Student Movements 
Chinese higher education and student movements are a 
modern phenomenon. Although the ancient Chinese 
civilization flourished for several thousand years, higher 
education institutions in the modern sense and student 
movements in China began only in the late eighteenth 
century. The political situation, the evolution of higher 
education, the major student movements, and the interaction 
of the three are important to the understanding of the 
relation between the Chinese government, students, and their 
movements in the 1980's. 
Prior to the early nineteenth century, the traditional 
Chinese traditional educational system embodied the study of 
the Confucian classical texts for the Civil Service 
Examinations. 1 This testing mechanism served as the sole 
criterion to recruit capable candidates into public service 
and formed the basis of traditional Chinese education, which 
completed the cycle since education supported the 
examination system while the exam system supported the 
classical education. There were a few public schools and 
some private ones. Teachers were generally men who had 
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passed the exam or who had tried but failed. Bright 
students would either go to school or have private tutors at 
home. The curriculum consisted of Confucius' Four Books and 
Five Classics which did not include applied subjects such as 
medicine, mathematics, and engineering. 2 students devoted 
much time to memorizing the classics and composing poems and 
essays. China had gone through many transformations in 
three thousand years of dynasty cycles, but the function of 
education had never gone beyond that. The Chinese regarded 
the traditional educational system as the only possible 
system until near the end of the eighteenth century. 3 
Higher education in the modern sense started during the 
late eighteenth century. The fire power of British cannons 
undermined the Confucian way of life and along with it the 
long-standing educational tradition. The Opium War forced 
China, ill-equipped militarily, to fight for her territorial 
sovereignty. The need to learn Western technology first 
resulted in the establishment of professional colleges for 
the study of foreign language, military science, and 
navigation. 4 These colleges were very different from the 
traditional schools in which only Confucius' books were 
taught, but what dominated the curriculum of that time was 
still the study of the classical literature and culture. 
Nonetheless, colleges in the modern sense came into being, 
and college students began to appear on campuses. 
When Japan defeated China during the Sino-Japanese war 
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in 1895, the Chinese came to the realization that, besides 
developing military forces, they must also develop their 
economy, industry, and education. They needed not only 
modern military and naval officers but also scientists, 
industrialists, and other professional men. 5 This enlarged 
view about the mission of the country enabled the 
progressive reformer Chang Chih-tong to compile the 1904 
educational regulations. These regulations accomplished 
three very important tasks: the establishment of nationally 
run universities in large cities to replace or incorporate 
the privately owned schools of the traditional period; the 
founding of a Ministry of Education to provide centralized 
direction; and the elimination of the Civil service 
Examinations.' 
The abolition of the exam caused by the decree was a 
decisive turning point in the decline of the Confucian 
educational system. With it, a new system of higher 
education organized on modern lines was ushered in. The 
newly-founded Ministry of Education set up new colleges, 
incorporated the old schools, and expanded the curriculum to 
offer subjects in more areas. To staff the new colleges, 
the government sent many students to foreign countries to 
study technological and industrial development, knowledge 
not available in China then. In a few years, there were 
about thirty-five thousand students who received higher 
eduction in Japan.' By the year 1909, there were altogether 
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650 students studying in the United states.• students who 
were studying abroad became increasingly aware of the needs 
of their own country, perceiving that "the task before the 
Chinese students today is to build up of a new, strong and 
powerful nation out of the old tottering China."' The 
Chinese students home and abroad were to "supply the country 
the future leaders, statesmen and diplomats, lawyers and 
doctors, teachers and professors and engineers and 
scientists of all kinds. 1110 
The 1911 political revolution in China toppled the 
imperial system that had lasted for several thousand years, 
and Chinese society underwent fundamental changes. At the 
beginning of 1912, a republican form of government had been 
established at Nanking with Sun Yat-sen as the provisional 
President. But governing authority after 1912 and 
increasingly so between 1916 and 1926, fell to the control 
of warlords. 11 Contrary to the hopes of many 
revolutionaries, the Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the 
Chinese imperial system, failed to produce a unified 
republic. During the time when control was in the hands of 
the warlords, there was a great breakdown of central 
authority. This political autonomy also manifested itself 
in higher education. 
The absence of centralized political control during 
this time provided opportunities for Chinese educators for 
the first time to create institutions that would contribute 
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to modern economic, academic, and intellectual development. 
By this time, China had established quite a number of 
universities, with many of them concentrated in a few 
cities, particularly Beijing.(Peking) Beijing became the 
educational and intellectual center with its cluster of 
celebrated universities and colleges, such as Beijing 
University, the National Normal University, Tsing Hua, 
Yenching, Beijing Union Medical College, and a scattering of 
smaller schools. 12 Of these several institutions, Beijing 
University-Beita was acknowledged as the most prestigious. 
Chai Yuan-pei, the German-educated chancellor of Beida 
brought together on its faculty a remarkable assemblage of 
intellectual leaders. Together with other intellectuals, he 
not only transformed the organizational structure of Beida 
into a university designed to create intellectual leadership 
in China but also stimulated the rise of a new political and 
intellectual consciousness among the students at Beijing 
University as well as at other educational institutions. 13 
The higher education institutions as a whole moved away 
from the autocratic educational system of earlier European 
and Japanese models and imitated in part the decentralized 
and more democratic American system.u consequently, the 
institutions began to offer courses of pure and applied 
sciences and humanities. They also implemented the system 
of distribution and concentration to ensure that students 
had an exposure to a range of knowledge areas. The pure and 
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applied sciences developed together, and this blending of 
practical aspects of the social sciences and humanities led 
to a high level of political activism among the students. 15 
"Political activism, if not outright revolutionary 
conspiracy, was unquestionably the principal extracurricular 
activity of most of these young men and women." 11 It was 
during this time the student movements began. 
Historians believe the modern Chinese student 
movements started from the demonstration of May 4, 1919, 
which set a prototype for a generation of student 
rebellion. 17 On May 4, 1919, politically-alert Beijing 
University students and thousands of students from several 
other institutions congregated at Tiananmen Square to 
protest against the Paris Decisions. 11 The provisions of 
the Treaty of Versailles allowed Japan to retain control of 
the German-leased territory in Shantung. The Chinese 
Minister to Japan, Chang Tsung-hsiang, had officially 
replied ·to Japan's request as being "accepted with 
pleasure. 1111 
Japan's demand and the warlord government's response 
infuriated the students and the public. The students wrote 
in their own blood on the walls of university dining halls 
and dormitories, denouncing both the Japanese and their 
Chinese partners. The students' outrage aroused the public. 
Merchants, shopkeepers, and workers joined them in organized 
demonstrations and in boycotting Japanese goods. The 
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student demonstrations took place in at least two hundred 
places, including Shanghai where merchants closed their 
shops for a week, and workers went on strike in forty 
factories. The Beijing authorities arrested many students 
but capitulated under pressure, and some 1115 students 
marched victoriously out of jail. 20 The warlord government 
was also forced to reject the treaty and removed the 
minister and other collaborators from their posts. 21 
The students carried on their resistance against Japan 
and the warlord government after the demonstration. The 
All-China students' Federation was founded and held its 
first congress in June of 1919. 22 Immediately after the 
incident, Beijing students started to organize the students 
of the nation in support of their cause. They also 
endeavored to win the sympathy of the general public by 
means of publicity, mass meetings, and demonstrations. In 
this process, they began to establish closer contacts with 
the masses of illiterate people and to secure strong and 
effective support from the merchants, industrialists, and 
urban workers. The students spread their new ideas 
throughout the cities of the country. 23 
The substance of this movement and manner in which the 
students expressed themselves were unparalleled in Chinese 
history. This movement was not merely an anti-imperialist 
campaign. By expressing their nationalism, the students 
challenged the authority and proclaimed their lack of 
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confidence in the warlord government. By confronting the 
government for its policies and decisions, the students 
demanded their political and democratic rights. As one 
participant and leader of May Fourth Movement put it, "The 
most pressing democratic demands at that time were the 
democratic rights to freedom of assembly, association, 
speech and publication." 26 The message that the Chinese 
people would deny the legitimacy of any government in which 
they could not place their confidence constituted the real 
impact of the May Fourth experience on later Chinese 
politics. 25 
The warlord era from 1916 to 1927 was a blessing as 
well as a curse to China. The divergence between political 
decline on the one hand and intellectual, economic, and 
social developments on the other illustrated the pluralism 
of this era. 2' The lack of central government control 
allowed a great deal of political autonomy during this time 
and this autonomy allowed all sorts of ideas and practices 
to stem forth unrestrained by authority. For the very first 
time, universities became centers for ideas, for 
intellectual debate, and for dialogue. Students engaged in 
activities far beyond the traditional curriculum. The May 
Fourth student Movement took place under this relaxed 
political climate. But China as a nation suffered. It lay 
defenseless before foreign enemies while military 
adventurers of individual warlord devoured the land. 
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Japanese demands for China's territory were a clear sign of 
the aggressiveness of foreign powers and the inability of 
the warlord government to act in defense of the country. 
Modern colleges and universities had attracted the ambitious 
youth during the warlord era, but the constant fighting and 
disputes among warlords disappointed the students. Many 
public institutions faced hard times as the warlord 
administrations cut educational funds in order to pay 
military expenditures. 2 ' The faculty were underpaid while 
the expanding student bodies were crammed into shabby 
dormitories, seething with discontent and frustration. 21 
After the May Fourth Movement, the dominant sentiment 
in China was for national unification by ending warlordism 
and gaining independence from foreign occupation. 21 The 
students were struggling to organize themselves and 
searching for a cause to which they could devote themselves. 
There were two political parties at that time. The 
Nationalist Party, known as the Kuomintang (KMT), was the 
only existing party that seemed to be promising and many of 
the educated youths found themselves in agreement with·its 
goals. 30 The Communist Party, Which came into being in 
1921, was at this time relatively small and obscure. The 
Kuomintang had long wanted to launch a Northern Expedition, 
a military campaign from the party's base in south China 
northward to Peking, conquering all the warlords along the 
way. 31 From 1925 to 1927, students paved the way for the 
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Northern Expedition. 
Higher education institutions and the students became 
important instruments for expanding the Kuomintang's 
political influence and achieving social reforms in China. 32 
The Kuomintang successfully recruited many students from 
Chinese universities, for both its civilian and military 
organizations. Under the influence of KMT educators, some 
universities became centers of the national revolutionary 
movement. Shanghai University's president, Yu Yu-jen, 
brought partisan intellectuals onto the faculty and 
furthered the recruitment of students for Whampoa, the 
military academy and the movement in canton. 33 A variety of 
KMT-allied organizations channeled the young talent of the 
vast Yangtze basin into recruiting agencies, and such 
operations at Shanghai alone processed over five thousand 
recruits during 1925, the year preceding the Northern 
Expedition. 3 ' Students became editors and writers for the 
official organs, street lecturers, labor union organizers, 
rural cadres, military propagandists, and government 
officials; they staged constant street demonstrations to 
keep mass enthusiasm alive. 35 The Northern Expedition of 
1927 led to the final downfall of the warlord government and 
established the first stable republican government under the 
Kuomintang--the Nationalist Party. 
Higher education after the Northern Expedition 
underwent manifold changes. Higher education institutions 
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had increased rapidly. By 1930, there were fifty-nine 
universities and colleges with a total teaching staff of 
5,212 professors, instructors, and teaching assistants plus 
41,966 students. 3 ' The Kuomintang Party, in order to 
maintain political control, favored a centralized 
educational system. "In line with the general political 
orientation of the Kuomintang, education was declared to be 
an ideological weapon in the hands of the party." 37 
students' political activities, which had earlier helped the 
nationalists to seize power, were now seen as a threat to 
political order. 31 The government wanted to disengage the 
youth from politics through education. Beginning in 1928, 
the Ministry of Education made efforts to standardize all 
university curricula, and in 1930 the government announced a 
series of required courses for students in various 
disciplines. 31 The Kuomintang government looked to Europe 
for more centralized higher education organizational 
patterns and placed emphasis on the natural sciences because 
of the determination to reduce social science enrollments. 
The social science courses and the students who majored in 
those areas had demonstrated a tendency toward examining 
practical problems of the political and social order, and 
the government considered such to be detrimental to the 
party's political power and stability.'0 
Hard as they tried, the Kuomintang leaders were not 
very successful in coercing or beguiling students into 
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acquiescence by thought control through curriculum. The 
student involvement in and concern over national affairs 
culminated in demonstrations over the loss of Manchuria to 
Japan in September 1931.u On September 18, 1931, the 
Japanese officers concocted an incident which aimed at the 
conquest of Northeast China. When Japanese soldiers looted, 
burned, and occupied the largest city in that area, the 
students were enraged. Like the May Fourth Movement in 
1919, the students were not only indignant at the Japanese 
aggression but also abhorred the government's non-resistance 
foreign policy. The students from major cities, such as 
Peking, Shanghai, and Nanking, convened emergency 
assemblies, organized anti-Japanese associations, and sent 
telegrams to the Kuomintang Party demanding punishment of 
the commanders of the Northeast forces who were responsible 
for the failure to resist the invaders.•2 Following the 
example of students fro.m these major cities, students from 
all over· China arrived in Nanking by the trainload, 
protesting Japan's conquest of Northeast China, insisting 
that the government take action, and volunteering for unpaid 
service.u 
The student protests continued until January of 1932 
with mixed results. They established various student 
associations, organized strikes, drafted petitions, 
triggered demonstrations, and engaged in fund-raising. They 
ventured to enlist the masses to join them in persuading the 
16 
government to take actions.•• But the government failed to 
take heed and continued its non-resistance policy. 45 
Thwarted by the Kuomintang's practices, the students who had 
helped the party to gain power and who had been loyal began 
to withdraw support from the government." 
.The student rebellion of 1935-1936 was the beginning of 
the end of China's non-resistance policy. Although the 
student movement in 1931 failed to affect the government's 
foreign policy, the student movement in 1935 did. After the 
conquest of northeast China in 1931, Japan furthered the 
aggression in 1935, seeking the separation of North China 
from the south. on November 1, an impassioned petition 
signed by students from several Beijing universities, was 
sent to the Plenary session of the Kuomintang and addressed 
to the press, news agencies, magazines, public institutions 
and organizations, schools and universities, and students 
organizations.•7 The petition called for open conduct of 
foreign relations, cessation of arbitrary arrest, protection 
of territorial integrity, and termination of illegal arrests 
of students and all civil war. The petition demanded that 
the Kuomintang government guarantee the right of free 
speech, and of the press and pleaded with the government to 
realize that "in this period of national crisis each citizen 
must individually shoulder responsibility and act to save 
his country."" 
The government's slow reaction to the petition prompted 
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a demonstration in December. December 9, 1935, one day 
before the announcement of the separation of North China 
from the south, a city-wide student strike and demonstration 
began." students from various universities in Beijing, 
carrying propaganda leaflets, flags, and placards marched 
and sang their way to the Forbidden City in defiance of the 
police while shopkeepers, housewives, artisans, teachers, 
and merchants applauded from the streets. 50 That same 
evening, representatives of the participating schools met at 
Beijing University and voted to begin a general strike in 
the morning. The following day, mass meetings in more than 
a dozen schools supported the decision to strike, approved 
the demands for the immediate release of the arrested 
students, and called for punishment of the police and 
soldiers who had injured demonstrators. 51 By December 13, 
almost all students were on strike at Yenching, Tsinghua, 
Beijing, Chaoyan, Fujien universities and several other 
schools. 52 on December 17, a second massive demonstration 
swept Beijing and Tientsin with tens of thousands students 
participating. Although the police, injured many students, 
and ~he government arrested ne.arly two thousand of them, the 
students held a third demonstration a week later which 
called for an end to civil war and a united front against 
Japan. 53 
The student movement of 1935 was a forerunner of a 
united front against Japan. The students' petitions, 
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demonstrations and strikes won the support of the masses and 
helped to push the Kuomintang regime toward a united front 
with the Communists against Japan. The student movement 
ended the non-resistance policy of the government and 
prevented the Japanese attempt to take over China by mere 
diplomacy." 
The outbreak of Sino-Japanese war in 1937 plunged 
China into eight years of bitter struggle which resulted in 
the steady deterioration of social and economic 
conditions. 55 The civil war was equally devastating. The 
Kuomintang government and the communists, which by this time 
grew into a formidable force to be reckoned with, fought 
painfully for the power to govern China. Even before the 
Sino-Japanese war, the Kuomintang was paranoid about the 
existence of the communists. To the Kuomintang, the 
Communists were intimidating with an ideology, a program and 
a very able revolutionary leadership. It regarded 
communism as a military problem rather than a social 
economic force and failed to realize that to eliminate the 
Communists, one had to eliminate the social and economic 
ills upon which communism thrived. The Kuomintang's policy 
of exterminating the Communists before responding to Japan 
and other domestic problems was a mistake of priority. 
To decrease the influence of Communism and stop the 
growth of the Communists, the Kuomintang sharply intensified 
its program of thought control through education. The 
government believed that the higher education institutions 
were centers for the Communists activities and, therefore, 
turned them into battleground where indoctrination, secret 
police surveillance, starvation, terror, arrests, and 
disappearances of students and professors dominated daily 
campus life. 5' 
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The students had supported the Kuomintang Party during 
the Northern Expedition and had anticipated a new China that 
would embrace democracy, science, and freedom from foreign 
aggression, and freedom from social and economic problems. 
But the Kuomintang government blundered badly and was unable 
to satisfy any of those expectations, yet it could no longer 
blame China's acute problems on warlord misrule. 57 Among 
all the causes of the civil war, the loss of confidence in 
the Kuomintang regime by the students was the one 
indispensable factor. The failure of the Kuomintang to take 
positive action led to pessimism, stagnation, and 
repression, driving hundreds of the ablest and most 
patriotic young students to the Communists as China's last 
hope. 51 
The Communist Party began its dominion over China in 
1949, compelling the Kuomintang government to retreat to a 
small island known today as Taiwan. The Communist Party was 
founded in 1921 after the May Fourth Movement. During the 
period of warlordism and Kuomintang control, the Communist 
Party demonstrated its sympathy for and support of the 
democratic movement in order to unite all political forces 
against Japanese militancy. It became not only an 
enthusiastic voice for the democratic movement but also 
seemed to be its strongest promoter. The repeated failure 
of the Kuomintang in domestic and foreign affairs altered 
the orientation of the majority of the students and 
intellectuals to the communists, and this alteration 
actually was one of the important factors that caused the 
flight of the Kuomintang government from the Mainland. 
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The higher education institutions and programs which 
the Kuomintang left were inadequate to the Communists' new 
purpose, and called for many transformations. one of the 
communists' goals was to use education to change the 
ideological outlook and political loyalty of the population 
in order to have the support of the populace for the 
communist leadership and its program.•• They did so by 
first eliminating institutions of higher education supported 
by foreigners and missionarieS. 10 In December of 1952, the 
new government set up a Ministry of Higher Education, that 
had authority over all higher learning institutions, 
dictated uniform curricula in all institutions, and unified 
the teaching plans. All students had to sit for the college 
entrance exams. Once the students were in college, the 
universities held formal lectures and discussions for the 
purpose of indoctrination through political propaganda. 51 
While encouraging academic excellence, the party also made 
21 
it clear that political reliability, resulting from proper 
indoctrination, must accompany it.'2 Universities had to 
forsake academic freedom as understood in the west for state 
control and to sacrifice spontaneous development of the 
individual for organized learning. The new government 
largely limited the enrollment in the social sciences.'3 
The central concern was to achieve and maintain political 
order, which was very similar to that of the Kuomintang's. 
"Once in power they had even less tolerance for the 
intellectual dissent that had been useful in the 
revolutionary struggle."" 
Another goal of the new government was to change 
higher education to suit the economic development and 
industrialization plan of the Communist Party.'5 Based on 
the experience of the soviet Union since 1928 and on the 
growing influence of Soviet financial aid and personnel 
assistance, a new structure of higher education emerged. 
Following the Russian model, the government changed 
institutions into three types: general universities, 
polytechnical universities, and technical institutions. It 
also eliminated or transformed most of the comprehensive 
universities with departments of natural sciences, social 
sciences, and humanities into specialized colleges or 
technical institutes, such as institutes of geology, 
mineralogy and metallurgy or chemical engineering.'' The 
intent was in order to strengthen specialized education in 
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important fields to speed up the process of training 
technical personnel for industrial development. As a 
result, "universities have actually become training centers 
for professional engineers and skilled technicians rather 
than places of learning where knowledge is pursued for its 
own sake." 17 More than eight thousand Chinese students and 
scholars went to the soviet Union to study, with most of 
them enrolled in undergraduate courses, and 7,324 finished 
their studies with proper qualifications." The returned 
students further enhanced the role of Soviet ideas and 
practices in China during the early years of the regime. 59 
Between 1949 and 1966, higher education in China had 
graduated all together 1,716,000 students, and there were 
four hundred institutions of higher learning in existence. 70 
The Proletarian Cultural Revolution that dominated the 
Chinese political and economic scene for a decade had many 
adverse effects on higher education. The Cultural 
Revolution was officially launched in 1966, and education 
was a major focal point. The Communist Party accused higher 
education institutions of fostering the selfish ambitions of 
individuals and of being incapable of .producing deserving 
successors to the Communist causes. 71 In response to the 
party's new policies to reform education, institutions of 
higher education were closed from 1966 to 1970. 72 In 1970, 
following Mao's "Latest Directive" which asked for the 
reopening and revolutionizing of some universities, a small 
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number of colleges began to enroll students. 73 The students 
who went to college from 1971 to 1976 were workers, 
peasants, and soldiers with at least two years work 
experience under the recommendation of their local party and 
revolutionary committee. This requirement was to ensure 
that acceptance to college was based on correct political 
attitudes rather than on academic records. The duration of 
college study during this period was reduced to three years. 
The most dramatic change to occur was in the curriculum, 
with subject matter now confined to six areas: political 
theory and practice, language, mathematics, military 
training, physical education, industrial and agricultural 
production.'' Beijing University, the center of 
intellectual ferment in the May Fourth era, was one of many 
universities affected by this change. When reopened in 
1970, 90 percent of the student body was from workers, 
peasants, and soldiers, and the faculty were also from 
workers and peasants, a vastly different group from the most 
highly respected and progressive intellectuals of the 
earlier years. 75 It was no surprise that one person said, 
"this great university has become an inferior junior 
college." 71 Qinghua University, China's MIT, recruited 
twenty-seven hundred persons, all of whom were workers and 
soldiers' sons and daughters; its library was full of the 
works of Mao, Marxist-Leninist literature and other Chinese 
classical works unchecked out and covered with dust since 
1965. 77 During this ten years, China lost one and a half 
million students. 78 
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The Communist Party floundered at least as much as the 
Kuomintang. Thirty-years of totalitarian control in 
Mainland China turned the country into an ideological and 
class struggle battleground while the economy was on the 
verge of devastation. Like the Kuomintang Party, the 
Communist government attempted to use higher education 
institutions as an effective means for propaganda and 
indoctrination. Unlike the Kuomintang, which had failed to 
succeed in its goals, the Communist Party thrived. It was 
able to shroud students in ignorance by using the 
educational system, and many students became either 
instruments or victims during the Cultural Revolution. The 
spirit of the student movement initiated by the May Fourth 
Movement had not been seen during these ten years and with 
good reason. But this situation began to reverse in 1976. 
The death of Mao in 1976 ushered in a new educational 
era of China. The Third Plenum of the Eleventh central 
committee of the Communist Party was held in December, 1978, 
and set the pragmatic policies for China's domestic 
development as well as for its attitude toward international 
cooperation. Deng Xiaoping said in his opening speech to 
the Educational Conference in 1978 that the country's 
mission was to modernize agriculture, industry, national 
defense, and science and technology within this century.'' 
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To reach that goal, China needed to have scientific and 
technical manpower, and Deng called for tremendous expansion 
and improvement in education. Higher education was vital to 
economic success in this new political context, and the 
major change aimed at reforming, consolidating, and 
improving existing universities plus building new ones.•o 
Practices that had been stopped by the cultural Revolution 
were reinstated. Admission to universities depended upon 
academic achievement on the unified state examination for 
university entrance. Once in school, the students were 
encouraged to excel academically. In all, the Chinese 
leadership tried to reverse the orientation of higher 
education after twenty years of moving in the general 
direction of revolutionary politics and anti-
intellectualism. 11 
The over-emphasis on political studies and the lack of 
other social science courses began to change. Prior to 
1978, political studies and ideological propaganda occupied 
a major place in the higher education curriculum. Deng's 
speech to the National Science Conference was intended to 
alter the direction: 
we can not demand that scientists and technicians 
and the overwhelming majority of them study a lot 
of political and theoretical books, participate in 
numerous social activities and attend many 
meetings not related to their work. 82 
starting in 1978, there were relatively few references to 
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the political ideological goals of higher education or to 
political ideological curriculum. The enrollment of 
students in social science areas increased from 43,111 in 
1980 to 183,672 in 1985, representing a nearly fourfold 
growth in the areas of importance for the future direction 
of Chinese politics. 13 Universities also introduced general 
social science electives into many other programs and 
departments and encouraged the students in the sciences and 
humanities to reflect critically on problems concerning the 
Chinese social and economic system.•• The required 
political education courses have been modified in a more 
liberal direction. 15 
The new Chinese leaders also recognized the importance 
of international exchanges in higher education. They called 
for Chinese scholars and students to learn from foreign 
countries what was valuable and relevant for China's 
modernization drive. Universities and colleges sent 
students and scholars abroad, received foreign students and 
teachers on campus, set up cooperative research projects, 
established partnerships between sister institutions, and 
organized international meetings. 11 
The years between 1978 and 1989 signified a new era for 
China and Chinese higher education. By the end of 1987, 
there were 1063 institutions of higher learning in China 
having graduated four million students." The restoration 
of Chinese higher learning institutions, the change of 
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orientation of the curriculum and the knowledge structure, 
the reformation of the composition of student body, the 
loosening of political ideological education, and the 
interaction with the West soon renewed the tradition of the 
Chinese student movements. The college students became 
increasingly aware of the political restraints in China and 
sought to be instrumental in bringing needed political 
reform. From 1978 onward, there were constant struggles to 
achieve this end. 
Modern higher education in China originated for the 
purpose of strengthening the nation militarily to protect 
herself from colonization. When the Japanese defeated China 
on land and sea, higher education functioned not only as a 
means to build a strong military but also to energize the 
nation's economy. Higher education during the early warlord 
era was characterized by intellectual ferment and students 
political activism. With the rise of the Kuomintang Party, 
higher education served as a vehicle supplying professionals 
for the country on the one hand and training the party 
loyalists on the other. The communist control from 1949 to 
1978 put higher eduction through many ordeals. The period 
after Mao's death and before the massacre in Tiananmen in 
June 1989 was a very unusual time for China and Chinese 
higher education. Facing the dilemma between economic 
development and political modernization, academic freedom 
and thought control, the communist Party had its share of 
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agony. 
Student movements began with the inception of modern 
higher education. The May Fourth student movement was a 
historical landmark followed by several decades of student 
uprisings and unrest. "Intelligence, courage and 
indifference to death for their cause gave the Chinese new 
youth an influence out of all proportion to their 
numbers."11 Almost every student movement in recent Chinese 
history has had a discernible political impact. The 
Communist regime, through thought control and effective 
indoctrination, constrained Chinese student movements and 
left them smoldering for years. But the student movements 
regained their momentum after Mao's death in 1976. From 
1978 to 1989, the second era of student uprising in modern 
history of China began. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CHANGING MISSIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
AND THE STUDENT MOVEMENT OF 1980 
China faced inevitable changes after Mao's death. The 
changes in the political missions and policies of the 
Chinese Communist Party from 1976 to 1980 greatly influenced 
the transformations in higher education institutions. The 
loosening of higher education institutions from political 
strictures and ideological indoctrination and the unique 
characteristics of the students resulted in the first 
student democratic movement of 1980. 
The Mission and Policy Changes of the Communist Party 
The death of Mao in 1976 signalled the beginning of 
the end of the Maoist era. His demise escalated the 
factional struggle and brought about the purge of the most 
notable Cultural Revolution leaders known as the "Gang of 
Four." Hua Guofeng, a designated heir, succeeded Mao as 
Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, but Deng Xiaoping 
successfully challenged him. Beginning with the Third 
Plenum in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping gradually 
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consolidated his position within the Chinese communist Party 
forcing Hua Guofeng first to step down from the premiership 
and then to relinquish his party chairmanship. Once the 
purged outcast, Deng recaptured power from Hua, marking a 
decisive turn in Chinese political leadership. 1 
China needed reforms. Emerging from a decade of 
devastation brought on by Mao's chaotic Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, and besieged by economic difficulties and the 
loss of public confidence in the communist Party and 
government leadership, China encountered one of the most 
profound political crises of its history. The new 
leadership, acknowledging the deep and wide dissatisfaction 
and demoralization of the general public and the wreckage of 
the economy, described the need for reform as a matter of 
"life or death" for China's socialist system. 2 The ideology 
during Mao's last decade was class struggle emphasizing 
political over technological or other criteria. 3 
The new leadership attempted to deideologize policies 
having to do with economic development; this pragmatism in 
economics began to infringe upon ideological orthodoxy. ~ 
People's Daily, the party's organ, stated "Marxism holds 
that economics is the basis of politics, while politics is 
the collective manifestation of economics."• Deng Xiaoping, 
in his opening speech to the National Science Conference in 
1978, stressed that the country's historic mission was to 
"comprehensively modernize agriculture, industry, national 
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defense, and science and technology within this century." 5 
Achieving the four modernizations was the means of grasping 
the essence of Marxism and therefore good politics. 1 ~ 
People's Daily interpreted the meaning of the four 
modernizations in the following way: 
Those on various fronts must see that every kind 
of work we are doing now is in the service of 
realizing the four modernization and has the 
utmost political significance. From this 
perspective we say that extracting more oil is the 
politics of the petroleum industry, producing more 
coal is the politics of coal miner ... working hard 
in studies is the politics of students. The only 
criterion for the results of political education 
is the utility in improving the economic 
situation. 7 
The realization of the four modernizations thus became 
the driving force to transform China from a preoccupation 
with class struggle to a concentration on reform and 
economic development. The Third Plenum of the People's 
congress in 1978 further defined and confirmed the 
importance of the modernization mission by stressing that 
the large-scale class struggle of a mass character had come 
to an end, by urging the separation of politics and 
economics in the party's tasks, and by stating that 
political work had both to serve the economic base and to 
guarantee the accomplishment of economic work.• 
The deemphasis of ideology and the emphasis of economic 
development provided a guide for the transformation of 
society. Changes took place in many sectors of society, 
such as agriculture, industry, and business management. 
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Higher education was also one of them. 
The Implications for Higher Education 
The basic principle for understanding the state of 
higher education was that the general line for national 
policy was set by China's top party leadership, and the 
education system was simply one of many sectors of the 
country carrying out that policy.' The new political 
missions and policies dictated new objectives for higher 
education. No phase of education after Mao's death 
reflected the new policy_ as clearly as higher education, and 
no phase of the education system suffered as much disruption 
and damage during the cultural Revolution as institutions of 
higher learning. 10 The years from 1966 to 1977 saw higher 
education institutions turning into a battleground for Mao's 
revolutionary goals, oppressing the intellectuals, holding 
back improvements in the quality of education, and slowing 
the supply of professionals needed for economic development. 
The Chinese leadership attempted to reverse the orientation 
of higher education after twenty years of revolutionary 
politics and anti-intellectualism. 11 
The overriding aim of education in the post-Mao era 
was to serve the needs of the modernization program. To 
reach the goal of the four modernizations, the mastery of 
modern science and technology was crucial, and China needed 
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to have scientific and technical manpower. The goals of 
higher education, therefore, were to train qualified 
manpower to advance science, technology, and economic 
development, and the leadership called for improvement and 
expansion of higher education. 12 This was in contrast with 
the earlier goals, which were to transform student 
consciousness, promote class struggle, consolidate the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and bring up ideological-
political stalwarts who could serve as faithful successors 
to the revolutionary cause. 13 The concept of "red and 
expert" described a relationship between socialist political 
consciousness and academic or technical excellence in China. 
In the past, the priority was given to "red," the 
correctness of political ideology even at the expense of 
scientific, technical, and intellectual competence. But the 
post-Mao leadership gave precedence to the development of 
science and technology and demanded an educational program 
that would speed up the four modernizations by fostering the 
personnel and the know how needed for this development. 14 
As the new leadership identified and redefined the mission 
for the new era, it enabled China's higher educational 
policies and practices to alter significantly. once the 
guiding policy of higher education was clear, specific 
changes took place in many areas. The party moved quickly 
to institute a broad range of changes in higher educational 
institutions, such as recruitment and curriculum. 
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As an initial step to help remedy the problems of 
higher education, the new leadership re-introduced college 
entrance exams in 1977. It was one of the first measures 
taken to reorganize higher education by transforming access 
to higher education through reinstating the pre-Cultural 
Revolution entrance exam. 15 Higher education institutions 
had abolished the entrance exam during the Cultural 
Revolution and had adopted a system based on the selection 
of students from among the workers, peasants, soldiers, and 
revolutionary faithful. In october 1977, the State Council 
announced the implementation of an enrollment examination 
system for higher education and the purpose of which was to: 
"Open road for talents, raise the quality of education, 
train more proficient personnel and make greater 
contributions at an early date so as to meet the urgent 
needs in our national construction."u Under the new 
policy, all those qualified for enrollment including 
workers,· peasants, educated youth, demobilized military 
personnel, cadres, and graduating high school students could 
apply for and take the exams. 17 
There were several criteria which were applied to 
students who wanted to enter universities. They had to take 
a total of nine subjects on the exams. All applicants took 
four tests: politics, Chinese language, mathematics, and a 
foreign language. Students in humanities took an additional 
two tests: geography and history. students in science, 
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engineering, agriculture and medicine took three additional 
tests: physics, chemistry, and biology. The competition 
was strong, and only 5 percent of those who took the exam 
were accepted. 11 In addition to passing the exam, 
candidates had to have a good political record and certain 
political qualifications, such as support of the Communist 
Party of China, love of the motherland, and love of labor 
and discipline. But no strict rules were developed to 
enforce these qualifications. 11 Ordinarily, the standards 
which were used to select students would determine the kinds 
of students entering higher education institutions. The use 
of criteria of academic achievement this time resulted in a 
high proportion of students with high academic 
qualifications from the families of intelligentsia entering 
higher education institutions. 
Curriculum changed accordingly. Before, political 
studies and ideological propaganda occupied a major place in 
the higher education curriculum. The new leadership 
attempted to amend the situation: "We can not demand that 
scientists and technicians and the overwhelming majority of 
them study a lot of political and theoretical books, 
participate in numerous social activities and attend many 
meetings not related to their work. 1120 There was little 
doubt that the Chinese leadership had always regarded the 
educational system as the important factor in both the 
training of manpower appropriate to the needs of the economy 
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and the creation of new socialist persons through 
ideological transformation. But the relative emphasis on 
these goals varied, and this variability was apparent again. 
Starting in 1978, there were relatively few references to an 
ideological curriculum. The universities had modified the 
required political education courses in a more liberal 
direction and largely ignored students' disdain of these 
courses. 21 The students viewed these political classes as 
mere indoctrination and propaganda, and teachers had a 
trying time teaching them. When students made a low grade 
in these courses, they were seldom concerned in contrast to 
their attitudes toward other academic courses. 22 The 
proportion between courses of scientific or technical 
content and ideological study was four to one in 1978 in 
comparison to one to one in 1975. 23 From 1977 to 1979, 
students entering colleges and universities began their 
specialized fields of study in their very first year. It 
was not until 1980 when students first took general required 
courses in their field before beginning to specialize. The 
curriculum paid more attention to the study of science at 
every level, and it was a requirement for every student to 
learn a foreign language. Upper level classes in liberal 
arts departments included the critical study of the 
philosophy and economics of other countries with different 
political systems, and students in foreign languages were 
encouraged to read foreign publications and listen to 
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foreign broadcasts.u 
Other reforms being introduced during 1977-1978 
included the reestablishment of post graduate courses, the 
support of intellectual academic exchanges, the compilation 
of standardized textbooks for all fields by the Ministry of 
Education, and increments in the proportion of state 
budgetary outlays for science and education. 25 There was 
also a new emphasis on research, and intellectuals were 
officially recognized as part of the working classes, which 
suggested greater freedom for them. University presidents 
began to have greater powers in the administration of their 
institutions. 21 
The Students 
The students of this time were the products of 
complicated social and historical conditions. The first 
group of students, who took the exam in 1977, were known as 
the 1977 grade. They were bright, afflicted and reflective. 
Many of them were from intellectual families and were 
persecuted together with their parents by the communist 
Party. Most of them personally took part in the cultural 
Revolution and worked in the countryside, and many of them 
were mature adults in their mid-twenties. They passed 
through the stage of fanaticism (the blind belief and 
following in Mao and his ideology during the ten years of 
43 
revolution), the stage of bewilderment (sense of confusion 
when they lost faith in the ideals of the communist Party), 
and the stage of deliberation (a time of reflection and 
questioning). 27 For these students, the chance of entering 
into higher learning was a privilege they could never have 
imagined while Mao was alive. 
The 1978, 1979, and 1980 grades were mainly high school 
graduates. These students came to colleges through 
competitive exams and were highly intelligent. But unlike 
the 1977 grade students, many of them did not undergo the 
traumatic Cultural Revolution and did not have the same 
experiences. Most of them were young, ranging from sixteen 
to twenty years of age. Although they did not go through 
the stage of fanaticism, they too underwent the stages of 
bewilderment and deliberation. 21 They grew up under the 
strict supervision and indoctrination of the party and were 
taught to believe that Mao represented the absolute truth 
and was the savior of the Chinese people. It was also these 
students who, while in high school, cried so distressingly 
when Mao died, believing China had lost the leader who had 
brilliantly directed and led them for half a century. They 
were more baffled than the students of the 1977 grade by the 
sudden shift of events after Mao's death and tried 
desperately to sort things out and make sense out of them. 
By going to college and mingling with the older students of 
1977 grade, these younger students were on the brink of new 
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learning experiences. 21 
While in colleges, many students from all grades were 
craving for knowledge and seeking ways to find answers to 
various social and personal problems. A survey conducted 
throughout the university system showed that these students 
had a great capacity for receiving new ideas, and they 
tended to think for themselves. Many students were 
skeptical about Marxism-Leninism and doubtful if socialism 
was right for China. They sought models of democracy and 
were engaged in an exchange of ideas. Wishing to build 
China into a rich and powerful country, they hoped for early 
modernization. They supported reforms of the new leadership 
and demanded that the defects in the political, economic, 
and educational systems be corrected. They were also aware 
of the great gap between China and the developed countries, 
and this stimulated their national pride, making them thirst 
for knowledge to help to modernize the country. But there 
were also students who did not believe in the party 
leadership and advocated Western democracy. 30 At the time 
of the election of 1980, the university campuses consisted 
of a student population of over one million. The students, 
with their unique characteristics, coupled with the fresh 
openness in both political missions and higher education 
policies, began the first phase of the student democratic 
movement since Mao. 
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Student Movement--Election of 1980 
The student movement took place in 1980 in the form of 
competitive elections for seats in the local people's 
congresses. Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech to the 
Politburo in August 1980 before the opening of the National 
People's Congress that inspired the "Gengshen Reforms. 1131 
The focal point of this reform was to allow citizens to 
elect the national delegates to the Congress directly rather 
than having them appointed. 32 Through this election, the 
leaders hoped to reconstruct the public's sense of 
affiliation with the government and symbolically show the 
party's claim to rule in the public interest and with public 
approval. 33 Deng Xiaoping also hoped to solve the problems 
of bureaucratism, retirement of old cadres, and to eliminate 
concurrent positions held by party leaders. But the 
leadership did not foresee that the election proposals "had 
the potential for a far reaching liberalization. 1134 
The university students took part in this event with 
such vigor that they carried the election beyond the 
purposes originally intended by the party. Trusting that 
the election could be an important step to enlarge the scope 
of democracy in China, students resolved to exercise their 
legal rights, the rights to vote and to run for offices, to 
elect the people's representatives. They theorized that the 
direct election at the county levels could serve as the 
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foundation for electing political leadership at the higher 
levels, which would be an essential basis for the practice· 
of democracy. Direct election would enable the county 
people's congresses to be in the hands of the people 
themselves. Through the people's deputies, the people's 
congresses and their standing committees and the people's 
governments, the Chinese people would be able to administer 
the country's affairs and chart their own future and the 
destiny of the nation and the state. 35 Armed with such 
beliefs, candidates voiced their views and plans for 
reforming Chinese society and won the support of the public 
and voters. In terms of style, they adopted the form of a 
forum for questions and answers. As the campaign 
progressed, there was an informal network of all college and 
university students established throughout the country, 
serving as a base for support, opinions and exchanges. 3 ' 
This student movement was unique because it was the 
first time in the history of modern China that students 
voluntarily participated in politics through elections. 
Many university students joined in this movement. Generally 
speaking, students from liberal arts and comprehensive 
universities were more involved in this election than those 
from technological institutions. Most candidates emerged 
from the students of 1977 grade from liberal arts 
departments. 37 There were some outstanding student leaders 
during this election, especially those who claimed to be the 
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candidates of the people's congress, such as Xiu Zhengyu of 
Shanghai Teachers College, Xiu Bengtai of Fudan of Shanghai, 
Liang Heng, and Tao sen of Hunan Teachers College, and Wang 
Juntao, Hu Pin, Fang Zhiyan, and Xia Sheng of Beijing 
University. 31 The students election started early in 
Shanghai and spread to Hunan, Guzhou, and Beijing. 3' The 
most representative universities of this election were 
Beijing University and Hunan Teachers University. 
Election in Beijing University 
Beijing University may be regarded as typical of those 
universities in which the election campaign was more 
rational and carefully organized to avoid direct 
confrontation with school administrators. 40 Beijing 
University was China's preeminent liberal arts university 
and the one which had led the May Fourth Student Movement in 
1919. During the direct election of people's deputies in 
Haidiang District in 1980, the third election district of 
Beijing University was to elect two people's 
representatives. The election campaign lasted for one and 
half months. The student candidates organized their own 
election committees which included both classmates of the 
candidates and those who did not know the candidates but 
were resolute in pushing the reforms forward through the 
election. 41 The candidates and their committee members ran 
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election activities in designated areas within the campus, 
publicizing their aims for participating in the election and 
their views regarding various social and political problems. 
They held meetings for questions, answers and discussions in 
the school cafeteria, halls, and classrooms. There were 
altogether eighteen such forums during the six weeks of 
campaigning, which were attended by twenty thousand 
people.'2 candidates held regular hours to answer questions 
for those people off campus and visited students in their 
dormitories, classrooms, and playing fields. several groups 
of students published periodicals to carry the news of the 
election. All the campaign documents, tape recordings, and 
other information were gathered into an archive by a 
volunteer group from the departments of history and Chinese. 
candidates worked out careful campaign positions in 
consultation with groups of advisors. Different kinds of 
big character posters, pamphlets, and the results of opinion 
polls were everywhere throughout the campus. In addition, 
posters for convening of meetings and suggestion boxes set 
up by candidates were found in many places. students were 
contending, debating, questioning, and delivering 
impassioned speeches.'3 Many students attended the election 
speeches. The university campus was seething with 
excitement during this six weeks of election. 
In a series of forums and question-and-answer 
sessions, the candidates expressed their opinions on broad 
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issues. one of the major topics was democratic reform. 
some candidates believed political reform would come 
naturally from the economic changes, while others emphasized 
"liberation of thinking" and still others believed in the 
stabilization of the legal system. such ideas differed 
little from the party reformers' program, but these 
candidates also made radical suggestions such as the 
separation of powers in government, the reformation of the 
Communist Party, freedom of speech, an independent press, 
and the breakup of the concentration of power in the party 
center." 
Hu Ping, a thirty-two year old student in European 
philosophy, was one the major candidates at Beijing 
university. His campaign was centered on freedom of speech, 
and it aroused the interests of a great number of students. 
He wrote a long essay defending the social utility of 
freedom of speech. Hu Ping stressed that the aim of this 
election was to speed up the implementation of freedom of 
speech and press. He held that enjoying freedom of speech 
and press did not mean having the right to do everything, 
but losing freedom of speech and press meant losing 
everything and he urged people to speak out.•s He also 
wanted democracy and the legal system strengthened. In his 
view, democracy meant not only majority rule but also the 
protection of minorities while the powers of the leaders 
were checked and supervised. Genuine democracy was, 
so 
therefore, impossible without free public opinion. 16 
Wang Jun Tao was another major candidate. He made a . 
critical assessment of the last thirty years of Chinese 
history, dealing especially with the Cultural Revolution and 
the political, social, and economic problems of the day. He 
criticized the extreme centralization of political, 
economic, and ideological control and advocated further 
liberalization of thought. Like Hu Ping, he stressed the 
importance of strengthening the legal system, separating 
powers, allowing free public opinion, freedom of speech, and 
respecting human individuality." 
All candidates called for further reform of higher 
education. They believed that higher education should give 
students a well-rounded education and develop their ability 
to the fullest, rather than turning them into manageable 
instruments or machines. In this sense, they were arguing 
for general education that aimed at training students to 
think, reason, and discriminate. Many candidates said that 
the administration and process of learning should be 
democratized and that students and faculty should form a 
representative council to which the president and other 
administrators would be directly accountable. They also had 
concrete suggestions, such as graduate students' assignment 
being based on a combination of their own personal 
preferences and the country's needs, not merely the needs of 
the country." 
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student voters also expressed their views. From the 
very beginning of the campaign, student voters showed an 
interest in political, theoretical, and social issues. The 
majority of the student voters considered this election one 
of the preliminary procedures for realizing socialist 
democracy, and half of the student population showed great 
concern and actively participated in the election 
activities. Even those students who were indifferent at the 
beginning of the election expressed their views and 
preferences. In one of the campus polls, 35 percent of the 
students questioned said they preferred to elect a radical 
social reformist, 20 percent a moderate socialist reformist, 
19 percent a status quo type, and 10 percent a person 
without strong political coloration. The remainder gave 
other preferences. 49 They raised questions such as how to 
interpret party leadership and what to do to change the 
situation in which power was overcentralized in the hands of 
the ruling party, how to develop a people's democracy, how 
young people should play the role in social reforms, and how 
to solve the problems of higher education. 50 
The issues, the candidates and student voters raised 
during the election, intimidated the school officials. on 
December 11, Hu Ping was elected with the votes of 57 
percent of the registered voters. However, the school did 
not allow Hu Ping to take his post as a deputy, even though 
the university administration had indicated that it would 
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not interfere in the proceedings and the local electoral 
authority had abided by the electoral laws and provided 
various facilities to ensure the smooth running of the 
election, including places to put up posters and papers in 
halls and lecture rooms. The election was not what some 
party and government leaders intended it to be. some top 
leaders outside the university accused various candidates of 
being "dissidents." The wall posters were torn down 
immediately after the first round of voting, even though the 
results had not yet been announced and there was still 
another round to come. 51 The authorities did not send the 
candidates of Beijing university to prison, but they waged a 
cold war with Beijing University student activists. 52 
Election in Hunan Teachers College 
The election at Hunan Teachers College may be regarded 
as typical of those schools which clashed directly with the 
school administrators, resulting in student demonstrations, 
petitions, and hunger strikes. Hunan, the province of Mao 
Zedong's birth, was resistant to Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic 
policies, and Hunan Teachers College, the large 
comprehensive university, was run largely by those 
revolutionaries who followed Mao during the early years. 53 
The election started in the middle of September, 1980, and 
Hunan Teachers College was in the 76th electoral district 
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with its electors mostly being college students. Its 5,830 
voters were to elect four deputies from six candidates. 54 
Despite the fact that the higher leadership initiated this 
election, the local cadres currently in office were fearful. 
The longstanding "unified leadership," the "appointment 
system," and the "lifelong tenure system" made such concepts 
as "legal system" and "democracy" foreign to the party 
cadres. The promulgation of "The Organic law of the Local 
People's Congresses and Local People's Governments of the 
People's Republic of China" and "the Electoral Law for the 
National People's congress and Local People's congresses of 
the People's Republic of China" did not really mean anything 
to them. 55 The school administrators told the students that 
"the electoral law will become effective only through our 
interpretation. 1156 The administrators of Hunan Teachers 
College had their own agenda when the election began. They 
announced that the election committee consisted of the 
school's vice-president, su Ming, together with the head of 
the college's Propaganda Department, the secretary of the 
campus Communist Youth League, the chairman of the student 
Association, and the party leader of each department. They 
expected students simply to cast votes for the candidate the 
school leaders chose. But the students of Hunan Teachers 
College saw things differently and acted accordingly. 57 
Students were determined to take this opportunity to 
express their views. Many student electors in Hunan 
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Teachers College had long been discontented with the 
bureaucratism and with the special privileges which the 
cadres enjoyed through the appointment and lifelong tenure 
systems. Because they believed in the top leadership's 
desire for change and trusted in the election, and also 
because the candidates' inflammatory and enlivening speeches 
had aroused them, students eager for change and anxious to 
establish a new order quickly erupted. 51 Hundreds of 
students and citizens from the surrounding neighborhood came 
before the regular saturday-evening campus movie to hear the 
candidates make campaign speeches. Film showings became 
political rallies; the speakers used borrowed megaphones, 
and the students gathered on the playing field. The 
candidates had organized and publicized the forum 
themselves, without the permission of the college election 
commit tee. 59 
Liang Heng and Tao sen from the Department of 
Chinese were two major candidates who emerged during this 
election. The Chinese department at Hunan Teachers College, 
one of the largest on campus, had about six hundred 
students. Among them were a number of older students, the 
students of the 1977 grade, who played a leading role in the 
election. Tao Sen and Liang Heng expressed their views on 
various issues. Both of them said they supported the 
Beijing leadership. But Tao Sen asked for the acceptance of 
the power of the people's congresses, thorough democratic 
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reform of the bureaucracy, exposure of party members to 
criticism from the masses, collective and rotating party 
leadership, and rigorous e~forcement of the law against 
errant cadres. He also recommended streamlining 
administration, reasonable independence for literacy workers 
in their task of serving socialism, and improved conditions 
for intellectuals, including freedom to select one's own 
profession and better conditions for students and teachers. 
Tao called his program "a great socialist reform."'0 
Candidate Liang Heng was the author of the Son of 
Revolution, and at the time of the election, he was married 
to an American woman who was teaching English in Hunan 
Teachers College. He criticized "ideologues who took 
Marxism-Leninism on faith like some kind of revolutionary 
religion." 61 He wanted to see whether the new election 
system would be truly democratic, and he supported the 
reform polices of the government and believed the essential 
nature of socialism should be a subject for inquiry. He 
articulated the goal of reforming the university, especially 
the job assignment system, by arguing that job assignments 
for graduates should take into consideration the students' 
preferences, and the party committee should not arbitrarily 
decide where students should work. 12 
When the school authorities tried to block the 
election, their efforts outraged the students. College 
officials declared that it was a bourgeois election and that 
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posters were illegal. They interdicted public speeches and 
forbade candidates to publish position statements. Finally 
they nominated their own candidate, the leader of the 
college's Communist Youth League. These actions set off the 
students' anger.'3 on 9 October 1980, two thousand students 
from the Hunan Teachers College marched to the office of the 
provincial party committee. They protested against the 
actions of the college administration that had broken the 
Election Law. They organized mass meetings, processions, 
petitions, and a hunger strike. Students from other 
colleges supported them, and strikes were organized in 
colleges and factories. The marchers shouted "Down with 
bureaucratism, down with feudalism, let the people be the 
masters, we want democracy and not autocracy." Reporters 
from Guangming Reibao, the party newspaper, and two 
provincial party committee members conceded that the 
students' petition was legal and promised to send a work 
team to investigate. But when the provincial party work 
team arrived and met with the student representatives, they 
concluded that the college election committee had acted 
legally in adding one more name to the list of six 
candidates. Their action only encouraged the college 
administration and further alienated the students.•• 
On 11 October Tao Sen sent a telegram to party General 
Secretary Hu Yaobang, and on 12 October, Tao sen, Liang 
Heng, and another candidate announced their temporary 
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withdrawal from the election to protest the college's 
action. Again the students petitioned the provincial party 
office. This time there were three thousand of them. Two 
hours later the provincial party leaders turned down their 
demands. Eighty-seven students, including Tao Sen and Liang 
Heng, went on a hunger strike. While expressing their 
determination, they wept. The same day eight hundred 
students of Hunan Medical School marched through Changsha 
city in support of Hunan Teachers College students, and 
three thousand marched that afternoon. on 15 october, the 
students went on a general strike and were joined by 
thousands of students from other Changsha colleges. 
students all over Changsha as well as ordinary citizens, 
gathered to show their support, and even representatives of 
Beijing University flew into the city. 65 
The battle with the school administrators continued. 
The investigators from the National Election committee spent 
two weeks at the college talking with people on all sides 
and then went back to Beijing to make their report. After 
weeks of anticipation, the committee issued a document that 
pronounced the Teachers College Election invalid because of 
insufficient voter participation. University leaders were 
ordered to make a public self-criticism for distorting the 
election rules, and the officials reluctantly did so.u 
Things began to change dramatically when Deng Xiaoping 
made a different speech on December 25, 1980, against 
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"Bourgeois Liberation." The specific reform proposal Deng 
had in mind did not include some of the issues the students 
so bravely raised. He had shared the criticisms of corrupt 
officials, but he did not welcome the questions about the 
legitimacy of the Communist Party. He may have needed the 
students to help him put pressure on his opponents, but not 
to threaten the one-party system. His speech, later issued 
as Document No 2 of 1981, attacked the "disorderly thought" 
of certain university students who had "lost confidence" in 
the party and socialism. 67 
Deng's speech, which represented the voice of the top 
leadership, clearly indicated to the school officials that 
they could crack down. In 1981, after Document No 2 had 
been handed down by the Party Central Committee, the college 
authorities began to launch an overall attack against the 
students. When the students returned to campus from winter 
vacation, the school officials canceled the first three days 
of classes for intensive small-group study of Deng's speech. 
During these group studies, the students were asked to 
indicate their position about political attitudes and to 
carry out public criticism with respect to the ideas and 
conduct of Liang Heng and Tao sen. During those three days 
of political study, the school authorities did not achieve 
the expected results. on the contrary, on the afternoon of 
the last day, a big character wall poster was put up at the 
college. Its contents ridiculed the tactless performance of 
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the college authorities and praised the student movement. 
The poster attracted the attention of teachers, students, 
staff, and workers. After taking a picture of the poster, 
the college authority tore it down and immediately launched 
an investigation by labeling this as a counterrevolutionary 
incident, a serious yet common accusation used by the 
Communist leadership to crack down on the opposition and put 
people into prison. From then on, the students no longer 
raised their voices. The college authorities used all the 
methods employed in China's political movements of the past 
and did a great deal to create disunity and 
demoralization.' 8 Tao Sen was expelled from school and was 
charged with committing "counterrevolutionary activities." 
The leaders never had to go through the law courts. They 
simply dispatched him to labor camp for three years to be 
reformed. Liang Heng was spared only because he got a visa 
to leave China. 59 
The student movement failed in all universities 
represented by either Beijing University or Hunan Teachers 
College. Some of them met the "cold war" treatment by the 
school administrators, while others faced the same 
consequences as the candidates in Hunan Teachers College. 
The most common punishment of the election leaders, 
candidates, and active voters was to dispatch them to the 
worst places upon graduation. 70 The regime the students 
naively believed was supporting them turned against them. 
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The well-publicized inauguration of free, democratic 
elections was marred first by school officials who balked at 
the prospect of having to relinquish their traditional 
autocratic prerogatives and was finally killed by those top 
leaders who were fearful of the forces they themselves 
unleashed. 
The 1980 student election was the direct turnout of 
Chinese political policy of the time. The post-Mao 
leadership, with Deng Xiaoping as its chief policy 
architect, reached a consensus during the Third Plenum in 
1978 that salvaging China's economy was the first priority. 
The party expected the active participation and cooperation 
of Chinese higher education institutions by training and 
supplying scientists and technicians to save the economy and 
achieve the goals of the modernization drive. Consequently, 
the party liberalized controls over higher education 
institutions by emphasizing academics rather than politics. 
In late 1980, the party called for elections as a means 
to reduce bureaucratism, terminate life tenure of cadres, 
eliminate overlapping responsibilities and the 
overconcentration of power. But the students, led by the 
unique class of 1977, took the opportunity of the election 
to express their own views that challenged the socialist 
system, one party control, the legitimacy of the party 
itself, and demanded political restructuring and freedom of 
press and speech. These requests were beyond anything the 
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ruling party could grant. 
The relaxation of political austerity in general and 
higher education policies in particular enabled the college 
campuses to enroll students not only of high academic 
quality, but also of unique experiences. The curriculum 
trends of this time, with the emphasis on science and 
technology and the gradual decline of the political 
indoctrination, facilitated students to learn things 
independently and to think on their own. The students did 
not initiate the election, but they participated in it with 
full intensity. The manner which the students exhibited 
during the election and the depth of the issues the student 
candidates raised and explored were the direct consequence 
of the open climate of the time. 
In the leaders' view, the leadership of the communist 
Party and socialist system could not be contested, at least 
not now. China is a huge country with a population of over 
one billion, eighty percent of whom are uneducated peasants. 
such a country needed a centralized government. The only 
way China could maintain her security and stability, and, 
therefore, the only way to China's salvation, was through 
the leadership of the Communist Party and adherence to the 
socialist doctrine. The reform should be gradual and 
cautious. The election was to solve the practical problems 
which hindered Deng's economic reform, not to create chaos. 
From the beginning, the party wanted to control and 
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supervise the whole process of the election and let those 
who would conform to the party line and serve the interest~ 
of the party, therefore, the interests of the people, be 
elected. 
The ideas voiced by the students during the elections 
were frightening to the party and clearly contributed to the 
leaders' decision to launch a final crackdown on the 
democracy movement. The party did not expect this election 
to be carried out this far and out of its control. In a 
larger sense, the party regarded the requests and ideas 
voiced by the student candidates unrealistic. If the 
students were successful in getting what they wanted, China 
would be plunged into utter anarchy, the condition of which 
were not conducive to the economic reform and the welfare of 
the masses. In a narrower sense, the fulfillment of the 
student demands would directly threaten the personal 
interests of those in power. With these considerations, the 
party ended the election by suppressing the student leaders. 
This unprecedented college student election had far-
reaching influence and meaning. It was the first time in 
the history of the democratic movement in China that the 
students participated in the movement through election and 
within the boundary of the law. It also revealed the 
fundamental discrepancy conflicts between what the students 
wanted and what the government could grant. After the 
suppression of the students and the election by the party, 
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the Chinese political climate and consequently the climate 
of higher education faced a period of five years' 
retrenchment. The students were subdued inside China. Only 
students outside China picked up the momentum for the 
struggle toward political democracy. It was not until the 
political thaw of 1986 when the student movement took place 
again. 
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The political situation after the election took a new 
direction. Between 1981 and 1984, while the policy of 
modernization remained in effect, the communist Party 
tightened its rules on political control. Higher education 
institutions were among many sectors of Chinese society that 
were adverseiy affected by this changing political 
atmosphere. The students were subdued; the student movement 
was in retreat. In the meantime, as part of the 
modernization policy, the party continued its exchange 
programs in hopes of expediting the modernization process. 
The students it sent abroad carried on the democratic 
movement that was suppressed inside China. 
Chinese Political Situation after the Election 
Beginning in 1981, the Chinese communist Party 
promulgated several documents to indicate the shift of 
policy. In China, such policy changes were generally 
stipulated in the regular communist Party meetings held each 
year and reflected by important speeches. The People's 
68 
69 
Daily and other party organs then interpreted and carried 
the party's view and policies to the general public through 
the editorial pages. sometimes the policy changes could be 
made without the regular Communist Party sessions. The top 
leadership made decisions regarding their new intentions, 
and these were communicated through a numbered "Document" to 
different working units. some of these documents were 
ordered to circulate to the leaders of the unit and then to 
the general public, while others were merely given to the 
top leaders of units, who interpreted the "spirit" or the 
"essence" of the documents to the masses. Every Chinese 
knew the meaning of "Document," for their behavior and 
thoughts were constantly regulated and changed by these 
documents. After the election, several documents were 
issued targeting different areas of society, and these 
documents comprised the strongest political offensive of the 
Chinese Communist Party since Mao's death. 1 
The "No 2 Document," which carried Deng Xiaoping's 
message on the crackdown not only on elections but on all 
activities and activists of the democratic movement, came on 
25 December 1980. The document castigated the viewpoints 
and trends of thought opposed to party leadership and 
socialism. It brought charges against phenomena such as 
illegal organizations and magazines and the open publication 
of anti-party and anti-socialist speeches. According to 
Deng, these phenomena demonstrated that the class struggle 
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did exist and that its seriousness should not be 
underestimated. To solve these problems, Deng wanted to 
mobilize and organize people to act consciously and openly 
in waging an effective struggle against various influences 
disruptive to stability and unity. The document, in the 
name of preserving social order and stability, categorized 
the students' views and activities as counterrevolutionary 
and expressed the leadership's determination to eradicate 
the problem. It commanded the party and the people to be 
vigilant against and to take resolute measures to deal with 
anti-party, anti-socialist, and criminal activities. 2 
The document attributed the election disruption to the 
lack of serious propaganda and urged the strengthening of 
ideology: 
certain figures connected with illegal 
organizations have been particularly active 
lately, publishing unbridled anti-party and anti-
socialist utterances under all kinds of pretexts. 
This danger signal should arouse the full 
vigilance of the whole party and the people and 
youth of the whole country. Strengthening 
ideological and political work and improving 
propaganda work already constitute an extremely 
important task facing the whole party for ensuring 
the smooth accomplishment of the current 
readjustment and consolidating and developing the 
political situation of stability and unity. The 
most important thing in improving party leadership 
is to strengthen ideological and political work. 3 
Before the election, Deng, in order to promote and realize 
his modernization policy, liberated the professionals from 
party control by requesting that the party organizations at 
all levels relinquish most routine administrative and 
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professional work to the government and the professional 
departments. This made it possible for professionals to 
attend to their own work for modernization without 
constantly being disturbed by party organizations which 
existed in every unit in China. Thus, he created a loosened 
atmosphere in which political and ideological work were not 
the biggest priority. Deng might have thought this was the 
reason that caused the backlash during the election, for he 
now was urging the party organizations to keep a firm hold 
on the principles and policies and to decide on the 
employment of important cadres. He also asked the leading 
organs of the party to devote most of their time and energy 
to ideological and political work.' Consequently, the party 
leaders who surrendered power earlier now regained it, and 
everything had to be done with the consent of the party 
leaders. 
"Central Document No 7" targeted the field of 
literature and art. on April 20, 1981, the Liberation Army 
Daily carried an editorial which condemned the film script 
of "Bitter Love" by Bai Hua. Bai Hua was charged with 
expressing views against the socialist system and resenting 
the party and socialist motherland under the disguise of 
"love." "Bitter Love" was essentially an essay in artistic 
self-expression, but the sensitive leadership saw it as 
anathema to the party leadership and the authorities. The 
editorial in the Liberation Army Daily commented that 
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"Bitter Love" was not an isolated phenomenon, for it 
reflected the erroneous trend of thought of anarchism, 
ultraindividualism, and bourgeois liberalism to the extent 
of negating the leadership of the Party and the road of 
socialism. 5 The writers and artists always had strong 
influences on Chinese society through their artistic work. 
By criticizing and punishing one of them, the party achieved 
the result of shutting the mouths of the rest. As one 
famous Chinese proverb went, "Kill the chicken to show the 
monkey." Bai Hua was a renowned writer in China, and his 
misfortune quelled the voices of those who held views 
different from the party. 
"Central Document 9" was directed at people's 
publications and organizations. Number 9 Document of April 
1981 instructed the provincial authorities to conduct 
investigations in all units, arrest participants in illegal 
groups, expel party members who supported them, and conduct 
a mass campaign of education against them.' In response to 
the document about illegal organizations and publications, 
persons associated with the democratic movement who had 
escaped previous indictment were rounded up. Pressure from 
the Mainland led to the closing of some publications in Hong 
Kong that were critical of the Communist Party. 7 
The messages of these documents were further confirmed 
by the "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of 
our Party since the Founding of the PRC" adopted by the 
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Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central committee on June 27, 
1981. This document firmly laid down the four principles as 
the guiding lines of the party and the people. Deng, in the 
Number 2 Document, said the anti-party and anti-socialist 
publications and activities were the result of not 
"positively, actively, justly, forcefully and convincingly 
publicizing the four basic principles and the leadership has 
failed to wage an effective struggle against gravely 
erroneous ideas opposed to the four basic principles."• 
The four principles were initiated by the new leadership 
after Mao's death to provide a political framework in 
China's economic reform. These four basic or cardinal 
principles were: upholding the socialist road, the people's 
democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist 
Party, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Before 
the election, the four principle were merely written on 
paper but not actively reinforced. After the election, the 
leadership retrieved these four principles to justify their 
political stands. The importance of the four principles and 
the punishment for not implementing them were clearly stated 
in this meeting: 
These four principles constitute the common 
political basis of the unity of the whole Party 
and the unity of the whole people as well as the 
basic guarantee for the realization of socialist 
modernization. Any word or deed which deviates 
from these four principles is wrong. Any word or 
deed which denies or undermines these four 
principles can not be tolerated.' 
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The reaffirmation of these principles sent a serious 
political signal to the masses that any action against them 
would be dealt seriously. 
The Spiritual Pollution Movement 
This meeting was followed by the most publicized attack 
on the democratic trend, the campaign against "Spiritual 
Pollution." This political movement was launched at the 
second Plenum of the Twelfth central Committee in October, 
1983. The term "Spiritual Pollution" referred to the 
unhealthy political and social tendencies allegedly creeping 
into China through its open policy for modernizations. 10 It 
was defined by the leadership as "abstract propaganda of 
human value, humanism, and socialist vagaries divorced from 
Marxism-Leninism; spreading the thought of debauchery, of 
homicide, terrorism, fantasy and pursuit of a hedonistic and 
decadent bourgeois life-style." 11 The way to eradicate 
spiritual pollution was: to criticize all non-Marxist-
Leninist ideas and speeches in the theoretical, literary, 
and art circles; to study "selected Works of Deng" and 
"anti-pollution" documents; to single out targets for 
criticism; ban all movie films, dramas, recorded and video 
tapes deemed as "unhealthy," and to ban all "outlandish 
apparel," including jeans and bell-bottom trousers and 
wearing long hair and permanent waves. 12 Essentially this 
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movement was aimed at those activities which disseminated 
all varieties of corrupt and decadent ideologies of the 
bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes and which fostered 
sentiments of distrust toward the socialist and communist 
cause and to the Communist Party leadership. Deng Liqun, 
director of the CCP central Propaganda Department, and Chu 
Muchih, minister, Ministry of Culture, were charged with the 
job of pushing the movement. The movement had adverse 
effects on China's economic reform in terms of industrial 
and agricultural output, on its efforts to absorb overseas 
Chinese and foreign capital, and on scientific research 
programs. 13 By early 1984, when it became clear that the 
movement had threatened social stability and entrepreneurial 
peasants, intimidated intellectuals, and scared off foreign 
investors. In other words, the movement appeared to 
jeopardize the four modernization program on which the 
legitimacy of Deng and the party rested and consequently the 
leadership finally terminated its spiritual pollution 
drive. 14 
Higher Education Retrenchment 
All these political maneuvers inevitably affected 
higher education institutions. The manner of communicating 
these documents made people feel that the party's primary 
targets were colleges, universities, and students. 15 Though 
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Deng Xiaoping reaffirmed the policies toward the 
intellectuals and acknowledged that they were a force to 
rely on in the cause of socialism, for it was impossible to 
carry out socialist construction without culture and the 
intellectuals, he urged the Party to strengthen and improve 
ideological and political work and educate the people and 
youth in the Marxist world outlook and communist morality. 
As far as education was concerned, he persistently urged the 
party to carry out the educational policy that called for 
training students to be "red and expert," integrating the 
intellectuals with the workers and peasants, countering the 
influence of decadent bourgeois idealogy, overcoming the 
influence of bourgeois idealogy, and fostering the 
patriotism and the pioneer spirit of selfless devotion to 
modernization. 16 To use his words, education should focus 
on "strengthen political education, education on the 
situation, ideological education or education on the outlook 
of life, and moral education in schools of all levels. 1117 
Under these new guidelines and the directives, higher 
education institutions took several specific measures to 
respond. The students' election was brought to an end, 
activists were rounded up, a campaign against deviant 
thought took place in every university, and political 
education was tightened. Under "Central Document No 9," ..B..e..d 
~' a literary periodical published by the students of the 
Chinese department of Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, 
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which lasted longest among similar publications, was forced 
to suspend publication. 11 
The enrollment screening criteria were altered to fit 
the intent of the new policy. On May 9, the Ministry of 
Education held a conference in Xian on student enrollment by 
institutions of higher learning. The conference laid down 
the regulations for "Student Enrollment by Institutions of 
Higher Learning," which were approved by the State council 
and transmitted to the various localities for study and 
implementation. The "Regulation" asked all units to 
seriously conduct the political screening of applicants in 
accordance with the party policy. The students had to 
support the CCP, love the socialist motherland, observe 
discipline, and love to participate in labor. 1 ' Before the 
election, these criteria also served as a way to recruit 
students. But like the four principles, they were never 
earnestly implemented. The leadership assumed that 
negligence in executing these standards contributed to the 
disruption of the election, and to change the situation it 
was necessary to set these standards ardently in place 
again. 
Political and ideological training were intensified. 
As a second step to change the situation, the leadership 
strengthened political education in higher education 
institutions in various ways. Most universities had adopted 
annual appraisal measures to fortify students• ideological 
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education and moral evaluation. The specific yearly 
appraisal measure included the student's brief written 
ideological summary of his or her own political thinking, 
moral character, purpose and attitude of learning, sense of 
organization and discipline, and so forth. A group 
evaluation meeting was then held at which students carried 
out mutual criticism and self-criticism and arrived at a 
group evaluation of each student. Finally, the teacher in 
charge of each class would comment on each student, pointing 
out his or her strong and weak points and the direction he 
or she should follow in future. Beijing Normal University 
used this annual appraisal measure to ensure that every 
student's thought was on the right track, the track on which 
the party wanted them to be. 20 
Shanghai Jiaotang University had established a student 
conduct evaluation system to appraise students' political 
thinking and moral accomplishment and to promote all-round 
development of students morally, intellectually, and 
physically. The conduct evaluation was mainly based on 
political thinking and moral character. The evaluation 
method was similar to that used by Beijing Normal 
University. It consisted of the students' brief written 
ideological summary and evaluation on himself or herself. 
The teacher in charge and the political instructor of each 
class then commented on the student's evaluation, gave a 
grade of each student's moral character based on facts and 
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his or her performance, and finally submitted the grade to 
the department and university for review and approval. The 
student conduct evaluation, done once a year at Shanghai 
Jiaotong University, was used as an important basis for 
appraising students upon graduation. 21 This appraisal in 
turn greatly affected the job assignment upon graduation. 22 
The Anti-Spiritual Pollution Movement, which was aimed 
at the literary circle, also had repercussions on higher 
education. sure enough, when a chicken was killed, the 
monkey got the message and was hushed. The movement took 
place in the middle of a semester. The administrators 
ordered the faculty to change the curriculum that contained 
the content the movement was opposing. The professors 
became confused as to how to distinguish what was right and 
wrong. was the European civilization course a part of 
"spiritual pollution?" was it all right to talk about the 
Bible and Christianity in religious courses? was it wrong 
to teach about paintings of various styles? During that 
period, it was very awkward for the faculty, especially 
those in humanities classes. 23 The library was another 
problem. In many universities, students were forbidden to 
borrow books written either by foreign writers or by Chinese 
authors that communicated subtle anti-Communism messages. 
The students were required to attend more political meetings 
to study the spirit of the documents regarding the movement 
and to express their political stands both verbally and on 
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paper. The four principles were again brought up to set a 
clear line of demarcation for the students as to what they· 
could and could not do and the consequences of not following 
the rules. The party commanded school officials to 
encourage students to make strict demands on themselves and 
first be red and then expert. 24 
It seemed that the Chinese political leadership was 
caught in a dilemma between the changes needed to improve 
the economy and cha,nges needed in political structure to 
promote economic growth. The leadership did not know how to 
balance both. For fear of economic repercussion, the regime 
proclaimed vociferously that the policy had not changed. In 
his speeches, Deng tried to convince people that the policy 
of the Third Plenum would continue and that the changing of 
policies after the election did not resemble that of the 
"Cultural Revolution." It was true that the policy changes 
as a result of the election were not as drastic as those of 
the "Cultural Revolution," and economic reform continued in 
spite of a temporary breakdown. The movement against ' 
"Spiritual Pollution" was halted before it got out of hand 
completely. In spite of the intensified political control, 
particularly during the period of Anti-Spiritual Pollution, 
all other aspects of higher education institutions went on 
as usual. The continuation of the students' international 
exchange policy was one example. After all, what Deng 
wanted was to stop the anti-party and anti-socialist trend, 
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not the trend of the four modernizations on which Deng had 
bet his political fortune. 
International Exchange Policy and the students Abroad 
The exchange policy initiated after Mao's death was one 
component of Deng's modernization program. The need to 
learn from foreign countries arose directly from the 
realization that, in the effort to accelerate the four 
modernizations, China must seek the help of other countries 
and that China was at present so far behind the industrial 
advanced countries she could not afford to lose any time in 
learning the technology and science. This need was stressed 
in practically every speech made at the education and 
science conferences. 
As for natural science and technology, we are 
behind advanced world levels. We admit our 
backwardness but we refuse to lag behind. We must 
catch up. This requires us to be good at 
absorbing whatever is good in things foreign, take 
them over and turn them to our account and combine 
our learning from foreign countries with our own 
inventiveness so that we can catch up with and 
surpass advanced world levels as soon as 
possible. 25 
Deng's call for the rapid development of the economy to 
realize the four modernizations and catch up and surpass the 
advanced world made the international exchanges program an 
integral part of the reform. It was the leadership's 
initiative to implement on a large scale the policy of 
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sending many students and visiting scholars abroad from 1978 
onward as part of the open door policy and the drive for the 
four modernizations. The political changes that took place 
after the election in 1980 did not stop Deng's economic 
policy, and the exchange programs continued and expanded. 
The continuation of the exchange program policy was first 
reflected by the "The Sixth Five-Year Plan of the People's 
Republic of China for Economic and social Development." The 
plan revealed the party's ambition to boost the economy 
through education and exchange. The plan confirmed that 
through the period of the next five years (1981 to 1985), 
China would send more people to study abroad. During these 
five years, efforts would be made to send fifteen thousand 
persons abroad, an average of three thousand persons per 
year. The plan speculated that within this period, eleven 
thousand persons would complete their studies abroad and 
return home. The regulation also stipulated that most of 
those sent abroad should study in graduate schools and that 
fewer should take undergraduate studies. 2 & This made it 
possible for the students who participated in the election 
while undergraduates to benefit from this policy. Students 
sent abroad would major primarily in such specialties as the 
natural sciences and engineering technology, with emphasis 
on those fields in which China was weak or needed to 
explore. At the same time, the regime also wanted a certain 
number of persons sent abroad to survey and study politics, 
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economics, law, education, and foreign languages. 27 
It seemed ironic that the regime would take such a 
political risk as sending the students to study abroad. The 
majority of the students went to those countries whose 
political systems were entirely different from that of 
China's. The leadership did foresee the negative aspects of 
sending the students abroad, for those countries would 
inevitably influence them in many ways. If unfavorably 
influenced, once the students returned to China, they would 
pose a political threat to the stability of Chinese society. 
Again, the Chinese leaders faced an impossible dilemma. 
Between the choices of cutting off international ties that 
would slow down economic progress or risking its political 
future, the party swung the pendulum and chose the latter 
with circumspection. 
Having decided to send students abroad as the lesser of 
two evils, the leadership wanted to minimize the risk as 
much as possible. It issued a regulation that those 
students sent abroad should be strictly examined and 
selected with regard to their political and ideological 
levels, academic and foreign language competence, and health 
so as to guarantee quality. Deng Xiaoping at the 12th 
Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in August 1982 
cautioned the party not to let foreign, corrupt ideas sneak 
into China: 
· We will unswervingly follow a policy of opening to 
the outside world and actively increase exchanges 
with foreign countries on the basis of mutual 
equality and benefit. At the same time we will 
keep a clear head, firmly resist corrosion by 
decadent ideas from abroad, and never permit the 
bourgeois way of life to spread in our country. 2• 
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However, the ideological levels of the students could change 
once given a chance. The ideas from abroad, decadent as the 
leadership perceived them to be, inescapably penetrated 
China with the returned students as the messengers. 
Education exchange programs in the form of sending 
students were developed with Japan, several European 
countries, the United states, canada, and other developed 
industrial countries. There were several main forms of 
international exchange in existence, and sending students 
and visiting scholars abroad was by far the most important 
one. In terms of its sheer scale and the expenditures 
incurred, as well as its long-term implications for the 
development of China's education, science, and culture, and 
the national economy and foreign diplomacy, this form had 
important implications. 2' In terms of the political 
consequences to Chinese society, this form of exchange held 
far more ramifications than anyone predicted. The exchange 
program with Japan began with Deng's visit to Japan in 
october 1978. The visit spurred interest in closer 
relations with Japan, and Deng called for learning from 
Japan and the promotion of cooperation in cultural and 
scientific fields and student exchange. 30 The Chinese 
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rationale to learn from Japan was rather straightforward. In 
the nineteenth century and in the years of rehabilitation 
after World War Two, Japan liberally imported foreign 
technology and quickly advanced to a stage where she 
overtook and surpassed the countries from which she had 
learned. China's situation was comparable with Japan's 
then. Therefore, learning from Japan would enable China to 
achieve what Japan had achieved through learning from 
others. Besides, Japan borrowed Chinese culture extensively 
in the early period of Japanese history, and it was all 
right for China to learn from Japan now. Japan hosted the 
largest number of Chinese scholars and students next to the 
United states, a total of 3,847 by the end of 1984, West 
Germany hosted 2,489 Chinese students and scholars on longer 
term programs, the highest concentration in any European 
country, Britain and France both hosted well over one 
thousand students by the end of 1984. canada also hosted 
1,452 students over this period of time. 31 
The United states was the nation which had most 
extensive educational and cultural involvement in China, at 
least in terms of participating numbers. Educational 
exchange programs between China and the United States began 
in July 1978 with the visit to China by an American Science 
and Technology Delegation led by Dr Frank Press, science and 
technology adviser to President carter and Director of the 
Office of science and Technology Policy. 32 What made the 
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exchange programs between China and the American government 
different from the rest was the openly expressed intention· 
on the part of the American government to use educational 
relations with China for political purposes. Since the 
normalization of Sino-American relations in 1979, American 
officials had encouraged access to their educational and 
scientific institutions in the expectation that this would 
influence a new generation of Chinese leaders. 33 Between 
1979 and 1986, fifty thousand students and scholars from 
China came to study in the u.s, and were dispersed 
relatively uniformly across much of the country, although 
there were concentrations in New York and california. 3• The 
continuation of Chinese students' struggle for political 
freedom abroad were centered in the United States as well. 
The Student Movement in Foreign Countries 
The Chinese student democratic movement abroad took the 
form of establishing organizations and publishing magazines 
during the years 1981 to 1984. As a result of Communist 
control and political repression after the election, many 
Chinese students decided to remain abroad instead of 
returning to China. It was these students who initiated the 
student movement for democracy abroad. The most prominent 
organization was the Chinese Alliance for Democracy and its 
magazine known as China Spring. A thirty-two year old 
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Chinese student, Wang Bingchang decided to go to the United 
States after receiving his medical degree from McGill 
University in canada. Wang was the first government-
sponsored student in North America to earn a doctoral degree 
since China began to send students abroad in 1979. When he 
received his degree, he came to the u.s. and decided to 
"abandon medicine and to devote myself to China's 
contemporary democracy movement. " 35 Wang Bingchang was 
among over one thousand Chinese students who applied for 
political asylum between 1979 and 1982. 36 
At a press conference in New York on November 17, 1982, 
Wang announced the inauguration of the magazine, China 
Spring, which was to serve as an organ to speak for the 
resurgence of the democracy movement, for democracy, 
freedom, human rights, and the government of law. It would 
operate as a bridge between Chinese at home and overseas. 
The intent and aspiration of the organization were expressed 
more explicitly by the founding statement which appeared in 
the first issue of the magazine: 
China Spring will carry on the historical mission 
of this generation to fight against dictatorship 
and fight for the rule of law, democracy and human 
rights. The magazine "China Spring" will apply 
itself in exposing and criticizing the present 
system of China and examining China's past and 
future. It will introduce the social science, 
humanist thought, the political systems and the 
experiences of the democratic struggles of other 
countries in order to accumulate the experiences 
and theoretical basis for the changes of Chinese 
society. 37 
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The magazine had eight editors, of whom four were on the 
Mainland. The board of editors of China spring decided to 
name eighteen political prisoners and founders of unofficial 
magazines who were still in prison as honorary editors. 31 
The statement to the Chinese within China and abroad by the 
board of editors carried by the first issue of the magazine 
called on Chinese within China, overseas students, and 
overseas Chinese to unite together and participate in the 
endeavour for democracy. 39 
In 1984, China Spring established the first 
organization for democracy. During the first International 
conference of China Spring Democracy Movement, held in New 
York in 1984, over fifty chapter representatives of China 
Spring came from Hong Kong, Japan, Europe, and North America 
to attend this conference. At this gathering, the first 
democratic organization since the founding of the People's 
Republic of China was established -- Chinese Alliance for 
Democracy. This event brought China's democratic movement 
abroad to a new height by formalizing the dissident group. 
The principal objects of the Alliance were the 
implementation of a democratic political system that would 
rule China by law and the establishment of greater respect 
for human rights and freedom for the Chinese people.'0 The 
people who attended this meeting included Victor Sawicki, 
the author and the founder of the Polish-American Artist 
Association in the United states; Ralph Schoenman, the 
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Chairman for the Support of Polish Solidarity Movement 
Association, Olga Svintsovr, the representative of 
International Organization of Anti-totalitarianism; and 
James Seymour of the American Asian Association for Human 
Rights. 41 The conference lasted for six days, during which 
the China Spring Manifesto was presented and the China 
Democratic Leagues Constitution was discussed and adopted. 
Wang Bingchang, the founder of China Spring, discussed the 
future tasks of the organization in the meeting. 42 Soon 
after its establishment, the Alliance wrote an open letter 
to Zhao Ziyang, the Prime Minister of China who was coming 
to visit the United States at that time. The letter 
requested the Chinese Alliance for Democracy be recognized 
by the Chinese government, be allowed to operate freely in 
China, and that China Spring be published and distributed. 
The letter also appealed for the release of all political 
prisoners. It praised Zhao's economic policies, but warned 
him that political modernization was the only salvation for 
the eventual success of China's economic reform. 
As most of the leaders of the alliance are 
citizens of the people's republic of China, we 
recognize and praise the economic progresses that 
have resulted from your administration's pragmatic 
policies. To lead China onto the road of true 
prosperity and strength, however, the present 
totalitarian system must undergo fundamental 
change. 43 
Since its inception, Chinese Alliance for Democracy 
with its magazine China Spring had toiled among overseas 
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Chinese students and intellectuals to create an 
international network of Chinese dedicated to human rights 
and democracy in the motherland. Drawing inspiration from 
the Solidarity movement in Poland, the alliance pledged to 
use nonviolent means to promote democracy and improve human 
rights conditions in China, with the ultimate goal of 
transforming the existing totalitarian system into a 
democratic one. The organization started with a few members 
and expanded across fifty countries on the continent, 
developing a network encompassing thousands of students and 
overseas Chinese. It started to set up offices or networks 
first within the United States, from California to Houston, 
from Pennsylvania to Utah, then to Canada, Japan, France, 
Holland, Denmark, and Australia.'' The organization, using 
the media of various countries, expanded its influence and 
held many press conferences. All overseas Chinese 
newspapers with the exception of Mainland China carried 
articles· and editorials about the organization and the 
magazine. It caught the worldwide attention because of news 
coverage by major newspapers such as New York Times, LQa 
Angles Times, Montreal Gazette of Canada, Daily News of 
Japan. and Liberation Daily of France. It sponsored debates 
and lectures in several universities and promoted the 
understanding of the organization among Chinese students and 
foreigners. ' 5 
China Spring endeavoured to fulfil its mission. The 
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circulation of China Spring surged from four thousand to 
twenty thousand. The magazine had managed to obtain and 
publish the diary of one of China's leading political 
prisoners and also distributed several recordings of famous 
pro-democracy speeches by Professor Fang Lizhi. 46 China 
Spring had become one of the best-selling Chinese-language 
publications among overseas Chinese intellectuals. The 
organization distributed magazines to students from Mainland 
China free of charge for a number of years. It got 
financial support from people who believed in its cause. 
Many people read China Spring. James Seymour, a researcher 
at Columbia University, said he gained confidence in China 
Spring when he was "pleasantly surprised to find that my 
Chinese laundry man reads China Spring. If he reads it, a 
lot of people read it. They are reaching the masses. 1147 
China Spring was smuggled to Mainland China and was 
dispersed secretly among students and people. As a student 
put it: "It is a comfort to know the fire of student 
democracy was still burning. Somewhere in this world, some 
Chinese are carrying on the torch of democracy and this 
gives us hope and light." 11 
The organization and its magazine deeply annoyed 
officials inside China. In 1985, China Spring made 
international headlines when it sued the People's Daily, the 
Chinese Communist Party newspaper, in an American court for 
libel. In 1984, the People's paily had referred to Wang and 
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others as "political prostitutes ... swindlers who used 
patriotism as a pretext to racketeer overseas Chinese so as 
to feather their own nest ... hypocrites who deserted their 
mainland wives and children in order to look for new 
lovers." The suit was still pending.u Even Deng Xiaoping 
himself, in a speech to the Sixth Plenary Session, referred 
to Wang as China's most famous dissident. He accused him of 
"trying to lead China into bourgeois liberalization " and 
called him "representative of this trend of thought." 50 
Before the students were sent abroad, the leaders cautioned 
them not to have anything to do with the organization and 
not to read the publications. Once they were in the United 
states, the Chinese counselors repeatedly warned the 
students to stay away from the anti-Communist and anti-Party 
counter-revolutionary organization and its rnagazine. 51 
There were several other organizations and magazines 
acting as voices of dissent for the democracy movement 
abroad. Following China Spring, there was the publication 
of search by students from the western part of America. In 
March 1983, the students who studied in Japan published 
Chun Lei. The English translation would be Spring Thunder. 
Some students in New York started the publication of the 
magazine Quest. 52 The chapter of China Spring in Japan also 
began the publication of another magazine Min Xin. 
People's Wish would be its English translation. It assisted 
China Spring and its organization Chinese Alliance for 
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Democracy to reach the students and overseas Chinese in 
Japan. 53 Some students from Mainland China together with 
oversees Chinese students and patriots from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan formed another organization, "New China Democratic 
Association" with its publication Democratic China. All 
these contributed to the student democratic movement abroad. 
Chinese Intellectuals was another journal published in 
the United States by Chinese students. Liang Heng, the 
candidate of Hunan Teachers' College election, eventually 
came to the United states after marrying an American woman. 
His magazine, academic rather than polemical in content, was 
funded by a National Endowment for Democracy grant in 1984 
and published in New York. It served as a literary journal 
that allowed intellectuals to express their views freely and 
to engage in debate and dialogue. The magazine touched the 
area of politics, philosophy, economics, literature, and 
history. It intended to promote diversity of Chinese 
academics and reforms. In 1988 and 1989, when the political 
situation loosened up, the magazine found a corner in 
Mainland China. It established an office in Beijing and 
contracted with a provincial press for printing. The first 
volume was published, won widespread support. The magazine 
continued its publication in the United States, uniting 
Chinese intellectuals and students through probing and 
studying deeper problems and providing a theoretical basis 
for the Chinese democratic movement." 
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The organizations and various magazines, with Chinese 
Alliance for Democracy and China Spring as the major 
spokesmen, had a strong impact on the Chinese democratic 
movement. They served as symbols of the continuation of the 
Chinese democratic movement that was suppressed inside 
China. By uniting the Chinese students scattered across the 
continents, by arousing the awareness of the overseas 
Chinese about the political situation in China and their 
patriotism, by smuggling messages into China through 
magazines, they became a strong force with which the top 
leadership in China had to reckon. In many ways, they had 
paved way for the major outbreaks of student democratic 
movements in later years. 
The result of the election of 1980 made the party very 
cautious about its political reform program. Realizing the 
potential force of the people, most of whom were students, 
the party did everything in its power to prevent students' 
outbursts for political freedom. The fear of anarchy and 
political disunity was compounded by the fear of losing 
power. In the party's mind, its concerns for China were 
genuine and fears legitimate, and it was doing all it could 
to make China prosperous by accomplishing the goal of 
economic reform. The students felt differently. The 
political situation after the 1980 election was stifling. 
Unable to express its concerns inside China, the students 
who were sent abroad carried the mission. To a large 
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extent, what the students did abroad represented what the 
students at home would have done if the political situation 
had allowed them. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATION OF 1986 
The Chinese political climate experienced new shifts in 
1985 and 1986. The thwarted economy, which threatened the 
entire program of Deng's reform, prompted long overdue 
changes. The emergence of a new generation of technocratic 
leadership, the discussion of political structural reform, 
and the enthusiastic participation of the political reform 
discussion of higher education institutions were the 
backdrop of the student democratic movement in 1986. 
The Leadership Renewal 
The renewal of the party leadership, the initiation of 
a new group of technocratic leaders, began at the end of 
1984 and carried over to 1985. Since the crackdown of the 
student movement of 1980, China was in retrenchment. By the 
end of 1984, the leadership began to loosen political 
control to accelerate economic reform. In October 1984, 
Deng Xiaoping expressed at the meeting of the Party's 
central Advisory Commission that the key to the ultimate 
success of his reform program was to discover and employ 
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talented people who were more flexible and less resistant to 
. change. Accordingly, the party should promote young and 
middle-aged cadres, especially those in their thirties and 
forties, to leadership positions and persuade old cadres to 
be open-minded and vacate their posts. 1 Toward the end of 
1984, the party media announced the fact that the general 
education level of China's forty-two million Communist Party 
members was very low: only 4 percent had gone to college; 
less than 18 percent had attended senior high school. 
Furthermore, over 50 percent of the party members failed to 
advance beyond primary school. 2 Education was only half the 
problem. The other half lay in the fact that leadership at 
all levels of the Communist Party was in the hands of 
elderly cadres recruited before 1949, the year the People's 
Republic was established. 3 These leaders were now in their 
seventies and eighties; the majority of them clung to the 
past and were uneasy with the modifications introduced after 
Mao's death. Instead of being instrumental in the economic 
reform, they were fearful of its impact on the political 
arena and attempted to impede the progress of Deng 
Xiaoping's reform plan, the four modernizations of China. 
Deng Xiaoping, as the initiator of the economic reform and 
the one who charted the course of the country, was 
determined to get rid of the impediments. 
The renewal of the leadership hence began and resulted 
in a series of major personnel changes at the central, 
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provincial, and ministerial levels. In a break from the 
system of life tenure that was in practice in China for 
centuries, cadres by the hundreds of thousands stepped down 
from leading posts. The retirements occurred across the 
board, all the way to the very top. Wherever needed, 
government ministers and party politburo and secretariat 
members were replaced by younger people picked for their 
flexibility and proficiency. Some 469,000 young and middle-
aged people were prompted to the leading posts in party and 
government organs or the state-owned enterprises at or above 
the country level. 4 During the same period, nearly 1.27 
million senior officials, who joined revolutionary work 
before the founding of New China in 1949, retired from 
active service. 5 These efforts reduced considerably the 
average age of leaders. The promotion of younger cadres 
also immensely improved the educational level of cadres, 
over 50 percent of whom had a college education.' As Deng 
Xiaoping had contended, this new generation of leaders was 
indeed more liberal in thinking than its predecessors and 
was more eager to bring about changes. The result was a 
better mix in the leadership composition, combining 
experience with freshness. The step was a significant one, 
even though it did not eliminate all of the party elders and 
conservatives. The general public welcomed the change and 
anticipated that the new leadership would make a difference 
in the country's economic reform. 
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The Discussion and Debate of the Political Structure Reform 
The transformation of the leadership potently 
influenced the political agenda of 1986. Beginning in 1986, 
China was besieged by the problems caused by economic 
reform. Facing the trying situation, the new leadership 
began to point to the underlying causes of economic 
problems--the defects in the Chinese political structure. 7 
The Chinese word "crisis" tA~.JU meant danger and 
opportunity, for it was also a widely held belief in China 
that where there was a danger, there was also an 
opportunity. The newly recruited leaders wanted to take 
this economic crisis --"danger"-- to push the political 
structure reform --"opportunity"-- so as to take China out 
of the predicament the economic reform had brought. 
What made this political structure reform attempt more 
possible was the support from those above, including Deng 
Xiaoping·and Hu Yaobang, the party Secretary. Early in 
1980, Deng Xiaoping voiced his concern that the problems of 
the party--such as bureaucracy and overconcentration of 
power--could impede the full realization of the economic 
reform plan.• In 1986 Deng concluded that experience with 
economic reform had made it clear that bureaucratic 
impediments were the cause of the slow economic progress and 
that the ultimate success of the reform depended on the 
reform of the political structure. He went further to 
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declare that reforming the economic structure without 
renovating the political structure would not work. 9 At a 
June 20 conference on improving the party work style, Deng 
argued that the problems of economic reform were the direct 
by-products of an outmoded political structure, that the 
unconditional power of the ruling party was the source of 
all unhealthy tendencies. 10 Hu Yaobang, the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of China said that China's 
reform was a historical trend that could not be reversed. 
Without getting rid of concentrations of power, without 
streamlining administration, and without decentralizing 
decision-making powers, it would be hard to further economic 
reform and difficult to preserve the results achieved. He 
contested that the party should carry out economic reform 
together with political reform. 11 
In June 1986, Deng and Hu entrusted the issue of 
political reform to the new reformers. Having long waited 
for this political breakthrough, they immediately put the 
reform of the political structure on the agenda. The new 
reformers recognized the resistance of the party 
conservatives, but they relied on the support from Deng and 
other leaders who were inclined toward political reform. 
The principal thrust of the new reformers' effort was to 
encourage public debate and discussion of the issues of 
political reform in order to assist with the understanding 
and clarification of both problems involved in political 
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reform and to find solutions. As in the past, each major 
reform or movement was preceded by the discussion and debate 
among leaders, theoretical workers, intellectuals of various 
fields, and students, and this was no exception. The effort 
to stimulate debate and discussion was meant to prepare the 
ground for the next stage of the political reform. 
Since June 1986, people throughout China, under the 
leadership of new liberal leaders, engaged in discussion and 
debate about how to create a socialist political system that 
was efficient, democratic, and supported by a proper legal 
system. Several influential meetings or symposia were held 
for the exchange of ideas, and the results were widely 
publicized, setting models for other debates and 
discussions. A leading group on the reform of the political 
structure was set up, headed by Hu Qili and Wang Zhaoguo and 
endorsed by the Central Party School and the Academy of 
social Sciences. 12 Wang Zhaoguo remarked in a meeting of 
graduates of the central Party School that reform of the 
political system would represent an improvement of China's 
socialist system and an important part of the effort to 
build socialism with unique Chinese characteristics. The 
purpose of the reform should be to establish a better 
socialist political system having a high degree of democracy 
as well as efficiency and an improved legal system. He also 
urged the middle aged and young people recently promoted to 
positions of responsibility in China to support the party's 
decision on political reform and be instrumental in 
implementing it. 13 
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The topic of multiparty issue was discussed in another 
important meeting. Some speakers believed that the 
development of the forces of production called for 
corresponding changes in the superstructure and that the 
current economic reforms had made it necessary to revamp 
China's political system. Some speakers thought that 
supervision by the people was inevitable in a truly 
socialist democratic system. The Chinese Communist Party 
must listen to different opinions, criticisms, and correct 
its own shortcomings and mistakes. Supervision by different 
parties was conducive to strengthening of the party's 
leadership in socialist development and to the establishment 
of a highly developed democracy. The speakers suggested 
institutionalizing political consultation and democratic 
supervision to create a harmonious atmosphere in which 
people with or without party affiliation could feel free to 
speak out.u 
A symposium on the theory of political structure reform 
was held in Beijing and involved one hundred leading 
theoreticians, academic and political figures. They 
pondered questions such as the relationship between 
political and economic reform, the nexus between the party 
and economic reform, the basic aim of political 
modernization, and functions of the Communist Party. 15 
106 
The national research symposium on policy research of 
July 27 was another important milestone in the debate. Wan 
Li, a member of the Political Bureau of the central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and a vice-premier, 
was among the leading political personnel who attended the 
meeting. The debate and discussion gained more impetus when 
extensive coverage was given to his speech entitled, "Making 
Policies Democratically and Scientifically--An Important 
Problem of Political Restructuring." The full text of Wan 
Li's speech was carried in People's Daily and other Beijing 
newspapers. Linking his remarks explicitly to the issue of 
political reform, Wan stressed that the previous methods of 
decision making were unacceptable and that policy making 
must rely on the most advanced scientific method. The 
systems for policy consultation, appraisal, supervision, and 
feedback had to be validated. He said the influence of long 
years of feudal society and small-scale production, combined 
with the backwardness of science, education, and culture, an 
imperfect legal system, the incompetence of officials, and 
shortcomings in their democratic style of work had left 
China without rigorous procedures and systems for forming 
policies. "The time to effect a change in this situation is 
overdue," he commented, "otherwise, our socialist system 
will remain imperfect and the national economy will not be 
able to develop continuously and steadily. 1116 Recognizing 
that intellectuals might be reluctant to challenge powerful 
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interests, Wan called for the adoption of legislative 
measures to give legal protection to those engaged in 
policy-related research, to guarantee their relative 
independence from political forces. 17 His speech contained 
such forward and candid rhetoric: 
To develop a scientific approach, it is necessary 
first to create a political environment in which 
democracy, equality and the free exchange of views 
and information are the norms of life. Leaders 
must respect other people's democratic right to 
their opinions without fear, including those that 
contradict their own. This is all the more 
important for soft science research, because it 
comprises mental work involving political as well 
as academic questions. Only in an atmosphere of 
complete academic and political freedom can one 
hope to form true judgements and fee free to speak 
out and argue with others. 18 
For the next several months, articles and speeches on 
the necessity of political reform flooded the Chinese press. 
As the mouthpiece of the party, the press contained articles 
expounding the views of the leaders. Beijing Reyiew. an 
official magazine published in English and several other 
languages, was a typical example. During 1986, especially 
the latter half of the year, the magazine was full of 
articles and commentaries on political reform that not only 
affirmed the economic achievements of Deng's reform but also 
pointed out that, to reach the ultimate goals of 
modernization, China needed to change the political and 
legal systems, to transform people's mentality by overcoming 
the influences of old customs and outdated ideas, to 
separate the functions of the party from those of the 
government, and to improve the standard of democracy and 
ethics of society. 11 
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In the middle of 1986, the political mood in China was 
again strongly indicating the possibility of political 
reform. This time it was possibly even stronger than in 
1979 when Mao just died. The top leadership seemed to be 
very serious about reform, and the new leadership was eager 
to push it as far as it could go. People from all walks of 
life, particularly intellectuals and students, were actively 
involved in the discussion and debate over political reform, 
looking for the theoretical basis for China's reform. With 
the strong backing from Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, and the 
young leaders, there was widespread optimism that the 
momentum for change would be sustained and that the 
conservatives would eventually have to give in. The urgency 
of political reform was felt in the air, and people were 
hopeful that after seven years of economic reform, the 
political restructure had finally came to the scene. 
The Implication for Higher Education 
The political ramifications for higher education 
institutions were immediately apparent. The replacement of 
the old leadership and the elevation of the young leaders 
made it possible for a generation of intellectuals to govern 
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their own academic units. This, coupled with discussion of 
political structure reform encouraged from the above, 
enabled the academic institutions that had been repressed 
since the elections of 1980 to come alive again. 
There were two important documents that charted the 
direction of changes in higher education institutions. one 
of them was issued by the Ministry of Education in 1984. 
"The Reform of China's Educational structure" called for 
dramatic changes in the country's university system, 
including the election of administrators to top positions by 
committees of academics rather than through appointment by 
the party. This was followed by a more critical one: "The 
Decision of the Reform of the Educational structure," which 
came from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party on May 27, 1985. This document indicated that China's 
present educational system, educational guidelines, 
curricula, and methods were not congruent with the socialist 
modernization program. over-strict control by government 
departments had made schools, particularly institutions of 
higher learning, lack vitality and initiative. Urging that 
administrative powers be given to universities and colleges, 
the document granted them autonomy in eight areas: school 
operation, finance, capital construction, personnel affairs, 
hiring and job assignments of teaching, teachers, scientific 
research, and academic exchanges with other counties. It 
also extended the power of the presidents, including the 
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right to recommend appointments, to dismiss deputy 
presidents and leaders at various levels, and to hire or 
fire teachers and other staff members. In addition, 
universities and colleges would have the right to readjust 
their curricula, draw up new teaching programs, and select 
their own teaching materials to meet social needs. The 
regulations also encouraged universities and colleges to 
expand academic exchanges with other countries by granting 
them more power in accepting contributions from abroad and 
deciding who would be sent abroad for the academic 
exchanges . 20 
The Chinese press and leaders explicated and 
accentuated the importance of the documents. A People's 
Daily commentary said universities and colleges as the 
training centers for professionals should be relatively 
independent entities for teaching and scientific research. 
Their management should conform to the laws of education, 
not the rigid government administration. 21 Vice-Premier Wan 
Li at the National Education Conference expatiated at length 
on the need to abolish traditional educational theories and 
teaching methods of the closed type that had fixed and 
ossified content. He argued that such theories and methods 
could produce students who were obedient and docile but who 
lacked creativity and originality. He encouraged higher 
educational institutions to learn from previous experiences, 
develop new theories, and open new fields of knowledge. 22 
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Scores of changes took place as a result of these two 
documents. For the first time since Mao's death, colleges 
and universities elected faculty to supervise the work of 
the executive committee responsible for general leadership. 
Academic heads of departments were also given greater voice 
in decision making. Faculty and students could openly 
discuss academic issues, matters of university 
administration, budget, and broad political questions. 23 
The atmosphere created was one in which scientific and 
intellectual leadership was harmonized with the party 
supervision. 
Although many of the institutions participated in the 
academic reforms, one higher education institution led the 
way. The Chinese University of Science and Technology, 
which was established in 1958 under the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences and Technology (CUST), was a leading institution in 
both the basic and applied sciences. CUST was located in 
Hefei, Anhui Province. During October and November of 1986, 
the Chinese press carried a series of articles featuring the 
reforms being carried out in the internal administration and 
governance of this university under the new leadership. 
Fang Lizhi, the distinguished astrophysicist, became vice 
president of CUST while his colleague in physics, Guan 
Weiyan, was appointed president as a result of leadership 
reform. 24 
once in position, Fang and Guan devised a program of 
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academic reform for CUST. They proposed a plan that would 
implement a radical horizontal redistribution of power at 
the university. Instead of having all authority 
concentrated in the hands of top-level administrators, 
allowing them to control research funds, granting of 
degrees, and faculty promotions, Fang and Guan would spread 
out these functions among special committees and the 
departments themselves. A second reform involved 
establishing the rights of faculty and staff to audit all 
administrative meetings. A third area that concerned Fang 
and Guan was freedom of speech. They wished to create an 
open academic and political environment, to establish firmly 
the rights of students and faculty not only to speak out on 
campuses, but also to remain free from all forms of 
ideological repression. It was their conviction that anyone 
should be able to put up a handbill or hold an event on 
campus without having to seek prior approval from some 
higher authority. To foster openness that would have a 
cosmopolitan dimension, they also sought to establish as 
much contact as possible with the outside world. By the end 
of 1986, more than nine hundred faculty members and students 
from CUST had been sent abroad to visit, lecture, and study, 
and over two hundred foreign scholars had visited CUST. 25 
The discussion of the political structural reform 
provided an opportunity for Chinese intellectuals to raise 
fundamental questions of academic freedom. Chinese 
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officials asserted during the debate on political reform 
that academic freedom was necessary if China were to advance 
rapidly in science and other intellectual fields. The 
official press stated that socialist China advocated 
academic freedom and called for a relaxed social environment 
in which people were allowed to express different opinions 
and constantly break new ground. The right to disagree over 
academic issues should be guaranteed to every academician. 
Both criticism and counter-criticism should be allowed, and 
nobody should resort to smothering ideas which conflicted 
with his or her own or to inveigh against those people who 
held different opinions. 2 fi 
consequently, the academic reform in Chinese higher 
institutions toward internal administration was paralleled 
by the debates over academic freedom. some academicians 
thought that it was possible to make a clear line of 
demarcation between political and academic issues and that 
complete freedom for debate and differences of views should 
be secured within the university community only on academic 
issues. 2 ' Others felt it was not possible to draw a clear 
line between political and academic issues and that the only 
effective guarantee of intellectual freedom was the 
democratization of the political system. 21 Su Shaozhi, the 
director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism- Mao ZeDong 
Thought in the Academy of Social Sciences, was very 
provocative in his remarks and was frequently cited in the 
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academic circle. He gave several widely publicized 
interviews in the autumn of 1986 calling for the 
strengthening of China's intellectuals as a social group and 
for the development of an independent mentality so that they 
"do not always yield to power and link their prospects with 
an official career."n 
Providing substance to the assertions, the party 
leaders supported controversial writings in economics and 
literature, the so-called Ma Ding and Liu Zaifu affairs. 
Both Ma Ding, a young lecturer in philosophy at Nanjing 
University and Liu Zaifu, the director of the Institute of 
Literature in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, had 
written articles that deviated from Marxism. Ma had 
questioned the continuing relevance of Marxist classics like 
Das Kapital in seeking answers to the practical problems of 
socialist development. He advocated the critical borrowing 
of Western economic theories to supplement Marxist analysis. 
Liu was critical of theories of literature and art that 
emphasized political over aesthetic criteria. Both of their 
writings were controversial but were allowed to be published 
and discussed. 30 
By the autumn of 1986, there seemed to be a widely 
shared perception among colleges and universities that, if 
the profound effects of the economic reform were to continue 
in the desired direction, the party had to make changes in 
the political structure. The discussions and debates were 
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thought provoking and enlightening. The participation in 
the discussion of academic freedom and political restructure 
on the part of intellectuals, faculty members and 
administrators had animated the students. The students, 
more than any other group of people in China, were spirited 
and hopeful of the process and outcome of the potential 
political changes; they, more than any other group in China, 
were more daring and determined to see the tangible 
transformations taking place. 
The students 
The students of 1986 were products of the time and had 
distinctive characteristics. Unlike the students of the 
1980 election who were older and experienced, the students 
of 1986 were young and mostly high school graduates. The 
revival of the university entrance examination system had 
provided them with an opportunity to continue their 
education right after high school. Most of the students 
were eighteen or nineteen years old. The students of 1986 
had come of age during the Three Beliefs Crisis--lack of 
belief in the party, lack of confidence in socialism, and 
lack of trust in leaders. Mao and his cultural Revolution 
had greatly disillusioned the students. Deng's initial 
reform had given them hope, but the crackdown of the 1980 
student election again disenchanted them. Many of them 
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became cynical and confused. "Lost Generation" was a term 
used by the society to describe those students. 
The students of this time were exposed to many new 
thoughts and ideas. Beginning in 1978, China pursued a 
policy of opening to the outside world, which had led to a 
tremendous influx of new ideas and things. In spite of the 
tightened control of the party after the 1980 election, the 
students continued to maintain contacts with the outside 
world. After the curbing of the 1980 election, the party 
had hoped the higher education institutions could immunize 
themselves from Western influences and therefore adhere to 
the four principles the party had laid down in 1980. But 
the reality was contrary to what the party had expected. 
The students, in one way or another, were exposed to Western 
ideas and democratic thoughts through the interactions with 
those students who returned from abroad, those who came to 
China to teach, to do business, and to travel. The powerful 
media, such as Voice of Affierica, also played an important 
role in bringing ideas and news that the students could not 
get from Chinese media. They had a deep sense of social 
injustice and a powerful feeling that something was very 
wrong with Chinese society as a whole--something that could 
only be corrected by fundamental changes in the system 
itself. 
The renewal of leadership, the participation by higher 
education institutions in political reform discussion had a 
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profound impact on the students. New ideas of democracy and 
freedom, articulated so forcefully even in the official 
press in the summer and fall of 1986, had created a strong 
sense of expectation among China's university students. 
They seemed to be waiting for this occasion for a long time, 
and when it came, they welcomed with enthusiasm. Campuses 
were alive with a kind of unregimented political discussion 
that had been unknown for years. The open climate on 
campus, the opportunities to air grievances, the freedom of 
speech and writing, the introduction of interdisciplinary 
courses and new programs increased chances to attend liberal 
arts and science courses, lectures and other such activities 
pleased students. 31 Stimulated, they lined up with the 
reformers and hoped for the fundamental changes. 
One person who propelled students more than anybody 
else was Fang Lizhi. Fang Lizhi did not limit his reform 
within the circle of CUST. He was active in the internal 
administration reform of CUST as well as being vigorous in 
advocating the political structure reform outside CUST. In 
a newly relaxed political climate, not only was there a 
renewed sense of intellectual excitement, but student 
organizations were also allowed to book rooms, invite 
speakers, and put up posters freely to announce events. 
Fang Lizhi was frequently invited by many campuses as the 
guest speaker, giving speeches on how to achieve academic 
freedom and democracy. In his speeches and interviews on 
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Chinese university campuses, he stressed his two favorite 
themes--the role of the intellectuals as an independent 
force for social reform and the need to consider democracy 
as a right and not as a gift from above. He wanted to 
ensure freedom of thought as one of the principles of 
university education. 32 
In 1985 and 1986, Fang seemed to turn up whenever and 
wherever there was open political discussion or ferment. As 
appeals for political reform reached a crescendo in the 
fall, Fang traveled to several more Chinese universities 
making speeches, holding discussion groups, and giving 
interviews. His calls for democracy were bolder and more 
uncompromising than ever, and his fearlessness more 
pronounced. In fact during the month of November, 
particularly in student circles, one began to hear Fang 
Lizhi's name spoken more and more often. In Beijing, Hefei, 
Hagzhou, Ningbo, and Shanghai, wherever he spoke, young 
students listened, recorded and even hand-copied his talks, 
and sent them on to other friends and student groups all 
across China, even to colleagues studying in the United 
states and Europe. 33 He addressed students on the subjects 
of democracy, reform, and modernization, rousing them to 
repeated rounds of applause. His speeches galvanized those 
university students to action. To students, Fang not only 
represented the intellectuals but also the new leadership. 
The student movement after the 1980's election began. 
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The discussion and debate went on for a few months, but 
there were no specific steps taken by the leadership. The 
students assumed that the conservative group within the 
party was obstructing the progress of reform. Restless and 
determined, the students took the matter into their own 
hands. Enthusiastic discussion over political reform 
finally culminated in a massive outbreak of student 
demonstrations in November and December of 1986, the largest 
such movement since the founding of the People's Republic of 
China. At least seventeen Chinese cities were the scene of 
student marches which in some cases, involved up to five 
thousand students. If the top leadership had not initiated 
the political reform, if the higher education institutions 
and intellectuals had not actively participated in the 
debate and discussion, the students' hopes and desires would 
have lied latent and fervor unawakened. But the political 
overture from the party had provided them an outlet for 
their pent-up grievances and hopes. 
The student Demonstration of 1986 
The Student Demonstration in Hefei 
Not surprisingly, the student movement began in Chinese 
University of Science and Technology of Hefei, Anhui 
Province where Fang Lizhi served as vice president. 
Students from various universities and colleges of Hefei had 
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been dynamic participants during those months of intense and 
lively debate and discussion on the political structure 
reform. There was no doubt that Fang and the reform his 
university CUST carried out had stimulated the students' 
zeal about the prospect of political reconstruction and had 
prepared them for the coming incident. 
The protest by the students of CUST started with the 
way the candidates for the local congress were selected. 34 
The party had designated all the candidates for the December 
election to the county-level people's congress. 
Furthermore, the party leaders of CUST refused to let the 
undergraduates and graduate students contend with the 
appointed candidates. 
In 1980, when the party tried free election of 
candidates for local people's congress, the students 
throughout the country vigorous participated in the 
election. In the process of the election, the students 
raised fundamental questions that challenged the power of 
the communist Party and the legitimacy of the government. 
Intimidated, the top leadership launched a blunt crackdown 
on the students and the election. Since then, the party 
decided who should run for election, and the candidates they 
chose had to say and do what the party wanted them to. 
There was no toleration for differences in opinions or any 
kind of opposition to the party's policies. Between 1981 to 
1985, all local candidates were designated from above. The 
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firm control of the party permitted no challenge to this way 
of election, and the students, though angry, were largely 
silent. But the year 1986 was different. In the process of 
the discussion of political democracy, this kind of election 
seemed to mock and ridicule the concept of democracy itself. 
The renewed momentum of the political structure reform 
discussion prompted students once again to challenge and 
defy the way the election was conducted. 35 
The demonstration by CUST students thus began. Wall 
posters appeared on campus. Some of them quoted the 
Gettysburg Address 11 Government of the People, by the People, 
for the People. 1136 on December 4, more than fifteen hundred 
students gathered on campus protesting to the party 
committee of the school the way the election was handled. 
At the rally, Fang delivered an inflammatory speech. 3 ' 
Three thousand of them marched to the offices of the 
provincial government, insisting on being allowed to run for 
office. The authorities capitulated. The demonstration was 
successful in getting local officials to postpone the 
election, and the students were permitted to nominate their 
own candidates. 31 
The demonstration by CUST students caught the attention 
of the central party leadership. Vice Premier wan Li came 
to Hefei and summoned all the leaders from institutions in 
Hefei to discuss the topic of how to "Run Universities 
Democratically." Though the discussion did not reach 
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concrete results, yet the concept of "Run University 
Democratically" fomented the students in Hefei. They were 
convinced that if the university were to be run 
democratically, then non-party candidates including students 
should be allowed to run for elections. 3 ' 
The initial success of the students from CUST and the 
discussion by Wan Li with school leaders enabled the 
students from other colleges and universities to join in the 
protest. The students from several universities in Hefei 
decided to demonstrate concurrently on December 9, the 
fiftieth anniversary of the student Movement of 1936. On 
that day, students from various universities had taken to 
the streets and demonstrated, demanding freedom of speech 
and democracy from the Kuomintang Party and protesting 
against the aggression of Japan. Fifty years later on the 
same day, several thousand students from universities in 
Hefei marched toward the provincial building of Anhui. They 
shouted "Without democracy, without modernization," "Give 
me liberty or give me death," ••we want democratic 
election," "We do not want democracy bestowed." 40 standing 
in front of the building, the students gave speeches 
pointing out the flaws of a totalitarian system. In the 
meantime, they presented the letter petitioning to be 
allowed to have a democratic election.u 
As it turned out, the student protest in Hefei ended 
peacefully and with good results. All elections were 
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postponed, and provisions were made for students to propose 
candidates of their own. But the demonstration did not stop 
there, because the student demonstration in Hefei 
immediately sent shock waves pulsing throughout the rest of 
the country. 42 
The students of Hefei sparked the student democratic 
movement throughout the country. CUST students, ever since 
their demonstration on 4th of December, used letters and 
telephones to inform students from elsewhere, urging them to 
join them in the endeavour for democracy. Many universities 
across the country received leaflets and other materials 
issued in the name of the students of CUST. 43 On the day 
when the students from Hefei demonstrated in front of the 
buildings of the provincial government, students in Wuhan 
took to the streets in solidarity with the students from 
CUST. Twenty-five hundred students coming from Wuhan 
University and HuaZhun Institute of Technology surrounded 
the provincial building of Hebei Province. Under slogans 
such as "Without democracy, without modernization," and "We 
want freedom," they gathered in front of the building for 
over an hour.'' Protests also broke out in Hunan Teachers' 
College where the 1980 student election had taken place. 
Fifteen hundred students demonstrated in the city of 
Changshai and shouted the same slogans. From December 9 to 
December 15, Sichun University, Nanjing University, Hangchow 
University, and universities in Shenzhen, the economic zone, 
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and students from Shanghai and Beijing all participated in 
demonstrations.' 5 The student demonstrations in Shanghai 
and Beijing were the most significant in terms of its scale 
and effect. 
The student Demonstration in Shanghai 
The students from Shanghai, the biggest city in the 
country, joined in the demonstration~ During the second 
week of December, big character posters began to appear in 
sequence in Jiaotong, Tongji, and Fudan universities. The 
posters showed their support for the Hefei students and 
reprimanded the sluggishness of political reform and the 
stultifying bureaucracy of the party. Urging the students 
all over Shanghai to learn from Hefei students, the posters 
encouraged students to unite to protest so as to push the 
needed changes.'6 on December 18, thousands of students 
broke through the locked gates of Jiaotong University and 
marched off the campus to Shanghai's People's Square. They 
carried banners and placards with slogans similar to those 
of Hefei and Wuhan students: "Give us back our human 
rights," "Long live the power of the people," "Long live 
democracy."" 
Following the demonstration of 18 December, students 
from all major universities and colleges in Shanghai 
protested for three consecutive days. On December 19, 
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thousands of students from Jiaotong, Fudan, and Tongji 
universities flooded into downtown Shanghai. After a mass 
meeting in People's Square, they surged off to the buildings 
of the Shanghai Municipal People's Congress standing 
Committee. Student representatives gave impassioned 
speeches, demanding freedom of press, and freedom of 
election, pressing a list of their requests on the Mayor of 
Shanghai. These demands were: the government should take 
no reprisals against demonstrators, acknowledge the legality 
and constitutionality of the marches, grant students access 
to the media to air their views, and speed up political 
reform in both Shanghai and the rest of the country.•• 
When the Mayor of Shanghai failed to give satisfactory 
answers to the students' demands, the students went further 
with the demonstration. on December 20, an estimated thirty 
thousand students from almost all of Shanghai's major 
institutions of higher learning poured into the streets. 
over fifty thousand Shanghai citizens stood by and cheered 
the students. This was the largest student demonstration 
since Mao's death. The students surrounded the People's 
Square and the Municipal Building and then marched to the 
American Embassy in Shanghai requesting that it take the 
message of their demonstration to the world and to the 
Chinese students studying abroad. 49 On December 21, 
gathering on People's Square, the students handed out a 
manifesto on three by five inch mimeographed slips of paper. 
The manifesto was addressed to "our countrymen:" 
our guiding principle is to propagate democratic 
ideas among the people. Our slogan is to oppose 
bureaucracy and authoritarianism and to strive for 
democracy and freedom. The time has come to 
awaken those democratic ideas that have long been 
suppressed. 50 
Another handout, an "Open Letter to All Fellow Citizens," 
was also handed to the students: 
Between the past and the future, there is only the 
present. We can not rewrite history, but we can 
change the present and create the future. In the 
face of the reality of poverty and autocracy, we 
can endure. However, we can not just allow our 
children to grow up abnormally in shackles and in 
the absence of freedom, democracy and human 
rights. We can not just allow them to feel poor 
and abused when standing together with foreign 
children and the lack of democracy and human 
rights are the roots of backwardness. 51 
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The students listened to speeches and read the handouts; the 
citizens demonstrated sympathy for the protesters by making 
small contributions of food and money to the hungry, cold 
students. s 2 
The student demonstration ended in Shanghai without 
either major confrontations with the police or with any 
concessions from the government. After three days of 
increasingly large and tumultuous street protests by 
university and college students, the Shanghai police finally 
banned all further demonstrations without a permit. This 
step effectively made any public protest illegal. on 
December 22, newspapers and radio stations publicized the 
Shanghai municipal government spokesman's answers to 
correspondents' questions on student demonstrations. The 
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spokesman commented that the majority of students took part 
in the demonstrations out of concern for reform and with 
good wishes for speeding up the process of socialist 
democracy. But he also cautioned the students not to 
jeopardize the country's stability and unity. This was the 
first time that the domestic mass media had given a detailed 
report on the student demonstrations and the first time that 
a local government had made known its position. 53 on the 
campuses of Shanghai's colleges and universities, officials 
posted large notices urging students to return to classes 
and halt the street demonstrations. The pressure from final 
exams, parents, and official warnings undercut the momentum 
of the protest, and most students returned to class. 54 
Shanghai student demonstrations were nevertheless 
significant. They happened in the biggest city in China and 
caught the attention of a national and international 
audience. Many first-class universities and colleges were 
concentrated in Shanghai, and the movement from the students 
of these institutions was more intimidating to the party and 
better reverberated through other institutions of higher 
learning. Most important of all, the demonstration in 
Shanghai led to the movement erupting in the institutions of 
higher learning in Beijing. 
The student Demonstration in Beijing 
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The students from Beijing, the capital of China, also 
took part in the demonstrations. Starting on 12 December, 
the campus of Beijing University began to have wall posters 
supporting the students' demonstrations in Hefei and urging 
the Beijing students to renew the spirit of the Chinese 
student movement and join the Hefei students in this 
endeavour. The posters praised Fan Lizhi for his bravery in 
backing the students and his role in promoting the political 
reform. 55 
on the evening of December 23, 1986, the night the 
students from Shanghai returned to their classrooms, the 
students from Beijing started their demonstration. 
Thousands of student protesters massed on the campus of 
Qinghua University to demand a debate with school officials 
on the question of democratization and shocked party 
officials. When their demands were not met, they took to 
the streets and marched toward People's University, chanting 
such slogans as "Maintain solidarity with our fellow 
students from Shanghai," "Long live freedom and human 
rights," and "Recognize freedom of the press and freedom of 
publication." A smaller group of bolder students broke off 
from the main body and tried to march on Tiananmen square, 
but they were intercepted by police and turned back. 5 ' 
The demonstration in the center of Beijing worried the 
leaders, who took steps to control possible bigger 
demonstrations in the future. The People's Daily published 
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an editorial entitled "Treasure and Develop Political 
Stability and Unity" on December 23, the day Beijing 
students demonstrated. The Daily urged the students to 
offer criticisms and suggestions through different channels 
rather than demonstrations. 57 On December 26, the standing 
committee of the Beijing municipal people's congress adopted 
the Provisional Regulations Concerning Procession and 
Demonstration. 58 The regulations consisted of ten articles, 
one of which demanded that the organizers of processions and 
demonstrations file a written application with the public 
security organs of the locality five days in advance, and if 
they violated this regulation, security organs should adopt 
necessary measures to stop the demonstration. These 
regulations were published by Beijing Daily the next day. 59 
on December 29, ignoring the ban on demonstrations and 
the new stridency of the party leaders, students from 
Beijing Teachers' University took to the streets. 60 The 
immediate cause of this demonstration was a dispute with 
university authorities whom students had caught ripping down 
wall posters and banners. Waving burning brooms as torches, 
carrying banners covered with slogans, and shouting "We want 
freedom," the students rushed off campus and marched toward 
People's University and Beijing University. There, they 
broke open the locked gates, poured inside, beating drums 
and washbasins, and exhorted the other students to join 
them. The demonstration wound up at Beijing University that 
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morning without further incident. 61 
January 1 brought the biggest demonstration in 
Beijing. That night, several thousand students, refusing to 
be intimidated, began a march on the spiritual seat of 
political power in China, Tiananmen Square. This spacious 
square is located at the heart of Beijing, in front of both 
the Imperial City and the Great Hall of the People. 
Tiananmen Square is a sacred place in the eyes of the 
Chinese people, and it is particularly meaningful for 
students. It was in Tiananmen Square that China's first 
mass student demonstrations touched off the May Fourth 
Movement in 1919. Students returned several times in later 
years, protesting the government's corruption and Japan's 
aggression. When the students reached the square this New 
Year's morning, they quickly held up well-prepared banners 
with slogans on them. There were student leaders and 
organizers in the procession, some of whom took the lead in 
shouting "Demand freedom o.f demonstration," "Abolish the 10 
article regulations" and "Oppose tyranny." 62 The Square was 
surrounded by thousands of police, organized into a human 
chain to block their way. Uncertain about what to do, the 
demonstrators milled about, chanted slogans "Long live 
freedom, give us freedom of the press," and "Long live 
democracy." The demonstrators soon attracted a much larger 
crowd of onlookers. The plainclothes police with video 
cameras tried to take pictures of the students. 63 
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Eventually, the police arrested and hustled away a group of 
twenty-four students leaders.'4 
As word of the twenty-four arrests began to spread 
around college campuses, students at Beijing University 
reassembled to demand the release of the detained 
demonstrators. "Return our comrades, Return our comrades," 
they chanted in front of the house of the university 
President Ding Shisun. When President Ding finally 
appeared, he was presented with a list of demands, which 
included release and amnesty for the arrested students, a 
guarantee that no reprisals would be taken against other 
demonstrators, and a promise that access to the media would 
be given to student representatives so that the viewpoints 
of the demonstrators could be explained to the Chinese 
people. Student representatives claimed that a boycott of 
classes would be carried out if the demands were not met. 
President Ding, claiming that he was in touch with Beijing 
Mayor Chen Xitong, promised to consider the requests. It 
was almost midnight when he returned and announced to cheers 
that the detained Beijing University students would be 
released. When it was learned that the promised release did 
not pertain to non-Beijing University students who had been 
arrested, a crowd once again assembled to march on Tiananmen 
Square. In the early morning hours, the Vice President Sha 
Jianxun, obviously fearful that if student demands were not 
met, the protest would grow in both size and intensity, went 
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into the streets to announce to the students that the 
government had agreed to release all of those arrested. 65 
on January 4, five hundred students of Beijing University 
gathered and burned copies of Bei1ing Daily. Congregating 
on campus under a banner that said, "Beijing Daily go to 
hell," the students, in a clearly intended slap at the 
party's desire to foster an image of modernity abroad, 
burned copies of the hated newspaper in front of foreign 
reporters, who promptly relayed photos of the incident 
around the world." As a bonfire sent pieces of flaming 
paper skyward, students in dormitories threw other burning 
copies from windows. 67 Beijing Daily, which was published 
by the city authorities, had been denouncing students for 
staging demonstrations. The newspaper portrayed their 
demands in a very unflattering manner: 
The ideological roots of the disturbances have been the 
poisonous ideological trend of bourgeois liberalism. 
They want to use the false democracy to create 
anarchy.u 
students, furious at the way they had been portrayed in the 
media, indulged in one last bit of political revenge. This 
symbolic action was also an expression of their resentment 
toward the Beijing Municipal Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party." The bonfire turned out to be the last 
protest of the whole movement. Providentially for the 
government, nationwide examinations were about to begin, 
after which students were to take their month-long winter 
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vacations over the Chinese New Year. In the highly 
competitive academic environment of China, few students 
could afford to ignore schoolwork any longer. On top of all 
this, the party made known its position on the 
demonstration. With sadness and disappointment, the 
students ended the month long protests. 70 
The Party's Reaction to the Student Demonstration 
The party's reaction to the student demonstrations was 
at first tentative and cautious. The demonstrations, which 
commenced in Hefei by CUST students and ceased in Beijing by 
Beijing University students, lasted for a month. The views 
as to how to handle the students and their demonstrations 
were split between liberal reformers and conservatives, and 
the central figure of Chinese politics, Deng Xiaoping, did 
not give specific directions until the students in Beijing 
protested. Hence, the responses by the authorities to the 
student demonstrations were at first mainly uncertain and 
discreet. Colleges and universities in Hefei postponed the 
election. The authorities in other parts of the country 
attempted to calm the students by persuasion. Sometimes the 
leaders even sounded encouraging and sympathetic toward the 
students. "Student demonstrations will not be suppressed as 
long as they are not against the law," commented a State 
Education Commission official when being interviewed by 
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Xinhua News Agency as the students demonstration broke out 
in Hefei, Wuhan, and Shanghai. 71 When asked to expound on 
the fact that students were demanding democracy and freedom, 
he explained that development of socialist democracy had 
been a constant policy of the Chinese government, because it 
was adopted as an important plank in the restructuring of 
the political system by the party. He remarked that "it is 
understandable that colleges students should be concerned 
about the restructuring of the political system and hope to 
express their views on these issues. "72 
When the demonstrations rocked Beijing itself, Deng 
spoke out, and the conservatives prevailed. The 
demonstration Tiananmen Square in the heart of in Beijing, 
challenged the central government. Deng finally decided to 
make use of the hard-liners, the conservatives, to halt the 
demonstrations. According to him, the crackdown was for the 
benefit of the country. His fears of this student 
demonstration were similar to those of 1980 student 
election. If the students had got what they had asked for, 
not only would the country lose its stability and unity but 
also the unchallengeable primacy of the party. In spite of 
his willingness to push for the political reform, Deng could 
not let the students get what they demanded. There were 
restrictions imposed on the political reform. There was 
only so much freedom that could be given and the students 
could not overstep the limits. Although Deng was far from 
being an outright Maoist hard-liner and had himself 
initiated the political reform, there were limitations to 
his flexibility. His tenacious commitment to his four 
cardinal principles: the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
the socialism, the leadership of the Communist party, the 
ideology of Marxism--Leninism and the thoughts of Mao 
Zedong, and his animosity to what was known in the party 
circles as "bourgeois liberalization" and "wholesale 
Westernization" were evident in 1980 election crackdown. 
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The stance of Deng toward the 1986 student demonstrations 
again revealed his attitude toward those who violated his 
four principles and his aversion toward those who advocated 
Western democracy. Deng might have sincerely believed that 
Western democracy was not applicable to China's situation 
and the only way to curb the chaos resulted from the 
economic reform was to follow his four tenets. Deng 
Xiaoping ordered the Communist Party committees at all 
levels of the government to give new importance to the task 
of opposing bourgeois liberalization. Just as he had joined 
the hard liners and turned against the students in 1980 when 
the election threatened his concept of social stability and 
no longer served his political purpose, he took the same 
stand in 1986. 
The crackdown began, ending the party's seven-month 
experiment with political liberalization. Deng's speech of 
1980 against the student election was reprinted over and 
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over in the official press. A special meeting of the party 
leadership was convened on December 30 to discuss the 
student unrest during which Deng revealed his position on 
the demonstration and gave orders to arrest the student 
leaders. 73 The party relied heavily on its media to get the 
message across. Following the meeting, the Chinese press, 
the party mouthpiece, was barraged with articles criticizing 
the students. Speeches by conservative leaders denouncing 
the contaminating influence of Western political values and 
free expression swamped China's newspapers and television 
news reports. The term "bourgeois liberalization" had 
become the pejorative phrase to describe any Western-style 
ideas or actions. Although repeating their views that the 
students' supposed embrace of the West was politically 
corrupt, these conservatives had also vigorously championed 
the virtues of the communist Party, the legitimacy of its 
dictatorship, and the role it must play in the life of the 
country. 74 The conservatives also managed to close some of 
newspapers, many of which regularly published divergent 
views on a range of economic and political matters. 75 
The political climate signaled a major change of 
direction for the Chinese leadership. After Deng Xiaoping 
sided with the conservatives and began a crusade against 
bourgeois liberalization, the students began to be concerned 
about the political fate of those liberal reformers who 
sided with the students and who really meant to push genuine 
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political restructuring in China. Two weeks after the 
student demonstrations, to quell any sign of liberalism, 
Deng Xiaoping relieved the Communist Party Secretary Hu 
Yaobang, the second-most powerful man in China, of his post. 
He was accused of failing to combat bourgeois liberalization 
and going beyond the party guidelines in promoting an 
acceleration of political reform. Criticism of Hu focused 
on his alleged misguided ideological leadership. In 
particular, he was censured for his tolerance of or even 
opposition to the anti-spiritual pollution and anti-
bourgeois liberalization movements. Regarded as a principal 
defender of a freer intellectual climate, Hu had been an 
important spokesman for the reform of political structure 
during the previous few months. As the second-most 
influential person in the top leadership, he was the 
representative of a energetic group composed of the young 
liberal reformers. such a startling shake-up in the 
communist Party hierarchy had not been seen in nearly a 
decade, ever since paramount leader Deng Xiaoping came to 
power in 1979. It was all the more astonishing because Hu, 
had been handpicked by Deng to lead the party and was widely 
thought to be in line to succeed the eighty-two-year old 
leader. 75 In China, expulsion from the party represented a 
severe form of political punishment for anyone in a position 
of leadership. This motion was a relentless personal 
onslaught against Hu Yaobang and was a harbinger of what was 
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to happen next. 
After the replacement of Hu Yaobang, the party 
initiated a new campaign of criticism against those liberal 
reformers and intellectuals who had encouraged or permitted 
departures from the political orthodoxy and sympathized with 
the student demonstrations. The party concluded that the 
result of the demonstration was the spread of bourgeois 
liberal thought on the part of intellectuals and the fact 
that some leaders had shown weakness in fighting it. 
Intellectuals were put on notice that the party would not 
permit them to explore new political ideas or allow them to 
question the tenets of the Communist Party as they had in 
recent months. It warned that the Chinese regime would 
insist upon rigorous obedience to the four cardinal 
principles. 77 Just a few mouths earlier, the party had 
loosened the ideological bonds that hobbled intellectual and 
artistic expression. Now the party reversed its decision 
and the intellectuals were again the major victims. 
As if the criticisms and warnings were not enough to 
bridle the pernicious inclinations of the intellectuals, the 
party began a series of purges. The purge of these 
intellectuals carne amid a stream of castigation in 
newspapers and on television against any intellectuals who 
demonstrated attitudes sympathetic to Western thinking or 
values and supported the students. Fan Lizhi, not 
surprisingly, was dismissed from his vice presidential post 
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at CUST. His crime was his speeches that defamed the 
party's leadership, slandered the socialist system, and 
supported the student demonstrations. CUST's president, 
Guan Wiyan, was also removed from office for failing to 
restrain his subordinate and for being responsible for the 
nationwide bad influence caused by the student unrest at the 
university. 78 The party also dismissed two other men, Liu 
Jixi, the president of the Academy Science, a structural 
scientist, and Yang Dongsheng, the Academy's vice president 
and a ceramic chemist. The Academic of Science, which was 
made up of about one hundred institutes with nearly forty 
thousand scientists, was responsible for the appointments 
and control of the CUST. 19 Their offenses were the 
appointment of Fang Lizhi to the vice presidential post in 
CUST and the failure to rein in CUST when the demonstrations 
broke out. Liu Binyan, a famous Chinese writer, was ousted 
from the party for having criticized corrupt officials in 
his writing. Wang Ruoshui, a leading theoretician, was 
sacked for arguing that alienation or public malaise could 
occur in a socialist society just as it could under 
capitalism. Zhu Houze, the Communist Party's propaganda 
chief and a proponent of liberalization, was also 
dismissed. 80 In contrast with the purges in the leadership 
and in the circles of intellectuals, the students' 
punishment was mild and symbolic. Having eliminated the top 
leaders and important intellectuals, the party turned to the 
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students. one thing the party repeated over and over was 
that the students were a group of innocent youngsters who 
did not know what was going on. They were merely led astray 
by the bad elements, namely people like Hu Yaobang and Fang 
Lizhi. Stopping the influences of these bad elements was 
one remedy to prevent students from doing things which would 
harm the Communist Party and its power. The other way was 
to intensify ideological education. Once more the emphasis 
was on an all-round education that would develop the 
students physically, intellectually, and morally. More 
political education sessions were added. University 
students had been required to attend political lectures on 
Marxism and Leninism. During spring and summer vacations, 
some university students were sent to work on farms or in 
factories while others carried out social surveys in rural 
and backward areas to give them a more realistic picture of 
life outside "the ivory tower.'' In September 1987, military 
training was once more emphasized in schools to make 
students more disciplined and to prevent outbursts of the 
movement. 81 
The party did punish one particular student. One of 
the students educated in the United States was detained as a 
demonstrator. The student, Yang Wei, returned to China 
after receiving a master's degree in molecular biology from 
the University of Arizona. He was arrested on January 11 in 
Shanghai after taking part in the student demonstration in 
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December. He was put under arrest and charged with counter-
revolutionary activities. 12 To the Communist Party, Yang 
Wei was not an ordinary student, for he represented the West 
and western education where bourgeois liberalization 
originated. Punishing Yang Wei sent signals to those abroad 
as well as at home--the party would not tolerate the 
demagogues and agitators who were under the degenerative 
influences of the West. Yang Wei was not the only student 
who returned home and participated in the demonstration, but 
the party used its old tactic--to punish a few to show the 
rest while avoiding alienating more people than necessary--a 
tactic that had worked for rulers in China throughout 
history. 
The Chinese students who had been sent abroad over the 
years had been concerned about events unfolding at home. 
After the crackdown on the student election of 1980, many 
students abroaa, particularly those in the United states, 
had been strong proponents for the Chinese political 
transformation. They were very hopeful of China's future as 
a result of the relaxed political atmosphere from 1985 until 
the end of 1986. During this period, students scanned the 
Chinese press, talked among themselves, and became more 
optimistic because of the increasingly liberal atmosphere 
that prevailed back home. The Chinese Alliance for 
Democracy, with its magazine China Spring, played an 
important role in this movement. According to statistics of 
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the organization, for every four students abroad, one would 
be in possession of the magazine. Those who returned to 
China would either bring physically or introduce verbally 
the magazine and the ideas the magazine conveyed. More than 
ten thousand copies of the magazines were smuggled into 
China each month. The students from Hefei and Wuhan who 
were studying in the United states tried to get the 
magazines to CUST and other students via Hong Kong. 83 It 
was with great anticipation that they observed the whole 
process of the student demonstrations at horne. 
It was also with a real sense of shock and apprehension 
that Chinese students abroad heard of the fall of Hu 
Yaobang, the expulsion of Fang and the intellectuals from 
the party, and the arrest of Yang Wei who was just like one 
of them. on January 20, 1986, more than a thousand Chinese 
students studying in the United States took the 
unprecedented step of endorsing an open letter to the 
leaders of China expressing concerns over recent events and 
condemning the purges of the liberal reformers. This was 
the first time that a substantial number of Chinese students 
in North American had used their names in a letter as such. 
Copies of the letter were delivered to Chinese officials and 
to two Chinese newspapers in New York.u When the 
government ignored the lette~, the students felt helpless 
and angry. The fate of Yang Wei cast doubts in the minds of 
many as to whether to return to China upon graduation. 
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The student demonstration of 1986 was also the outcome 
of the Chinese political milieu. What had stirred up the 
student interests in protest was again the party's own call 
for political reform. To a degree, the students saw 
themselves as spearheading the drive to push the political 
reform to help the liberals including Deng to accomplish 
their purposes. As students who participated in the 
demonstration of 1986 later said when asked why they had 
taken to the streets: 
We were responding to the call last July by Deng 
Xiaoping for political reform. It seemed that the 
top leadership favored the political reform and we 
were encouraged by the press which carried 
articles on the reform almost everyday. The 
students had hoped that their demands and 
demonstration would help Deng's reform. The 
relaxed political climate that saw famous 
intellectuals criticizing the Party also gave 
students the impression that dissent would be 
tolerated by the government.'5 
It was true that the party called for political 
changes, but not the changes demanded by Fang Lizhi and the 
students. It was hard to tell whether the party would 
accept the requests made by the intellectuals and the 
students in the future, but what the party and Deng wanted 
now were the gradual and slow changes. The party wanted the 
country to go in one direction in its way, at a slow pace, 
and the students wanted the country to go in the same 
direction, but in their way and at a much faster pace. Both 
had good intentions, both had legitimate arguments. 
Nonetheless, their disputes seemed to be impossible to 
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solve. 
The reassertion of political control after the 
demonstrations in 1986 posed a problem for the leadership in 
that it was still committed to rapid economic modernization. 
The party vowed to continue the open door policy and 
economic reform. Unlike the crude phantom of arrest and 
imprisonment with which students were threatened when each 
crackdown took place, this one ended with the dismissal of 
several liberal reformers and intellectuals. The party did 
not want to alienate further those who were essential to 
economic reform. The continuation of the economic reform in 
the country and curricular changes that would hold promises 
for economic reform in higher education institutions evinced 
more political storms ahead. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATION OF 1989 
The political climate after 1986 took yet another 
shift. soon after the suppression of the 1986 student 
demonstration, the party began to loosen its hardline 
stance, attempting to curb the crusade against 
liberalization for fear of a backlash on China's economic 
reform. The student demonstration of 1989, the biggest in 
the history of modern China, was once again the consequence 
of the party's own call for political restructuring to carry 
on the much needed yet problem laden economic reform. 
The Political Situation After 1986 
Since March 1987, the tendency toward continuing reform 
in the economic and even the political domain placed the 
trend toward conservatism. The political regrouping after 
the student demonstration of 1986 had one blessing in 
disguise. Zhao Ziyang, the Chinese premier who replaced Hu 
Yaobang as general secretary of the Central committee, was 
himself a liberal reformer. Beginning with a speech on 
January 29, Zhao sought to restrict the campaign against 
bourgeois liberalization. He emphasized that opposition to 
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bourgeois liberalization would be confined to the party, 
handled mainly in the political and ideological fields, and 
would not halt the ongoing reform. 1 The Fifth Session of 
the Sixth National People's congress, the highest organ of 
state power in China, was held in March and April 1987. The 
meeting confirmed Zhao Ziyang's position on various issues. 
Zhao wrote a report entitled on the Work of the Government. 
While taking into account the importance of political 
stability and unity, Zhao emphasized that 
without democracy there will be no modernization, 
that democracy must be institutionalized and 
legalized and that conscientious efforts should be 
made to promote democratization in the political 
life of the Party and the state, in economic 
management and in social activities as a whole. 2 
None of these could have happened without Deng 
Xiaoping's change of heart. Deng remained the only person 
who could wield power in the party after Mao's death. 
Deng's dilemma between economic reform, his brain child, and 
political restructuring, was profound. Since 1979, his 
policy repeated a cycle of advance and retreat. This time, 
Deng, annoyed by the conservatives' over-zealousness in the 
participation in severe attacks on liberalization and 
bourgeois influences, concluded that the campaign should not 
go too far. 3 In January 1987 right after the student 
demonstration, he declared that the tendency of rightism was 
a greater danger than leftism. "Leftism" was defined as 
rigid ways of thinking and a lack of understanding of the 
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reforms and opening to the outside world, while "rightism" 
meant the tendency to reject the four cardinal principles of 
the party.' Evidently, Deng in January was fearful of those 
liberals who favored political reform more than those who 
were against it. By April he had reverted to the view that 
leftism or the conservative's were more dangerous to his 
economic reform. 5 This was similar to the stand he had 
taken during 1983 when the movement of Spiritual Pollution 
launched by the conservatives went too far. The reversal of 
his position on this occasion underscored a strong resolve 
to get on with the task of economic reform. 5 
Deng's viewpoint was further manifested when talking 
with a member of the central Presidium of the League of 
communists of Yugoslavia on June 12. During the talk, Deng 
said his reform was comprehensive, including the economic 
and political fields. The political reform was to 
rejuvenate the party, government at all levels and other 
organs, to get rid of bureaucracy, and give power to the 
people. 7 The tone of his talk reflected the position he 
took before the crackdown in 1986. 
several other events manifested the changing political 
tone of the party. Fang Lizhi, after being expelled from 
the party and his vice-p~esidential post in CUST, was 
transferred to Beijing from Hefei. He continued as a member 
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and was made a research 
fellow at the Beijing Astronomical Observatory. A similar 
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situation happened to Guan Weiyan, Fang's associate, and 
writers, such as Wang Ruowang and Liu Binyan.• This led the 
Chinese news media to conclude that "the struggle against 
bourgeois liberalization will not affect the party's policy 
of respecting knowledge and talented people," and the policy 
of "letting a hundred schools of thought contend" will not 
change." 9 These incidents sent a message to the public 
that this political movement by no means resembled the one 
during the cultural Revolution when all intellectuals who 
held opinions different from the government were victimized. 
These occurrences also evidenced the party's unwillingness 
to distance further the people it needed most for the 
development of the country and the effort to eradicate the 
damage caused by the crackdown in 1986. 
The political climate came to parallel that of 1986. 
Several key newspapers and journals carried Deng's old 
articles on political democracy. The media coverage of 
Deng's earlier speeches on political reform revealed that 
the leadership meant what they said in 1986 about political 
restructuring, and after a temporary setback, the political 
reform would go on after all. on July 1, the 66th 
anniversary of the Communist Party of China, the major 
Chinese newspapers republished a 1980 speech by Deng 
Xiaoping entitled "On the Reform of the system of Party and 
sate Leadership." 10 In a commentary, Ren Min Rei Bao 
described the republication of the speech "as an important 
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ideological preparation for the 13th National congress of 
the Party. 1111 Many people expected that an overall plan 
for the reform of China's political set-up would be 
formulated at this meeting, which would open in October. 12 
A few days before the opening of the 13th National Congress, 
Premier Zhao Ziyang was interviewed by NBC news anchorman 
Tom Brokaw in Beijing. Zhao reaffirmed that the pace of 
reform would be expedited, that the success of the reforms 
depended on the leadership's ability to get rid of the 
interference from conservative thinking, that the 
intellectuals who had been expelled from the party would 
continue to be respected and.that they would use their 
talents in their respective fields. 13 
The 13th Party congress of October 25, 1987 was a 
milestone in the course of reform. Zhao Ziyang made a 
report to the congress on behalf of the Central Committee. 
To justify the economic reform that deviated from the 
communist doctrine, Zhao carne up with an official 
ideological justification. He defined China as being in the 
primary stage of socialism. Because China was in this stage 
of development, it should accomplish industrialization and 
commercialization, socialization, and modernization of 
production, which many countries had achieved under 
capitalist conditions. 14 As the fundamental aim of the 
primary stage of socialism was to develop the economy, China 
should engage in reform, adhere to an open door policy, 
strive for a market economy, and encourage democracy that 
was essential to economic reform. 15 
The deepening of the ongoing reform of the 
economic structure makes reform of the political 
structure increasingly urgent. The process of 
developing a socialist commodity economy should 
also involve the building of a socialist 
democracy. Without refor~ of the political 
structure, reform of the economic structure can 
not succeed in the end. 11 
This meeting was significant to Chinese political 
reform. In the report, Zhao also called for separating 
party and government functions, delegating power that was 
over-concentrated to lower levels, reforming government 
organs to solve the unwieldy administrative structure, 
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reforming the personnel system, strengthening the socialist 
legal system, and establishing a system of consultation and 
dialogue. 17 Zhao's report reflected Deng's position prior 
to the 1980's election. As in the past, the general public 
believed that meetings as such were signs of which line the 
party took. The tone of Zhao's reports told them that China 
was once again heading for more and speedier reforms in the 
political and economic fields, which would in turn help its 
modernization efforts. 
Zhao Ziyang took several measures to reinforce the 
directives of the 13th People's Congress. To eliminate 
possible resistance from the propaganda organs where the 
conservatives had entrenched themselves and to let his 
theory of the primary stage of socialism go without 
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opposition, he forced several conservatives to retire, 
closed the major propaganda magazine, Red Flag, and replaced 
it by Seeking Trutb from Facts. 11 In addition, it was 
officially decided that the portraits of Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, and Stalin would not be publicly exhibited in 
Tiananmen Square after the celebration of the 40th 
anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of 
China on October 1, 1989. 1 ' With all these changes, the 
political situation of 1987 returned to the way it was 
before the crackdown in 1986. 
The reformers, under the leadership of Zhao Ziyang, 
entered 1988 in an offensive position. At the beginning of 
the year, communist Party leader Hu Qili stressed the 
importance of emancipating the mind, saying the primary 
ideological task for 1988 should be to achieve a deeper 
understanding of Zhao Ziyang's report to the 13th National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China. 20 The 7th 
National People's Congress was held in April of 1988 in 
Beijing. This Congress was even more open and democratic 
than the one a year earlier. Reform was stressed as the 
most important job, and non-party deputies attended the 
meeting. More than four hundred Chinese and foreign 
reporters covered the meeting; there were many news 
briefings and live TV broadcasts and some foreign news media 
commented that this meeting showed that China was making 
steps toward dernocracy. 21 The representatives voiced their 
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opinions of nominees, and the result had been that few 
nominees were elected unanimously, which broke the tradition 
of Chinese congress meetings where everybody would raise 
hands and agree with everything the leaders proposed. 22 
Zhao Ziyang in this meeting repeated his call for 
democracy in party and state work so as to maintain a sense 
of continuing reform momentum. He called for greater 
openness in party and state affairsr recommending the early 
establishment of a spokesman system for dialogue and 
consultation to solicit opinions of people from all walks of 
life on important draft laws and plans for major reforms 
such as price readjustment. He said people should know the 
truth about major events affecting social stability and 
policies, and things must be explained through extensive 
dialogue so as to enlist people's support and cooperation. 23 
The meeting was full of debate and even dissent. The future 
for political reform looked as bright as it did in 1986. 
The meeting was followed by the boldest economic reform 
since 1978, price reform. Price. of commercial goods had 
always been controlled and regulated by the government, 
which hindered the progress of Deng's economic reform. 
Liberal reformers believed that price reform, the market 
control of price, had to be instituted to provide a 
situation conducive to other economic reforms. Chinese 
economic reform needed a boost, and some believed this was 
the key. At the end of May, reformers pushed their boldest 
157 
move, price reform, supported by Deng. But the price reform 
proved to be premature, and inflation and corruption ran 
rampant as a result. Political attempts to deal with the 
situation had gone in two directions. The dominant one had 
been one of restriction and recentralization advocated by 
conservatives, and the other was to support the continuing 
effort to maintain the momentum of reform from liberals. 
After experiencing some setbacks. in economic reform, 
particularly this price reform, Zhao and other liberal 
leaders became convinced that political reform must take 
higher priority. Organizational reform should precede price 
reform. To introduce price reform, it was necessary to 
restrict the power of the government to intervene in 
enterprise. It was also imperative to have the system of 
checks and balances to "formulate laws and regulations to 
make government more "transparent" and guarantee the honesty 
of officials. 1124 
The Chinese economy before Deng had been socialist 
centrally planned economy. The problems caused by this 
central planning were many such as continuous shortages of 
wanted goods, massive waste, old technology and lack of 
incentives. 25 To solve these problems and realize the goal 
of Four Modernizations, the government began partially 
marketize, privatize the institutions, and partially break 
down the institutions of central planning. But the 
government did not intend to go all the way to the market 
system but only to a socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. 26 
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The government believed this socialism with Chinese 
characteristics would be most beneficial to China. The 
consequences of a complete capitalist market system would be 
as devastating as the consequences of a rapid political 
reform. But the reluctance to go all the way resulted in 
inflation, as the price reform indicated, unemployment and 
income disparities while the half-way market system did not 
provide means to counteract these deficiencies. 27 The 
essential cause of the economic failure after 1984 "has been 
the disjointedness and incompleteness as well as hesitant 
pace of the changes resulting in the emergence of a 
nonsystem that has unintegrated often incompatible, and 
internally inconsistent and unrelated parts of market and 
plan." 28 "The only answer is for the reforms to go all the 
way to the market system at both the levels of institution 
and ideas, uzt 
China entered 1989 facing two realities. The relaxed 
political climate ironically coexisted with deepening 
problems of economic reform, corruption, and public 
dissatisfaction. on the one hand, the anti-liberalization 
crusade, which started after 1986, faded, and political 
control was slackened. The party was politically tolerant, 
and its tolerant attitude permitted intellectuals and 
students once again to stand up and speak out as in 1986. 
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on the other hand, the failure of price reform, the 
uncertain prospect of political reform, widespread 
corruption, and inflation put China into a state of unrest. 
The loosened political climate made it possible for 
liberals, intellectuals, and students to test the limits of 
constraints and to push for more reforms, while the failure 
of economic reform gave conservatives an opportunity to 
reclaim control. 
The mood of the general public, particularly 
intellectuals and students, was that of disappointment and 
distrust. The battle between liberals and conservatives as 
to how to chart the course of the country became fiercer 
than ever. People perceived the party as divided into two 
groups of leaders who wanted to pull China in two different 
directions, while Deng sat on the throne, waving his flag 
one day toward one group and another day toward the other. 
What was most discouraging was that the failure of price 
reform demonstrated that further economic reform would not 
be possible unless political reform was attempted; yet the 
conservative group hampered every endeavor to achieve that 
reform, because it feared the rapid political reform would 
throw China into utter chaos. There was a deep admiration 
of Russia which, under the leadership of Gorbachev, was 
conducting the kind of political reform the Chinese people, 
particularly intellectuals and students, had hoped for, 
freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of 
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election, and freedom of democracy. There was a sense of 
chaos, chaos of ideas. No one could explain how China could 
proceed along the road of communism to a market economy, and 
no one could validate that the freedom of democracy would 
come from following the four basic principles explicated by 
Deng. There was widespread cynicism and despair, and the 
people seemed increasingly immune to the government's verbal 
pledges and promises of China's future. 
Higher Education Institutions 
The changes in higher education institutions reflected 
the Chinese political milieu. Immediately after the 1986 
demonstrations, the government's tone was stern and 
threatening. The college and university campuses were 
shrouded by an anti-liberalization atmosphere. When Zhao 
Ziyang and the liberals came to salvage the potential 
political disaster by curbing the spread of the anti-
liberalization crusade, they saved the higher education 
institutions from catastrophe as well. Along with the thaw 
in the political realm, the gloom that had spilled over the 
campuses began to disappear. 
Certain changes took place in higher education after 
the demonstrations in 1986. The party attributed the 
student demonstration to the bad influence of certain 
intellectuals and to the immaturity of students who came 
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right out of high school and understood little of Chinese 
society. Consequently, the government sought to provide 
students with more opportunities to experience real life so 
that they could maintain the correct political orientation. 
several practices were implemented such as increasing 
political and ideological education for students, 
introducing physical labor and military training, using 
political behavior as a criterion in admitting students to 
college, and urging students to participate in community 
service. 30 The party called community service a second 
classroom during which the students carried out extensive 
social studies. 31 
In some higher education institutions, the party tried 
to improve communication between students and 
administrators. In Beijing University, lectures were 
sponsored by the school to address the problems that 
concerned the students, such as student protests, economic 
reform and western democratic ideas as applied to China's 
modernization. In Fudan, similar lectures were held. 32 All 
these efforts displayed the government's attempts to orient 
students toward what it deemed "correct thinking." 
However, these measures were mild and cautious in nature, 
drastically different from those used during the Cultural 
Revolution. Students would not be barred from entering the 
university if they declared that they would adhere to the 
four cardinal principles. This procedure had much latitude, 
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for declaring one's belief in the four cardinal principles 
to be recruited was different from saying what one really 
believed in. Community service was largely voluntary while 
lectures and political education classes were more 
superficial than real. In all, the police campus created 
during the Cultural Revolution was evident at this time, and 
the government tried to avoid further alienating and 
inflaming the students. 
The government's approach in dealing with several 
intellectuals, especially Fang Lizhi, sent a clear signal to 
students that the party did not want to distance itself from 
the people who were essential to economic reform. When 
interviewed by a Beijing Review correspondent, the new 
president of the Chinese Academy of Science, Zhou Guangzhao, 
parroted Zhao's words that combating bourgeois 
liberalization was strictly an inner-party matter that would 
not affect academic debate. He further stated that, in the 
field of science, the academy would stick to the policy of 
"letting a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of 
thought contend" and encouraged scientists to do research 
and think for themselves. Science and accomplished 
scientists would be held in high esteem, and the new 
president used Fang Lizhi as an example. 33 
The fact that Fang Lizhi and other intellectuals who 
supported the demonstration did not face persecution as they 
would have earlier was a relief to the students. In 1988, 
163 
Beijing Review carried an article on Fang Lizhi's academic 
achievements, which indicated that even though ostracized 
from the party, Fang continued his research work and the 
government recognized his contributions. Fang was also sent 
by the government to visit foreign countries to attend 
lectures and meetings. When asked about the 1986 unrest and 
the anti-bourgeois liberalization campaign, Fang boldly 
said: "I just spoke my own mind. 1131 Students sensed that 
Zhao Ziyang and "his liberal gang" were making a comeback. 
In the meantime, the government tried to ensure that the 
policy of sending students abroad would remain unchanged. 35 
This deliberate effort underscored the attempt by the party 
to assure students at home as well as abroad that the 
government would carry on its open door policy. 
Higher education institutions after 1986 resembled that 
of society at large. Politically, the liberals went from 
being on the defensive to the offensive; society went from a 
repressive one to a open one and so did higher education. 
By 1988, higher education institutions were as open as they 
were in 1986. At this time, Chinese higher education 
institutions had 1.96 million students, 120,000 graduate 
students, and ten thousand foreign students from more than 
one hundred and ten countries. These institutions had sent 
fifty thousand students to study in seventy-six countries 
and regions. 36 
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Students 
The students after the 1986 demonstration were a 
disillusioned group. Although the political climate was not 
repressive, students were largely dismayed by the crackdown 
on the student demonstration in 1986 and by the inability of 
the government to bring about needed political structural 
changes. The political reality was tragic for these young 
men and women. They had tried once in 1980 to attempt 
changes, but they were suppressed. They tried again in 
1986, sincerely believing that the party was serious about 
political reform and genuinely trusting that their efforts 
would determine the course of the nation, but the same fate 
greeted them. What seemed to be more puzzling and ironic 
was that each time they took to the streets and protested, 
they did so under the encouragement from leaders above, and 
each time they were repressed by those same leaders who 
spurred them to action in the first place. The suppression 
of the 1986 demonstration, though mild in nature, left the 
students disenchanted with those who were leading the 
nation. In spite of a relaxed political climate, a feeling 
of hopelessness and sometimes despair enveloped students and 
campuses. 
Students of this time became more thoughtful and mature 
after what they had witnessed and weathered. Only two years 
elapsed between the end of 1986 and the beginning of 1989. 
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Many students who demonstrated in 1986 were in their final 
years of college, and many who were high school seniors in· 
1986 were now freshmen and sophomores. Contrary to the 
common belief that college students were a bunch of kids, 
fiery, idealistic, but nevertheless naive and immature, 
Chinese students of this time, as a result of the unique 
social background, were more mature and sophisticated than 
people in China or foreigners were willing to admit. The 
students were the products of Chinese political reality. 
They witnessed what had transpired in China since 1979, and 
many of them actually participated and experienced the 
political upheaval. Young as they were, they were the best 
of the country and equipped with brilliant minds. Students, 
especially those in the fields of social science, had read 
widely before entering the universities, absorbing ideas at 
very fast pace. 
students of this time were burdened. The reality of 
economic reform had taught them that China would not 
progress, and economic reform would not be carried out to 
its fullest extent without attempting some kind of 
fundamental political reform. They read about the dynamic 
political processes of other countries and felt trapped by 
the autocratic one in which they lived. The Cultural 
Revolution, which was experienced by their parents and 
grandparents, bore bitter memories. The crackdown of the 
1980 and the 1986 student patriotic demonstrations and the 
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repeated failure of attempts at political change left them 
disoriented. The expectation for meaningful life and 
freedom, which was brought about by Deng's economic reform 
and open door policy, was evaporating. In addition, Russia, 
under the leadership of Gorbachev, was undergoing rapid 
political restructuring. The political freedom, which was 
felt stronglyby the Russian intellectuals, was envied by 
the Chinese students and intellectuals alike. If Russia 
could do it, why not China? If political freedom and 
democracy in western countries seemed too far to reach, 
Russia, a communist country after which China patterned its 
political structure, was not an illusion. Students wanted 
freedom, freedom to think and speak. They wanted some 
balance of power, so that the fate of a nation would not be 
determined by the will of one person. They did not advocate 
the abolition of the party or the government. They might 
have wished to put an end to the communist regime, but they 
knew better that political change in China should be a 
process, not a revolution. They were also determined that 
this political process should start somewhere, and paying 
lip service was not enough. The question was how to begin 
this process without being defeated again by the system that 
would resist to the end. 
There was an atmosphere of crisis. In spite of efforts 
on the part of liberals such as Zhao to gear China toward 
more reforms, the situation toward the end of 1988 was 
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dissatisfying to say the least. The troubled economy, 
rampant bureaucracy, and corruption affected China like a 
plague. When Li Shuxian, the wife of Fang Lizhi was invited 
to speak to Beijing University students at a self-styled 
"Democracy Salon" in 1988, she lectured on the topic of 
Chinese democracy. When she asked students for opinions 
after her talk, one student said: "It is not so much fear 
that I feel. It is just hopelessness. our leaders do not 
listen to the people. They n.ever will. 1137 This I perhaps' 
represented the feeling of the majority of students at that 
time. 
The student Demonstration of 1989 
China was bound for something unique in 1989. The co-
existence of the loosened political climate and public 
dissatisfaction signalled a crisis for China entering 1989. 
What made the situation more ominous was the fact that China 
would embrace three expected important events this year. 
Nineteen eighty-nine was the 70th anniversary of the 1919 
May Fourth student demonstration, the 200 anniversary of the 
French Revolution, and the 40th anniversary of the People's 
Republic of China. These three big events beckoned three 
big celebrations. But what was there to celebrate? Had 
China achieved the goals of science and democracy for which 
the students on May 4, 1919 fought? Had China followed the 
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French Revolution's motto--liberty, fraternity, and 
equality? What had the Communist Party accomplished during 
these forty years of control that deserved commemoration? 
These three events caused agitation among Chinese 
intellectuals and students. Finally, with Hu Yaobang's 
unexpected death in early April, China wrote a rare page of 
history. 
several other unique events preceded the 1989 
demonstration, one of which was Fang Lizhi's and other 
intellectuals' letters to Deng. In February 1989, Fang 
Lizhi wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping, hoping that he would 
release Wei Jinsheng, who was sentenced to prison for ten 
years for advocating Chinese democracy. Following Fang's 
letter, thirty-three intellectuals wrote an open letter to 
the Central committee and the state council, asking them to 
release Wei. 31 Following this, a second open letter 
appeared. Forty-two prominent scientists and social 
scientists signed the letter. This was followed by a third 
open letter, signed by young writers and scholars, making 
more extensive demands for democracy. 3 ' 
These incidents greatly affected and encouraged the 
students who were frustrated with the regime and were 
looking for an outlet to express their dissatisfaction. 
They had planned a demonstration on May 4th to commemorate 
the 70th anniversary of the movement, but the death of Hu 
sparked off the earlier planning. The authorities had 
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anticipated protests from dissident intellectuals and 
students on May 4th and were prepared to cope with it, but 
what they did not expect and prepare for were the death of 
Hu Yaobang and the overwhelming student reaction to his 
death. 40 
Hu Yaobang, who helped to navigate China away from 
orthodox Marxism, who led the world's largest Communist 
Party for six years, and who supported the student 
demonstration of 1986 and who was forced to resign in 
disgrace in January 1987, died in April, 1989. 61 Hu became 
increasingly popular among intellectuals and students and 
came to be seen as a symbol of democracy and change, while 
his resignation was viewed as a major example of the 
tenacious allegiance to Marxist orthodoxy and communism ~hat 
existed among some elderly leaders and conservatives. A 
student said that since the 1986 student movement that led 
to the downfall of Hu, university students in Beijing had 
been expressing their feelings of dissatisfaction, and this 
time, their anger came to an explosive point.'2 Thus the 
death of Hu was the prelude to one of the largest and most 
significant demonstrations in the history of China. 
The Mourning and the Demonstration 
Hu died on April 15, 1989, and his death caused 
spontaneous mourning by the students. It was not an 
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ordinary mourning. The evening after Hu's death was 
announced, Beijing University students mourned and 
commemorated Hu in sadness and anger. Wearing black 
armbands, the Chinese way to mourn death, students covered 
campus walls with poems and couplets, essays, and posters. 
These contained not only their sorrow for having lost a 
respected leader who supported political reform and the 
student demonstration of 1986, but also anger at the 
government, which ousted him for tolerating intellectual 
dissidents and students, and which stifled the hopeful 
political restructuring process in late 1986. Hu's death 
finally served as an outlet for the students' pent-up 
grievances and disappointments. one elegiac poem was 
probably the embodiment of the students' feelings: 
Those who should have died live, 
Those who should have lived have died. 
A sincere and honest man has died, 
But the hypocritical and false live on. 
A warm-hearted man has died, 
Indifference buried him. 
A star of hope has fallen--China meets with calamity; 
The ordinary people are angry; if they were not angry, 
What would be the way out? 
What a shame, what a shame? 
one man who cared for all under heaven; 
For one man all under heaven mourn. 
Seeking self-governance for the people, attempting to 
make the country strong and prosperous 
What faults were these? 
Upon hearing of the untimely death of an outstanding 
hero, 
Upon seeing that the universe remains the same as 
before, 
Who can remain unmoved? Yaobang, rest in peace. 43 
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The mourning intensified. Following the poems, 
posters, and wreaths, students of Beijing University, Qinhua 
University, People's University, and another dozen 
universities simultaneously held sessions on campuses 
criticizing the way the government had treated Hu and 
expressing their deep discontent over the party. In 
addition, students voiced their dissatisfaction about the 
obituary of Hu by the Party central Committee, which did not 
clarify the reasons Hu was deposed in 1987, and demanded a 
fair evaluation of his work. 44 On April 16, several hundred 
students went to Tiananmen Square to place wreaths around 
the massive Monument of the People's Heroes and under the 
portrait of Hu. on April 18, thousands of students marched 
from Beijing University to Tiananmen Square in the morning, 
holding banners and shouting slogans along the way: "Long 
live democracy! Long live freedom!" "Down with corrupt 
officials!" They sang patriotic songs, hoping that they 
would not be stopped by authorities. Demonstrations had 
been banned since 1987, but the Chinese constitution 
permitted ceremonies of mourning. Consequently, the 
demonstration, which was partially mourning, was 
unobstructed by police and followed by foreign reporters. 45 
Shortly, the spontaneous mourning and demonstration 
developed into organized protests. In the past, the student 
protests were largely spontaneous with a little or sometimes 
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no organization and strategy, which, to a degree, 
contributed to the failure of the demonstrations. This 
time, the students wanted to do better. Many students felt 
that the official student unions in various schools, which 
were controlled by school authorities, could not represent 
the majority of students or provide leadership to this 
student movement. Therefore, they proposed independent 
student unions be established to organize and coordinate 
protests, unify strength, and win victory. 46 The leaders of 
the organizations would be elected by students, representing 
students and linking students with the citizens. These 
organizations would represent the movement to the government 
while leaders served as official student spokesmen on 
important policy and strategy. 47 This endeavour marked the 
first time in the history of the People's Republic that 
students openly united in forms of organization to protest 
against the government. 48 Consequently, students in several 
universities in Beijing established their own organizations. 
The Preparatory Committee of Beijing University Solidarity 
student Union was established on April 19, and the next day, 
the Student Association of Beijing Universities, which later 
changed its name to the Autonomous student Association of 
Beijing University was formed.'' several other 
organizations of different forms were organized later on by 
students from other universities. In the course of the 
movement, the union of these organizations played a critical 
role in planning the demonstrations and coordinating 
students. 
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Under the leadership of the student organizations, the 
students launched a sit-in in front of the Great Hall of the 
People 1 and initiated their first attempt to communicate 
with the government. The student representatives presented 
a seven-point petition to the government, demanding that the 
party acknowledge the legitimacy of Hu Yaobang and the 
students' pro-liberalization position in 1986, revoke the 
anti-spiritual pollution campaign, which was launched after 
the demonstration, make public the leadership's private 
possessions, allow the publication of independent 
newspapers, raise the educational budget, abolish 
regulations which prohibited demonstrations, and recognize 
demonstrations and the current movement as patriotic in 
nature. 50 students intended to hand the petition to the 
standing committee of the National People's congress, but 
nobody from the committee came to receive it. Instead one 
staff member came out and received the petition. The 
leadership's indifferent attitude toward the students' 
sincere request further displeased and frustrated them. 51 
For five straight days, beginning the day after Hu's 
death was announced, April 16 to April 20, Tiananmen Square 
was the site of students mourning the death and peacefully 
demonstrating for democracy. Students, first spontaneously 
then organized poured out their repressed feelings, and 
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student organizations conducted a public relations crusade 
attempting to involve citizens in support of students and 
their demonstration. 52 Demonstrations were not confined to 
Beijing. More than a thousand students in Shanghai took to 
the streets on the evening of April 18. 53 students also 
held demonstrations in many other cities, smaller in scale, 
but signifying the prevailing discontentment. 
Government's Reaction 
Chinese officials did not take the students seriously 
until students declared a boycott of classes. Unable to get 
any response from the government, students decided to 
boycott classes. 54 Grossly underestimating the reason 
behind these demonstrations, the government conjectured that 
student momentum would run out and quietly fade away with 
the waning of mourning. When the boycott of classes was 
declared, and an increasing number of students continued 
mourning and protest, the government decided to have an 
official memorial service for Hu Yaobang, to be held on 
April 22, one week after his death, to calm students and 
avoid further upheaval. on April 20, fearing that the 
students would once again assemble in Tiananmen Square, the 
Beijing municipal government announced that the square would 
be closed on April 22 during Hu's memorial service. 
However, the students outsmarted the authorities by going to 
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the square on the night before April 22. Consequently, by 
the next morning, there were a huge number of students, 
making it simply impossible for security forces to clear the 
square. 55 
While Hu's memorial was held in the Great Hall of the 
People, the students assembled outside in Tiananmen Square 
listened to the live broadcast of the service and prepared 
to submit a petition. After the service finished, three 
student representatives were allowed to cross the police 
line to present the petition to the government demanding 
dialogue and discussion of problems. 56 Utilizing a gesture 
conjuring up memories of the custom in which petitions were 
tendered to Chinese emperors in the past, three student 
representatives knelt on the step to present the students' 
petition. The three remained on the steps for about forty 
minutes and withdrew when it became clear that neither Li 
Peng nor any other high official would come out to receive 
the petition. 57 Once again, the government officials 
disregarded the students and their requests. Angered and 
humiliated, the students were determined to carry their 
demonstration further than they had originally planned. 
Deng Xiaoping and the conservatives observed the 
student movement with a growing sense of alarm and decided 
to use force to put the discord to an end. On April 24, 
meeting in a special session to discuss the unrest, the 
standing committee of the Politburo resolved to take 
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decisive action to prevent further student demonstrations. 
Premier Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, President of the Republic 
and Vice Chairman of the powerful Central Military 
commission, the Central committee's group in charge of 
military affairs, conferred with an angry Deng, who ordered 
army troops mobilized to suppress any additional 
demonstrations. Deng said: "This is no ordinary student 
movement, but an episode of turmoil. We must take a firm 
stand and take effective measures in opposing and ending 
this turmoil. We can not allow their objectives to be 
achieved. 1158 Zhao Ziyang, the party liberal, was away on a 
state visit to North Korea at this time. 
Deng's intentions were reflected by a front page 
editorial in the People's Daily. For several days while 
university students took to the streets after the death of 
Hu, the People's Daily avoided the issue of the 
demonstrations, mentioning only the mourning activities of 
the Chinese people, including the students. After Deng and 
the conservatives spoke out, the twenty-six editorials by 
People's Daily mirrored their views, calling the 
demonstration "a planned conspiracy, a political 
rebellion. "59 
Under the banner of democracy, they were trying to 
destroy the democratic legal system. Their goal 
was to poison people's minds, to create turmoil 
throughout the country, to destroy political 
stability and unity. This was a planned 
conspiracy, a riot, whose real nature was to 
fundamentally negate the leadership of the 
communist Party and to negate the socialist 
177 
system. 60 
The editorial's harsh condemnation of the movement and 
intimidation infuriated the students and provoked a massive 
march in defiance. Many students felt distressed and 
grieved on reading this editorial, which clearly defined the 
nature of the student movement as rioting and counter-
revolution. For students, the editorial vilified the 
patriotic movement as a planned conspiracy, and the language 
used in the editorial was harsh, reflecting the language 
used during the cultural Revolution, which was threatening 
and condemning. 61 In spite of the ominous warnings from 
Beijing authorities that the mourning period for Hu had 
ended and that further demonstrations were illegal and 
forbidden, on April 26 the Provisional students' Federation 
announced a mass student march in protest of the People's 
Daily editorial. On the morning of April 27, several 
hundred thousand students from more than fifty Beijing 
universities marched along the major streets of the capital 
in one of the biggest displays of dissatisfaction in forty 
years of Communist rule.'2 People in Beijing swarmed into 
the streets to support the students. crowds of cheering 
workers and civilians lined the entire route and hailed 
student marchers. An estimated half million people took 
part in the protest one way or another.' 3 The march was a 
huge success for the students and citizens, and a 
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humiliation for the government. The support of the populace 
was a needed moral boost for the students. 
From the beginning of the demonstration, the students 
expected dialogue with the government. Two petitions had 
been presented but both of them were disregarded. These 
petitions presented to the National Committee were an 
epitome of their demands. Their goal was to accelerate the 
progress of democracy, and their demonstrations, with the 
support of the people, were peaceful and organized. Instead 
of meeting students half way, the government added insult to 
injury by calling the students rioters and counter-
revolutionaries. The twenty-six editorials with their harsh 
condemnation from the top leadership pushed the student 
movement one step further. 
Demonstration on May Fourth 
The student demonstration continued into May 4, the 
70th anniversary of the 1919 Student Movement, as a result 
of the failure on the part of the government to meet the 
students' requests. The government leaders did make some 
gestures of reconciliation on April 29 and 30 by holding two 
dialogues, but both were manipulative and turned into 
lectures. 14 On May 2, student representatives delivered a 
detailed twelve-point petition to the National People's 
Congress and the Party Central Committee, demanding an 
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agreement within twenty-four hours to meetings "on an equal 
basis" between representatives of independent student unions 
and top government leaders. on May 3, when the government 
rejected the students' ultimatum, The Beijing student 
Autonomous Union planned to stage a bigger demonstration on 
May 4 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the famous May 
Fourth Movement. 65 
The May Fourth Movement, the first large-scale student 
demonstration in the modern history of China, which marked 
the awakening of Chinese students and intellectuals as a 
political force, was celebrating its 70th anniversary that 
year. on May 4, 1919, gathering in Tiananmen square, 
Beijing University students and intellectuals protested the 
government's acquiescence in the Versailles Treaty, and 
demanded more democratic rights for the people. Seventy 
years later, on this May 4, Beijing students again 
demonstrated in Tiananmen square, "but now it was from the 
Communist Party that they were demanding more democratic 
rights. 1156 
on May 4, 1989, nearly two hundred thousand protesters 
and other citizens packed Beijing's Tiananmen Square to 
press the government for democracy and freedom. In their 
own way, the students were celebrating the 70th anniversary 
of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, so it was unlikely that 
the government would instigate a crackdown on students on 
this particular day. Security forces made only half hearted 
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attempts to stop the students as they marched through the 
streets of Beijing for more than twelve hours. students 
encircled the Square and rallied at the Monument to the 
People's Heroes at its center. 6 ' Inspired by the example of 
students on May Fourth, 1919, student protesters of this 
time appealed to patriotism to justify their defiance of the 
law. "To be patriotic is not a crime," cried students as 
they marched." 
The New May Fourth Manifesto, read by a student leader 
in the Square, called the students to carry forward the May 
Fourth spirit of science and democracy. The manifesto 
declared that science and democracy advocated by students in 
1919 meant ''the collective wisdom of the people, the true 
development of each individual's ability and the protection 
of each individual's interests." The tasks of students were 
put forth as follows: 
First, to take the lead in carrying out 
experiments in democratic reform at the birthplace 
of the student movement-the university campus, 
democratizing and systematizing campus life; 
second, to participate actively in politics, to 
persist in our request for a dialogue with the 
government, to push democratic reforms of our 
political system, to oppose graft and corruption 
and to work for a press law. 69 
students from other parts of China also participated in 
the May Fourth Demonstration. After the demonstration 
began, independent student unions were in contact with 
universities through out the nation, and student activists 
from schools outside Beijing followed the agenda set up by 
Beijing students. on May 4, demonstrations took place in 
many cities throughout the country. 70 
Liberals vs. conservatives 
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Zhao Ziyang returned to China from his official visit 
to North Korea, and his attitude toward the student 
demonstration, which had been going on for days, was 
different from that of conservatives and Deng Xiaoping. 
Zhao was a liberal who had advocated economic reform and who 
had been supportive of steps toward political reform. He 
came back from Korea facing, on one hand, angry students who 
were determined to push forward their protests and on the 
other hand, the conservatives who were resolved to use 
military force to quell further demonstrations. As the 
general secretary of the Communist party, Zhao had some 
power and influence, which gave hope and encouragement to 
the demonstrating students. on May 4, the day the students 
demonstrated, Zhao Ziyang remarked to delegates of the Asian 
Development Bank that the student movement was patriotic and 
that the students' grievances deserved to be deliberated 
seriously. He told the delegates: 
I believe that they (the students) are by no means 
opposed to our basic system. What they want is 
that we eliminate the defects in our work. They 
are very satisfied with the accomplishments of the 
past ten years of reconstruction and reform, and 
with the progress and development of our country. 
But they are very dissatisfied with the mistakes 
we have made in our work. They want us to correct 
our mistakes and improve our work, which happens 
to be the stand of the Party and government as 
well. 71 
Zhao's speech was apparently a contrast to the People's 
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Daily editorial eight days before, which branded the student 
movement "turmoil," and his speech sent out a signal that he 
would take a more conciliatory line to deal with the 
students. 72 Zhao's stance toward the student demonstration 
was immediately reflected by the media. After Zhao's 
speech, and after studiously ignoring pro-democracy protests 
for the last two weeks, China's official newspapers began to 
display a new openness in their reports of a mass 
demonstration held on Thursday. On the day of the May 
Fourth Movement commemoration, The People's Daily devoted 
almost the whole page to stories concerning the student 
demonstrations, and it also printed the whole text of the 
student petition. The English-language newspaper, China 
Daily, used a cross-page headline which read, "Hi, Mr. 
Democracy!" All the television stations broadcast the 
student demonstrations as their first news item for the 
evening programs on May 4. In all, the media tried to 
portray the demonstrators as patriotic citizens 
commemorating a historic occasion. 73 This was heartening to 
students because more accurate reporting had been one of the 
students' principal demands, and that day's articles and 
photos seemed to be a move to satisfy the demand. 7 ' 
During the week after May 4, the moderate faction, 
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under the leadership of Zhao, attempted to find some common 
ground for a dialogue, but there was a growing schism in the 
party. The inevitable disagreement on how to deal with the 
student demonstration between Zhao and his moderate faction 
and hard-liners, which included Deng, Li Peng, and a group 
of elders, was escalating. Dismayed by Zhao's remarks on 
the May 4 demonstration and similar approaches to students 
during other public appearances, the conservatives were 
exasperated with Zhao and refused to repudiate the twenty-
six editorial. Liberals and conservatives were at their 
most serious and challenging battleground. 
The situation remains extremely unsettled, as the 
debate over recent student demonstrations 
continues to reverberate through the leadership 
and exacerbate the power struggle here. 75 
The demonstrators persevered. Although the boycott of 
classes was officially called off by the Autonomous student 
Association of Beijing Universities as a result of Zhao's 
speech on May 4, many students did not return to class 
because they thought the government had not met their 
requests. On May 6, several hundred students demonstrated 
on the campus of Beijing University, calling on others to 
continue class boycotts until the government agreed to a 
dialogue with the "true representative" of the students, 
namely representatives of the independent student union. on 
the same day, student representatives issued another 
petition to the Party Central Committee calling for 
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substantive dialogue and demanding a satisfactory answer 
from the authorities. However, the internal discord in the 
party made a timely government response to students 
impossible. 76 
May 18--Hunger Strike 
The Student Autonomous Union decided to start a hunger 
strike on May 13 in an attempt to put more pressure on the 
government to talk to students. If the leaders would not 
listen to reason, maybe they would listen to their hearts. 
Hunger strikes appealed to the emotion of those who held 
power as well as to citizens of the country. A hunger 
strike was a serious matter. It required tremendous 
sacrifice on the part of the students. Reluctant to abandon 
the protests without achieving any tangible results, 
students and their union leaders felt a hunger strike was 
their only and last resort. 77 
A hunger strike began, and the students' heroic 
endeavor touched the people of Beijing. On May 14, more 
than two thousand students staged a hunger strike in 
Tiananmen Square, with many citizens gathering around the 
Monument to the People's Heroes to support them. 71 The next 
day, supporters of the student hunger strike increased. 
Rallying in Tiananmen Square on May 15, the citizens showed 
their solidarity with the students. It was estimated that 
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the number of people had reached half a million at one time. 
Professors, journalists, workers, civilians, and even monks 
and nuns had joined the marchers. The students on the 
hunger strike felt positively that they would win because 
they had the support from the people.'' 
The next day, the demonstration was joined by organized 
groups of people. It "turned the center of the capital into 
near-pandemonium in one of the biggest displays of popular 
dissatisfaction the capital has seen since the Communist 
revolution in 1949." eo The crowd was significant not only 
for its size, but also because it marked the first time that 
intellectuals and workers organized themselves to join the 
students in a demonstration. A group of well-known 
intellectuals and professors marched to the Square under a 
big banner of "Chinese Intellectual Circle," and their 
contingent was several miles long. Also marching on the 
streets were journalists from The Science and Technology 
Daily. The People's Daily. China News service and many other 
news organizations. They were holding posters which 
demanded freedom of the press. 11 Among the thousands of 
"work units" that paraded through the capital were organized 
groups representing some of China's most respected and 
sensitive institutions like the People's Liberation Army, 
the Foreign Ministry, the Central People's Broadcasting 
station, and even the cadre school of the Communist Party 
central Committee." 
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Meanwhile, students from nearby cities like Tianjin 
rushed to Beijing overnight to joint their fellow 
students. 13 Huge demonstrations also took place in Hong 
Kong and Macao. Some Hong Kong students also initiated 
hunger strikes in front of the Xinhua News Agency, Hong Kong 
Bureau. About one hundred thousand people in Shanghai held 
a demonstration to support Beijing students. Demonstrations 
also broke out in more than twenty other major cities, such 
as Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shenyang, Hangzhou, Nanjing, 
Wuhan, Chengdu, Harbing, and Shenzhen. •• 
Gorbachev's visit to China 
It so happened that the Soviet President, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, was scheduled to visit Beijing from May 15 to 18 
for a summit meeting with Chinese leaders to improve 
relationships between t~o countries. For thirty years, 
since Mao split with the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in 
the 1959 summit in Beijing, China and the Soviet Union had 
undergone a long hostility which led to bitter ideological 
clashes and border skirmishes. When China was undergoing 
its economic reform, Mikhail Gorbachev decided to carry out 
reforms in the political and economic systems of the soviet 
Union. Under his programs -- glasnost and perestroika--the 
soviet Union had witnessed a lot of changes in its political 
affairs. By then, both of the communist giants desired to 
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mend the rift which existed between the two for thirty years 
in order to conserve more energy to improve their respective 
economies. When Gorbachev offered to go to Beijing for a 
summit talk, China's senior leader, Deng, naturally opened 
his welcome hands. To Deng's dismay, this significant 
event, which was scheduled for May 15-18, was overshadowed 
by the student movement, particularly the hunger strike, 
which coincided with the timetable. Because it was a world 
event, it had attracted many reporters from different 
international news organizations. 
The demonstrating students, who had long regarded 
Gorbachev as a champion of democracy, took this opportunity 
to push their call for dialogue. They regarded Gorbachev as 
a hero and reformer, and hoped that he would bring some 
fresh experiences of political reform in Communist systems 
to China. on May 15, when Gorbachev arrived in Beijing, the 
officials of the Chinese government hastily relocated a 
welcoming ceremony that had been planned for Tiananmen 
Square because thousands of student demonstrators and 
several thousand hunger strikers camping out in the square 
refused to end their vigil for greater democracy. 15 The 
students who occupied the Square said they would hold their 
own welcoming ceremony for Gorbachev. Some students 
displayed portraits of Gorbachev, and others held aloft a 
banner which read "Welcome, Mr Gorbachev, the true reformer" 
in a rebuke to China's own leadership. The demonstrating 
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students went to the soviet embassy to deliver a letter to 
Gorbachev, inviting him to give a lecture at Beijing 
University during his visit. They appreciated Gorbachev's 
reform of the soviet political system, because they believed 
it was the fundamental way of removing the malignant tumor 
of the society. Therefore, the students wanted to hear 
Gorbachev talk about the political reform in the soviet 
Union so they might draw some encouragement and experience 
from it." 
Mikhail S. Gorbachev's comment about the student 
demonstration was cautious but forceful. He portrayed the 
popular uprising that had engulfed the Chinese capital as 
part of a painful but healthy worldwide upheaval in 
Communist countries. Gorbachev cautiously praised the 
students who began the huge vigil for greater democracy and 
repeatedly declared that economic change was impossible 
without political reform. "I am convinced that we are 
participating in a very serious turning point in the 
development of world socialism," the Soviet leader said at a 
news conference when asked to assess the unrest here and in 
his own country. 17 "All communist countries are heading at 
different paces toward greater freedom of expression, 
democracy and individual rights. These processes are 
painful, but they are necessary."" 
Dialogue Failed and Martial Law Declared 
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The student hunger strike supported by civilians 
continued/ and Zhao's moderate wing made another attempt to 
alleviate the tension. The students on hunger strike 
demanded direct talks between their delegates and government 
leaders and insisted that these talks be broadcast live. 
Zhao Ziyang sent a message to the students calling on them 
to end their hunger strike and declared that the highest 
levels of the government and the Communist Party affirmed 
the students• patriotic spirit in calling for democracy and 
law and opposing corruption and striving for further 
reform.'' This was a retreat from the party's previous 
position that the demonstrators were trying to cause trouble 
and sabotage the economy. Zhao also promised that the 
authorities would not punish them after calm was restored. 90 
Unfortunately, the message sent by Zhao only represented the 
wish of the moderate gang 1 not the powerful conservative 
one. 
Premier Li Peng/ who represented the conservative wing 
of the government, did not have any direct dialogue with the 
students until May 18, the sixth day of the student hunger 
strike 1 when over three thousand students were rushed to 
hospitals for treatment. To defuse the situation/ Li Peng 
had a meeting with the student representatives. 91 However, 
the meeting was abortive because Li refused to accept any of 
the students' demands; instead he lectured them on the 
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importance of maintaining the political situation of unity 
and stability, refused to discuss issues raised by the 
students, and hinted at a crackdown if the disorder 
continued. As a result, students continued their hunger 
strike.u 
The student movement, which started on April 15, took 
a drastic turn when the government declared martial law. 
Since the beginning of the student movement, the political 
climate had experienced many fluctuations caused by the 
inner conflicts between liberal and conservative wings. 
students had hoped that the liberal group would prevail, and 
the conservative one would give in under pressure by not 
only students who demonstrated and those who went on a 
hunger strike, but also by the millions of people who 
supported them. Inauspiciously, the conservative hard-
liners inside the Communist Party took the upper hand when 
Deng explicitly expressed his view of using military force 
to suppress the democratic movement.' 3 Li Peng delivered a 
hard-line speech at a meeting attended by all top party, 
army, and government officials on the evening of May 19, 
which soon turned out to be the order of martial law. Li 
said in his speech that "we must adopt firm and resolute 
measures to end the turmoil swiftly and maintain the 
leadership of the party as well as the socialist system." 9 ' 
After Li's harsh speech, martial law was enforced. In 
the subsequent days, military troops were gradually 
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dispatched into the capital. Stories following the party 
line and covering government announcements began to 
outnumber those of the student movement. The martial law 
order s~gned by Premier Li Peng, the letter to the Beijing 
civilians by the martial law troop headquarters, and three 
orders by Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong, which banned all forms 
of demonstration, parade, and petition, and forbade foreign 
journalists to interview Chinese nationals or to take 
pictures of the demonstrations, inundated the media. 95 
General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, who refused to attend 
the meeting where martial law was declared, lost power in 
the battle. The day the meeting was held, instead of 
attending the meeting, he visited the students on strike in 
Tiananmen Square. He pleaded with them to end their hunger 
strike by assuring them that the problems they raised would 
eventually be solved. Zhao said, "I feel very sorry that we 
have come too late. You have every right to blame and 
criticize us." Zhao told the students that "you have good 
intentions. You want our country to become better .... But 
things are complicated, and there must be a process to 
resolve these problems."'6 on May 26, Zhao was deprived of 
power and placed under house arrest. Hu Yaobang, who was 
ousted for his role in the 1986 student demonstration, Zhao 
Ziyang, who had been a strong supporter of Chinese economic 
and political reform and had been sympathetic toward the 
student demonstration, both met the same destiny. 
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Students and civilians were angered and openly defied 
the government order. On May 21, the Beijing University 
student Autonomous Union announced an end to the hunger 
strike that had started on May 13. Nearly three thousand 
hunger strikers gave up their nine-day fast, saying they 
needed to preserve their strength to fight the government. 
They added that the government was too brutal to be 
sensitive to the pressure of a hunger strike.'7 After the 
martial law order was issued, the masses of Beijing 
civilians set up road blocks in some main traffic 
intersections leading to the suburbs, for fear of possible 
bloodshed when the People's Liberation Army carne into the 
city. By evening, large crowds gathered around the traffic 
intersections where blocks were set up with all kinds of 
large vehicles and other objects. on sunday, May 21, the 
peacefully demonstrating Beijing students sat together in 
Tiananmen Square with students from other parts of the 
country, and the endless stream of people on Changan Avenue 
moved about day and night. The demonstrations drew hundreds 
of thousands of people who called for the cancellation of 
martial law and withdrawal of the military troops. 98 
students rushed from all parts of the capital to the central 
square and vowed they would continue their fight for 
dernocracy. 99 
Many people took to the streets to defy martial law, and 
people from all over the world demonstrated to denounce the 
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government and show support for the students. Troops 
approaching Beijing on at least five major roads were halted 
or turned back by large crowds. 100 Since the students' 
hunger strike and the government's order for martial law, 
the protesters' rage seemed increasingly directed at the 
nation's leaders, especially the senior leader, Deng 
Xiaoping, and Prime Minister Li Peng. A popular slogan now 
was, "Xiaoping, step down! Li Peng, Resign! "101 The support 
of the students from people in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao, 
as well as from Chinese students studying abroad, against a 
possible crackdown was tremendous. 102 
The occupation of Tiananmen Square continued. By the 
end of May, students had held Tiananmen Square for more than 
two weeks. Even though the hunger strike was called off, 
thousands of students resolved to maintain pressure on the 
government by continuing their round-the-clock occupation of 
the Square. 
The Goddess of Democracy and Massacre 
After Premier Li Peng ordered martial law in Beijing, 
hundreds of thousands of Beijing civilians left their homes 
to set up blockades against the army troops in the Beijing 
suburbs. The party's control of the news media became 
tighter than ever before, and army soldiers were sent into 
some major news organizations such as People's Daily, Xinhua 
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News Agency, and the Central Broadcasting and Television 
Administration. News stories, filled with political 
propaganda began to appear in People's Daily again, and 
foreign journalists were warned not to interview or take 
pictures of the student demonstrators. Later, Chinese 
authorities even ordered the cutoff of satellite 
transmissions of some major international news media, such 
as CNN and CBS. Military suppression was imminent. 
At this critical moment, the students, defying the 
government warning and vowing to sacrifice their lives for 
China's democracy, put up a statue of the Goddess of 
Democracy in the center of Tiananmen Square to encourage the 
exhausted demonstrators to carry on their struggles. This 
action further angered the government. Reacting to the 
erection of the Goddess of Democracy in Tiananmen Square, 
People's Daily printed a statement by the Tiananmen 
Administrative Bureau on its front page May 31, calling the 
statue "an insult to our national dignity and a mockery to 
the nation's image." 1 ~ 
By now, the government had made the final decision to 
crackdown on the students who had occupied Tiananmen and 
gripped the attention of the world for nearly two months. 
The statue of the Goddess of Democracy was crashed into 
pieces by martial law troops amid the deafening gunfire and 
heartbreaking human screams in the early morning of June 4, 
when the army troops took control of Tiananrnen Square. 
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Relentlessly, the regime utilized automatic weapons, which 
filled the air on Changan Avenue, the main thoroughfare 
going through Tiananmen Square, and crushed the unarmed 
students and civilians. 
The communist regime started its frenzied military 
crackdown in the early morning of June 4. About 
20,000 troops broke through the blockade put up by 
the civilians under the cover of armored vehicles 
and heavy machine gunfire, and finally occupied 
Tiananmen Square. The troops fired 
indiscriminately at the crowds on both sides of 
the streets all the way during their advance 
toward Tiananmen, leaving countless corpses on the 
streets which were flooded by human blood. By 4 
a.m., about 3,000 students and civilians were 
slaughtered, and countless were wounded. 104 
Describing the communist troops as "frantic beasts" 
who lost all human senses and conscience, The Central Daily 
~ reported that they used the tanks to crush dozens of 
students and civilians, stabbed women and children with 
bayonets, shot at medical personnel and ambulances, and 
burned corpses in Tiananmen Square to eliminate the 
evidence. Yet on June 5, the Chinese media hailed troops 
for "victoriously crushing this counterrevolutionary 
rebellion. "105 Sure enough, the party was triumphant in 
shattering the dreams and hopes of millions of its people, 
and it accomplished the task by employing Chinese army tanks 
and soldiers. 
The massacre was only the first step toward total 
suppression of dissent and elimination of all that would 
pose a threat to the government. The purge following the 
June 4 massacre was petrifying. There were massive arrests, 
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tortures, executions of those who had been involved in the 
demonstration. The student leaders and intellectuals were 
once again the target of the purge. Unlike the campaign 
against bourgeois liberation after the 1986 student 
demonstration, which was cautious and mild in nature, the 
measures taken by the government this time were black 
terror. Many who were active in the demonstration sought 
ways to escape China, but only a few were successful. 
Following the arrests and executions, the party began a 
massive crusade of thought control and ideological 
rectification. Official documents came down and everybody 
was required to study the speech by Deng Xiaoping. All 
urban work units required their employees to engage in 
intensive political studies. 106 
What happened in China in the months of May and June 
1989 shocked the world. Ousted as general secretary for 
supporting earlier political reforms, Hu Yaobang's death led 
to an unparalleled political earthquake which had not taken 
place since the founding of the People's Republic. Rallying 
at the historical center Tiananmen Square, thousands of 
college students, with many of them on hunger strike, 
expressed the inexpressible, a longing for freedom and 
democracy. Inspired and encouraged, one million Beijing 
citizens joined the students. The demonstration spread to 
many other Chinese cities with students swarming to Beijing 
to show their support. Confronted by these serious and 
197 
eager students and the public, the Communist Party faced its 
most serious challenge in its forty year existence. After 
weeks of hesitation, the regime took action. The military 
massacred Chinese youth and people, and turned the peaceful 
dream for democracy into a horrible nightmare. Many were 
killed or wounded and others were arrested as counter-
revolutionaries. By using force to suppress the unarmed 
students and other civilians, the communist Party leaders 
shattered the legitimacy of the regime. 
The student movement, which sprang up after the death 
of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989, was the most dramatic and 
bloody demonstration of all, writing a significant page in 
the history of the Chinese student democratic movement. 
Hu's death triggered this unprecedented student 
demonstration. His advocacy of political reform and 
tolerance of student demonstrations led to his disgrace in 
1986 and won widespread sympathy among students and 
intellectuals. The students' spontaneous mourning 
activities quickly turned into demonstrations for freedom 
and democracy. Hu Yaobang was not the underlying cause of 
the demonstration. His death was merely the catalyst, the 
spark. Hu's death provided an outlet for pent-up anger and 
dissatisfaction. What the students said throughout the 
demonstration was what they wanted to say in the 1980 
students' election, the very beginning of the student 
movement after Deng came into power. 
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The significance of the 1989 student demonstration will 
be determined by its impact on China's future. Although it 
did not succeed in its immediate goals, it did awake the 
Chinese people both in China and abroad to their political 
consciousness. The government, by refusing to confront 
change and by wielding the military power to crush those who 
demanded change, lost its legitimacy. It is true that the 
Chinese government did not intend to kill as many people as 
they did. The government might have felt genuinely that 
order had to be restored and the suppression was necessary. 
Nonetheless, the crackdown brought the irreversible 
alienation of intellectuals, students, urban workers, and 
people from other segments of Chinese society. The student 
demonstration won the sympathy of millions of people from 
all over the world, and it united the overseas Chinese in 
the endeavour to strive for a democratic China. In 
addition, China estranged thousands of its students who were 
studying abroad. These students, who are the brightest 
group of China and who are in their final stages of 
finishing their advanced education, are unlikely to return 
home. Whether they would remain in foreign countries to 
carry on the movement or not, China had lost valuable 
personnel for its economic construction. 
The student demonstration of 1989 followed the pattern 
of the previous demonstrations. It was the result of the 
success of the party in slackening the political control, 
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but failure to carry out political reforms, the success in 
experimenting with economic reform, but failure to create 
systems to check the abuses in the market economy, which 
brought rampant corruption in 1988, the success in raising 
the standard of living, but failure to fulfil the higher 
expectations. The contradiction and dilemma of the Chinese 
political reform were further manifested. The leadership 
might indeed have intended on changes that could result in 
the political structure reform. But the official reaction 
made it clear that both the time and the scope of change had 
decided by the party that resolved to maintain a firm grip 
and order of the society. To call for limited democratic 
reform to enliven the country's economic life was one thing, 
but to implement it was quite another. The top leadership 
did not discern that democracy did not lend itself well to 
partial application, because it had a predictable way of 
raising expectations, particularly among Chinese students 
and intellectuals. The Communist Party could not expect to 
achieve democracy or political modernization without 
relinquishing some of its power, neither could it dictate 
what people should and should not do according to its own 
will. To a certain degree, the leadership's vision and 
understanding of China and its people were limited. There 
was no doubt the Chinese people wanted to have better 
material things and the leadership should do its best to 
fulfill these needs. Nonetheless, the Chinese people did 
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not live on bread alone. The basic needs for material 
things were soon superseded by higher needs such as 
political freedom. It was incongruous that the leadership 
would release some of its political grip over the 
intellectuals and students, and nonetheless expect them to 
be submissive and mute. 
When Deng laid out the four cardinal principals for 
China, he drew a clear demarcation line between what was 
acceptable and what was not. If Deng had not initiated his 
economic reform, perhaps it would be all right not to talk 
about the political reform. The paradox was that without 
political reform, Deng could not reach his grand plan for 
bringing China to catch up or surpass the developed 
countries. Yet with political reform, he might lose his 
control over the entire nation; his fear for the nation's 
disunity and anarchy might occur. on one hand, the party 
needed desperately to gratify the intellectuals and 
students, on whom the government pinned its greatest hopes 
of turning China into an economically advance country; on 
the other, it repeatedly offended and purged the 
intellectuals and the students who challenged its power and 
pushed political reform. These two realities have haunted 
Deng and the party ever since Mao's death. The 
contradiction and dilemma would continue as long as China 
prepared to open up to the outside world for its economic 
development. The pendulum would always oscillate between 
those who wanted more reform and those who desired more 
stability and power. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The tension between the Chinese government and the 
students and the impact of the government on the student 
movements from 1978-1989 was evident. The zigzag course of 
the political reforms and the zigzag course of the student 
democratic movements over these ten years revealed the 
fundamental tension and conflicts between the government and 
the students as to how to run China. The 1980, 1986, and 
1989 student movements flourished during the time when the 
Chinese leadership loosened control and encouraged political 
reform, while the student movements retreated when 
leadership retracted the freedom it had offered earlier. 
The student movements during these ten years had been 
spurred by the government's own call for political freedom 
and intensified by the unprecedented academic openness. 
However, unprepared for serious political challenges, the 
leadership was fearful of the force it released and finally 
stifled every movement as it occurred. 
This phenomenon also revealed a fundamental dilemma of 
the Chinese leadership. On one hand; it needed to institute 
political reforms so as to carry on the necessary economic 
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reforms, on the other hand, the political reform would, in 
the party's mind, not only threaten the power and 
foundations of Communism but also the stability and unity of 
China. consequently, the political reforms were half-
hearted and failed to satisfy the students and 
intellectuals, who believed that the ills of China could be 
resolved only through the fundamental political changes and 
that these changes should take place sooner rather than 
later. The students perceived the leadership as fearful of 
losing power. As for the leadership's concern for the 
country's stability and unity, the students and 
intellectuals did not think their demands would create chaos 
and anarchy; instead, they were convinced that what they 
advocated was to safeguard the unity and stability of the 
country. 
Mao's death in 1978 ushered in new Chinese political 
leadership. Facing the consequencies of Mao's policies, 
China had opened up and assimilated Western technology to 
save its devastated economy and to reintegrate itself into 
global economic development. The Chinese Communist Party 
called on its people to work for the modernization of 
agriculture, industry, defense, and technology. With the 
improvement of the economy and through the influence of 
western technology and ideas, there was an increasing need 
for changes in the political structure of the Communist 
Party. Unlike Gorbachev, whose gradual loosening of 
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communist strictures brought Russians some democratic air to 
breathe, the Chinese leadership refused to countenance 
serious political openness. Their.fear was for China's 
stability and unity. Thus the crisis between the 
transformation required by economic reform and the 
resistance of a cautious political leadership became 
inevitable. Under the pressure of economic development, the 
party had attempted several political reforms to improve the 
political structure, but each time the reform was carried 
further by the students than the party had intended, and met 
the opposition from the leadership that initiated the 
attempt. 
This phenomenon seemed to exert a significant impact on 
higher education institutions and t~e student movements from 
1978 to 1989. Following the oscillations of the 
leadership's temperament, higher education institutions 
carried out very aggressive reforms and in the meantime the 
institutions retreated as well. This was also true of the 
student movements. Since 1919 when Chinese students and 
intellectuals first participated in the demonstration for 
science and democracy, students had been active participants 
of Chinese revolutionary, patriotic, and democratic 
movements. Students, who were always the conscious of 
China, became active advocates for Chinese political freedom 
from 1978 to 1989 too. Their enthusiasm and yearning for 
political autonomy led to several significant student 
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movements, noticeably the one in 1989. However, the student 
movements in those ten years also weathered several setbacks 
following the political changes of the party. There were 
many long intervals when student movements were in retreat 
and students inactive. 
The students weathered experience and trauma of 
historical significance. They were the products of the 
higher education institutions under Deng's leadership. The 
relatively free and open academic environment prepared them 
to accept new challenges. Being led to believe that their 
demonstrations were in support of the party and its 
endeavour for political reforms/ the students participated 
with vigor and couragei yet each of their protests was 
suppressed by the leadership who encouraged them in the 
first place. All in all, each of the student movements 
represented a significant struggle on the part of the 
students for political freedom and democracy, and was an 
effort that would not have been possible without initial 
support from the political leadership. 
The Chinese political scenario of those ten years, 
which was dominated by the tension between the students and 
the government and which followed the pattern of advance and 
retreat, was finally over. Deng and his party, tenaciously 
clinging to his beliefs about how to administer China and 
refusing to yield to the student demands of political 
reform, eventually brought about bloodshed. Brutal and 
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tragic as the carnage of 1989 was, the party still believed 
it did the right thing, considering how powerful the force 
it released, and how dangerous it would be if the students 
were triumphant. However, the crackdown did not reduce the 
tension between the students and the government, neither did 
it rid the government of the quandary it had been facing for 
ten years ever since Deng took power. How could the party 
effectively use the intellectuals and students in its 
endeavour to develop China economically without involving 
them too much politically? Should it stop its open door 
policy and halt the economic reform, which was the cause of 
raised expectations, bourgeois liberalization, and 
demonstrations? If it did, China would face economic 
bankruptcy, which would make the government lose the support 
of the base of Chinese society, the peasantry. If that 
happened, eventually the government would lose its power, 
and the country would be thrown into disarray. 
After the June demonstrations, the government 
vacillated between total withdrawal and continuation of 
economic reform. Finally it realized it really had no 
choice but to go on with its open door policy and economic 
reform, for it could not afford an economic catastrophe. 
The government still believed it was working for the well-
being of the nation and China, under its leadership, would 
eventually surpass the world in the economic development. 
Present China is under military dominion. The 
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government is leading a dispirited populace with the support 
from the military and using the coercive power to keep its 
people silent, which it believes to be necessary for China's 
stability. However, is not a government that has to resort 
to the military to control its people a desperate one? How 
productive can a person be under the threat of a gun? How 
can human potential be used to its fullest capacity with the 
threat of persecution? How can the government regain trust 
through suppression? How well can the economy fare in a 
situation of control and intimidation? Above allr how long 
can a country maintain unity and stability through military 
menace? 
China today is facing a deeper crisis. To a certain 
extent, the leadership today is no different from the 
leadership before the massacre in that it still faces the 
same dilemma. It has no choice but to go ahead with 
economic reform. But the leadership today faces one new 
problem. The military force it unleashed in June 1989 
destroyed the credibility of the party. The "stability and 
unity" China has on the surface today does not represent the 
true stability and unity a democratic nation should have. 
It is conceivable that the leadership will gradually loosen 
its control, militarily, as well as politically; it is also 
conceivable that it will sometime later encourage some sort 
of political reforms. The question however is: Will the 
public in general and students in particular still believe 
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them? Will they answer the leadership's call as they used 
to? Will the confidence in the party lost during the 
massacre return? The answer is probably no. The present 
regime this time completely lost moral leadership, which is 
vital to Chinese society. 
Throughout Chinese history, the commoners' belief and 
trust in leadership had always been considered important. 
Confucius urged rulers to be good examples of virtuous 
conduct to enlist people to have faith in them. When Mao 
took over in 1949, people had faith in him, believing that 
he would lead them toward a no class, no oppression and only 
happiness society. This faith was damaged by the Cultural 
Revolution. By the time of Mao's death, the communist 
regime had already faced a serious legitimacy crisis. The 
confidence of major segments of society in the system had 
been shaken. When Deng launched his reform program, 
promising the reform of the economy first and political 
reform later, the confidence of the society in the 
leadership began to rebuild. This could explain why the 
students and intellectuals responded actively to the party's 
call for political reforms. Even though each student 
demonstration before 1989 was quelled, the treatment of the 
dissents was moderate in contrast to the treatment the 
students and intellectuals underwent in the cultural 
revolution. Consequently, the students still kept their 
belief in the leadership, assuming there were conflicts 
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within the party and that Deng would eventually prevail and 
side with the liberals. But the bloody crackdown of 1989 
changed perhaps the people's perception of and faith in the 
party. Consequently, it changed the course of the student 
movements. 
The massacre can be considered as a turning point in 
the student movement of these ten years. The cruelty of the 
military force in suppressing peaceful students and 
civilians has shattered the faith, however little the 
people, particularly students and intellectuals had in them. 
To use a Chinese saying: it has lost the "mandate of 
heaven." The demonstration and protest in the future of 
China is unlikely to resemble those in the past. When the 
new demonstration and protests do take place in the future, 
they will be the ones that will change the course of Chinese 
history, not the ones to be suppressed by the present 
leadership. 
The open door policy, economic reform, cultural 
pluralism, ideological relaxation, political reforms, 
student demonstrations over these few years, and the 
massacre of 1989 have compounded the tension between the 
students and the government. China can not be what it used 
to be when Mao was alive; nor can it be what it wants to be 
in a short time. The reality in the years to come will not 
only be the visible battle over economic development and 
political control but also over the invincible battle 
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between legitimacy and faith. The tension between the 
government and the students is bound to accumulate, and the 
danger lies ahead. Under the eerie calm surface of China, 
there is suppressed anger and dissent, and when there is an 
outlet to discharge this wrath, it is bound to be 
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